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The ability to resolve uncertainty surrounding reward-associated cues is essential for 
the proper organization and generation of reward-seeking. Traditional approaches have 
modelled this dynamic process with distinct physical settings which preclude a collective 
neural and behavioral assessment of both how such contextual or higher-order cues are 
encoded and how they subsequently act on conditioned stimuli to in turn effect 
behavior. Here, I investigated the ability of rats to use higher-order cues to resolve the 
likelihood of reinforcement to an ambiguous conditioned stimulus, a process termed 
occasion setting. In Chapter 2, I characterized a novel approach to observing the 
hierarchical control of reward-seeking and discover unique motivational characteristics 
of higher-order contextual stimuli. In Chapter 3, I use optogenetic methods in 
combination with genetically modified rats to probe the contribution of dopamine 
neurons in the ventral tegmental area to occasion setting. These findings present a real-
time contribution of the degree of dopamine neuron activity to the amount of reward-
seeking which is consistent with reports of dopamine neurons encoding the expected 
utility of conditioned stimuli. In Chapter 4, I show that neural activity and dopamine 
signaling with the nucleus accumbens is essential for occasion setting. I further 
characterized the activity of nucleus accumbens neurons using in vivo electrophysiology 
and, in collaboration with colleagues at the University of Minnesota, monitored 
dopamine release in the nucleus accumbens to provide a mechanistic account of the 
role of the nucleus accumbens in the organization of reward-seeking. In Chapter 5, I 
find that basolateral amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex, but not dorsal hippocampus, are 
necessary for occasion setting. In Chapter 6, I described the encoding of occasion 
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setters in the basolateral amygdala and the necessity of activity in the basolateral 
amygdala for this higher-order cue to influence conditioned reward-seeking. These 
results are contrasted with recordings and optogenetic manipulations in the orbitofrontal 
cortex. Collectively these results detail neural and behavioral mechanisms for the 
generation of flexible cue-triggered reward-seeking which have implications for our 
understanding of aberrant motivation in psychiatric illness. 
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Introduction: Hierarchical regulation of reward-seeking, reinforcement, and 
relapse 
Introduction 
We exhibit extreme flexibility in our behavior. For instance, we may have a goal 
in mind to run to the store after work and pick up some fresh salmon for dinner to fit with 
our new diet, but on the way speak to a colleague who just returned from Japan and 
instead coordinate dinner plans for izakaya that evening. This brief conversation 
overcame your previous goal to enjoy a more sustainable meal and save on costs, 
instead leading you to opt for a costlier, less healthy, but much more satisfying dinner 
experience. While the conversation itself did not involve a direct relation to the outcome, 
chicken karaage, it was able to exert control over your future behavior by altering the 
motivational value of the izakaya restaurant’s appeal. Systems neuroscience has long 
been fascinated with such concepts, yet the models of behavior used to probe and 
detail neural substrates responsible have not been sufficiently complex to capture these 
influences. These overly reduced approaches to cue-guided behavior have resulted 
from influential models of error-based learning that relate changes in behavior to 
changes directly related to the presence or absence of an outcome (Rescorla and 
Wagner, 1972; Pearce and Hall, 1980). Behavior, though, is sculpted by the presence of 
cues and occurs prior to the appearance of an outcome and in many cases can become 
immune to the influence of the presence or absence of reward so it is not apparent that 
trial-and-error learning best captures dynamical behavior. Thus, it is necessary to ask 
how motivation can dynamically alter our behavior and how neural systems could 
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exhibit exquisite scaling of responses to an identical cue according to the appropriate 
circumstance in which it was encountered. 
In the laboratory, it is difficult to model such complex influences on goal-directed 
reward-seeking and pair these approaches with careful neurobiological investigations in 
animals. One way in which to model flexibility is to make use of cues that have distinct 
meanings in differing settings. In this approach, animals must make use of a multitude 
of stimuli that are long-lasting and compose what is colloquially referred to as a context 
to disambiguate whether the cue will predict a given outcome or not on that day. While 
context-based models of reward-seeking are very popular and have been useful for 
understanding phenomenon like renewal of responding, relating the influence of a 
context in the lab back to potential contextual influences on real-world reward-seeking is 
difficult (Bouton, 1988, 2002, 2004; Zironi et al., 2006; Chaudhri et al., 2008; Maren et 
al., 2013; Remedios et al., 2014; Liberzon and Abelson, 2016; Trask et al., 2017; 
Valyear et al., 2017). Parsing the precise actions of an arrangement of stimuli like a 
context on a cue-outcome relationship is hard to disentangle given their undefined 
temporal structure, the typical requirement for both predictive learning and extinction 
learning to occur to observe context-based effects, and that they only provide a readout 
of contextual influences at a final test and not in the ongoing organization and 
generation of reward-seeking. 
One way in which our reward-seeking can be influenced is through the actions of 
stimuli that act to set the occasion for when cues are important. This occasion setting 
allows for the resolution of ambiguity about cues without the occasion setter itself 
generating a specific prediction about the likelihood of an outcome (Holland, 1992; 
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Schmajuk and Holland, 1998; Fraser and Holland, 2019). The actions of physical 
contexts and settings, both in the laboratory and in real life, likely sculpt behavior as a 
result of their occasion setting properties, but they can also become directly linked to 
reward and so it is unclear if the occasion setting or direct predictive properties of these 
contexts explains their actions (Bouton and Swartzentruber, 1986; Grahame et al., 
1990). Fortunately, occasion setting can be modeled in a number of tractable ways in 
the laboratory that allows for a mechanistic account of the generation of flexible cue-
generated behavior at both a psychological and neurobiological level (Fraser and 
Holland, 2019). In this review, I will expand on the ability of contexts and cues to act as 
occasion setters and highlight the utility of this overarching framework to advancing our 
understanding of the hierarchical control of reward-seeking. In particular, I hope to make 
apparent the potential pitfalls with traditional context-oriented approaches and avenues 
to overcome these issues by modeling the ongoing resolution of uncertainty with 
occasion setting. As a result, I provide predictions for the function of dopamine neurons 
in the ventral tegmental area and dopamine release in the nucleus accumbens in 
guiding such hierarchical cue-triggered motivations to hopefully guide future 
investigations in a vastly underexplored area of behavioral and systems neuroscience. 
Cue-triggered motivations 
One of the primary triggers for reward-seeking and relapse is the presence of 
cues associated with reward (Bolles, 1972; Bindra, 1974; Stewart et al., 1984; Childress 
et al., 1993; Robinson and Berridge, 1993; Toates, 1998; Berridge et al., 2009). 
Through associative learning processes, cues that are present during encounters with 
rewards, like drugs of abuse, come to predict them and can serve to generate 
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expectations of reward receipt. Cues can have simple or highly complex relationships 
with rewards and other cues which determine a number of factors in their influence on 
our behavior. In general, much research has focused on the actions and consequences 
of learning simple cue-reward relationships, where either a single cue is paired with 
reward, or one cue is reward-paired and a different cue is never paired with reward 
(Rescorla, 1988; Fanselow and Wassum, 2015). Even in these extremely simple cases, 
cues can come to predict a wide number of properties about the reward. For instance, 
the sound of an ice cream truck might elicit the taste of chocolate soft-serve, including 
its creamy texture and its sweetness that promotes reward-seeking. Cues may also 
elicit a general prediction about how good some outcome is, absent any mental 
representation of that quality or sensory properties of that reward, and this general 
value is used to shape behavior (Holland, 1990; Dayan and Berridge, 2014; Sutton and 
Barto, 2018). These mechanisms can be dissociated in the laboratory. 
Take for example a rat that has learned that white noise predicts a banana 
flavored sugar pellet and that a beeping tone predicts grape flavored sucrose syrup. As 
a result of the pairings of each cue with reward, the rat sculpts its checking of the port 
where the rewards are delivered to be highest when the cues come on, getting ready 
and exhibiting anticipatory appetitive behavior. If the rat was attracted to check for the 
rewards by the cues electing a rich and detailed representation of the crunchy, banana 
pellet or the sticky-sweet syrup, then manipulating the value of a reward should have a 
specific effect on the likelihood the rat will exhibit port-checking. There are two common 
ways to do this, either by letting the animal eat either reward freely until they are sated 
on it or by pairing consumption of one of the rewards with nausea produced by injection 
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of lithium chloride (Garcia et al., 1955; Rolls et al., 1981; Loy and Hall, 2002). If the rats 
used a rich representation of the sensory properties of the reward, they should respond 
less to the pre-fed or nausea-paired reward-predictive cue, but if the rats instead are 
generally motivated by the value of the cues resulting from their repeated pairings with a 
good outcome, then alterations of the reward’s value will be without effect (Holland, 
1990; Pickens and Holland, 2004). If responding to the cue is sensitive to making the 
reward less desirable, then we call this behavior model-based as it requires a link 
between the sound of the cue and the sensory properties of its associated outcome, but 
if the port-checking behavior is insensitive to this manipulation this behavior is called 
model-free, as there is not a need for a representation of reward, merely an abstract 
representation of the value of the cue (Figure 1) (McDannald et al., 2011; Dayan and 
Berridge, 2014; Sutton and Barto, 2018). It is important to note model-free and model-
based strategies that guide reward-seeking to either cue currently are not easily 
disentangled without a manipulation of the reward’s value (McDannald et al., 2011). 
These strategies have implications for computational models of reinforcement learning 
and much is unknown about what factors tip the scales between one strategy or the 
other (Gläscher et al., 2010; McDannald et al., 2011; Dayan and Berridge, 2014; Lee et 
al., 2014; Langdon et al., 2018; Groman et al., 2019a). Contextual influences and the 
scenarios that tip the favor towards model-free or model-based representations and 
strategies are largely unexplored, and evidence suggests the weighting of each strategy 
is affected by drug history and that the potential for arbitration between two strategies 
leaves much to be investigated (Groman et al., 2019b).  
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Which of these strategies is more dynamic and thus more able to rapidly adapt? 
If an agent makes use of model-free representations it should be readily apparent that it 
will require repeated trials to update changes in its behavior based on the value of the 
reward associated with the cue (Dayan and Berridge, 2014; Sutton and Barto, 2018). 
Thus, learning to respond to a cue differently when one is hungry versus sated will be a 
gradual and require many trials. In contrast, model-based representations do not 
necessarily dictate such a rigorous trial and error-based approach to updating. As 
model-based agents maintain rich representations of the sensory, motivational, and 
emotional components of cues and rewards they are inherently flexible and dynamic 
(Dayan and Berridge, 2014; Langdon et al., 2018). One of the most striking 
demonstrations of the extremely rapid updating afforded by a model-based system is in 
studies of salt appetite, an experimenter-induced physiologic need for salt that will never 
naturally be experienced by laboratory animals (Berridge et al., 1984; Berridge and 
Schulkin, 1989). If rats first learn in a normal state absent a need for salt that a cue 
predicts an extremely disgusting salty solution they are repulsed and reproach from the 
cue on its appearance (Robinson and Berridge, 2013). However, after the induction of 
salt appetite, on the very first presentation of this cue, and critically before the 
experience of the now rewarding salty solution, the rats are attracted, energized, and 
approach the cue before they can experience the now desired and pleasant salt 
(Robinson and Berridge, 2013). These model-based systems thus allow for a rapid 
reshaping of cue-triggered motivations and permit extreme flexibility in Pavlovian-based 
learning beyond what can be captured by predictions from Rescorla-Wagner based 
models where the value of a reward requires updating cue-value generated from the 
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experience and receipt of the actual reward (Rescorla and Wagner, 1972; Domjan, 
2005; Dayan and Berridge, 2014; Sutton and Barto, 2018). Cue-triggered behaviors, 
thus, depart in meaningful ways from predictions generated from popular theories of 
learning when factors such as internal state are incorporated as regulating factors. 
Apart from providing a way of predicting the likelihood of an outcome, cues can 
also become imbued with incentive motivational value, which allows their presentation 
to generate states of motivation that elicit reward-seeking and produce desire (Bindra, 
1978; Cardinal et al., 2002; Berridge and Robinson, 2003; Berridge et al., 2009; 
Robinson et al., 2014b). The incentive motivational and predictive properties of cues 
can be dissociated, in other words, just because a cue predicts a reward does not mean 
that the cue is motivationally relevant and acts to produce behavior or craving for 
reward (Flagel et al., 2009; Robinson and Flagel, 2009; Flagel et al., 2011; Robinson et 
al., 2014b). The attribution of incentive salience, or incentive motivational value, to 
reward-paired cues is essential for those cues to generate and provoke behavior 
(Berridge, 2004). Incentive motivational value renders reward-paired cues attractive, 
desirable, and able to invigorate reward-seeking actions (Bindra, 1978; Cardinal et al., 
2002; Flagel et al., 2009). This process is distinct from reward-learning in that rats can 
learn a cue-reward relationship yet fail to show characteristic responding to that cue that 
indicates the cue is motivationally relevant (Robinson and Flagel, 2009; Fraser et al., 
2016). 
 For example, if a group of rats learn that the insertion of a lever predicts a food 
reward there is individual variation in the conditioned responses rats exhibit upon lever 
insertion. Some rats rapidly approach, press, nibble, and sniff at the lever when it is 
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inserted, a response called sign-tracking, whereas other rats rapidly approach and enter 
the adjacent food cup where reward will be delivered when the lever ultimately retracts. 
Rats who are attracted and interact with the lever, sign-trackers, and those that 
approach the food cup, goal-trackers, both learn the lever-reward relationship at an 
equal rate and respond equivalently during training. However, to probe the motivational 
value of the lever rats can be asked to learn a new response to earn the lever itself in a 
test of conditioned reinforcement. Only sign-trackers will learn to work for the lever in 
the absence of food, goal-trackers typically do not persist in earning the reward-
associated lever (Figure 1) (Robinson and Flagel, 2009; Fraser et al., 2016). 
Conditioned reinforcement is thus a useful readout that clarifies if incentive motivational 
processes contribute to conditioned reward-seeking (Robinson et al., 2014b). What is 
less clear is how incentive motivational processes relate to the distinctions between 
model-based and model-free strategies (Dayan and Berridge, 2014). For instance, does 
sign-tracking indicate a model-free strategy (Huys et al., 2014; Lesaint et al., 2014)? Is 
conditioned reinforcement a readout of model-based or model-free processes 
(Parkinson et al., 2005; Burke et al., 2007, 2008; Sharpe et al., 2017a; Langdon et al., 
2018)? Is the attribution of incentive motivational value a requirement for model-based 
or model-free strategies (Morrison et al., 2015; Nasser et al., 2015)? Thus, even 
learning a simple single cue and reward relationship results in numerous possibilities for 
the manner in which that cue is represented and the underlying systems guiding 
responding to that cue. Yet, even still these single cue-reward relationships significantly 
oversimplify reduce the complexity of real-world interactions. In particular, in the real 
world the predictability of a cue and the subsequent response to it are largely shaped by 
9 
 
uncertainty and its resolution that can be guided by a number of internal and external 
factors.  
Uncertainty about a given cue can arise from a number of features including its 
temporal relation to reward, its predictability of reward delivery, or its perceptual 
ambiguity in discriminating it from related sensory stimuli. It is well appreciated that 
uncertainty can enhance and magnify cue-directed motivation, in particular for cues that 
unreliably predict a given reward (Anselme et al., 2013; Singer et al., 2020). In the real 
world this is best captured by slot machines and gambling situations in which the cues 
received and your interactions with have no influence on the outcome yet they become 
powerful generators of motivation to seek reward. Most of what is known about cue-
generated uncertainty has arisen from similar gambling-like cues in the laboratory, 
where a given cue has an absolute probability of predicting reward (Anselme et al., 
2013; Robinson et al., 2014a, 2019, 2020; Anselme and Robinson, 2019). These 
instances of relatively known uncertainty mirror our expectations of gambling situations 
but likely fail to capture instances in which expectations are dynamically shaped during 
normal reward-seeking.  In particular, these deterministic cases are unable to model the 
dynamic changing of ambiguity about the instantaneous importance and certainty of 
reward receipt of an uncertain cue as in these instances the probabilities are fixed or 
slowly drifting and must be resolved by numerous encounters with that cue and its given 
probability of reward to execute behavior according to a running average of expected 
value. In contrast, reinforcement uncertainty is able to resolved by means of exploiting 
other available external stimuli, recent history-based outcomes, or internal states and in 
turn this information can be used to compute a more nuanced expectation of reward on 
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a given instance, or even totally resolve uncertainty and render a given cue absolutely 
predictive of reward receipt.  
Together, cue-triggered motivations occur in many forms and learning a cue-
reward association can result in a number of complex representations, even in the 
simplest cases. Despite this, these deterministic, all-or-nothing, expectations are rigid 
and limit flexibility in behavior. It is critical to appreciate the dynamic control of behavior 
by cues, and their ever-changing motivational significance. In this dissertation I seek to 
capture dynamic cue-triggered behavior, which ultimately builds off of these 
fundamental properties of these reduced cue-reward relationships. Cue-triggered 
motivation is inherently flexible and our approaches to capture these dynamics should 
be sufficiently complex to model the factors influencing this flexibility.  
Occasion setting 
Capturing the complexity of dynamical reward-seeking requires an understanding 
of the mechanisms generating cue-triggered behavior. The ability of behavior to come 
under the control of complex mechanisms dates back to early musings by the famous 
behaviorist Skinner in which he became fascinated by the idea that a rat’s lever 
pressing could come to be shaped to occur only during a light, given the responding 
was only reinforced accordingly (Skinner, 1935, 1937). For Skinner, though this was a 
simple arrangement of stimuli and actions it was difficult to model how the light would 
act to control responding. In modern times, these stimuli are commonly known as 
discriminative stimuli - a term reserved exclusively for those stimuli that shape 
instrumental actions. However, discriminative stimuli do not necessarily capture the 
nuance needed for a true hierarchical relationship as they critically lack the ambiguity 
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needed to promote such a representation. For instance, in most cases a given 
discriminative stimulus is always associated with reward and always presented 
alongside the ability to perform the associated action, so there is not any cue-generated 
ambiguity or hierarchy. Discriminative stimuli instead directly gate the performance of 
actions and in turn can also become direct predictors of outcomes, which complicates 
their actions as true hierarchical mediators of behavior (Holland, 1991; Trask et al., 
2017). 
In contrast to discriminative stimuli, investigations into the determinants of 
Pavlovian conditioning gave rise to the study of the modulation of cue-driven 
responding. These investigations were primarily led by Peter Holland and colleagues 
into the mechanisms of such feature-based - a term for a cue that is not a typical 
conditioned stimulus - mechanisms of modulation (Ross and Holland, 1981; Holland, 
1989, 1992). Alongside Holland’s investigations into the control of conditioned 
responding by such modulatory cues in rodents were efforts made in pigeons by 
Rescorla, presumably motivated to expand upon the prevailing Rescorla-Wagner theory 
that was incapable of capturing such modulation (Rescorla, 1985, 1987). Prevailing 
views at the time on such modulatory actions suggested the ability of animals to 
modulate responding resulted from a configural account. Configural accounts of 
learning presume unique representations of the combination of two or more stimuli that 
allow for behavioral discrimination (Pearce, 1987, 1994). However, Holland and 
colleagues argued for a more nuanced and hierarchical representation wherein 
modulatory cues, like physical settings, internal states, and external stimuli instead act 
to modulate the strength of the association between a given conditioned stimulus and 
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the outcome it predicts (Holland, 1992; Delamater, 2012; Bonardi et al., 2017). This 
modulatory action was termed occasion setting as a given event sets the occasion for 
whether a conditioned stimulus will or will not be motivationally significant (Ross and 
Holland, 1982).  While much interest developed around occasion setting following a 
number of critical papers, interest in these mechanisms waned in the 1990s, perhaps 
owing the advent of new techniques for investigation in the neurobiology of learning and 
motivation that lacked appropriate specificity to identify such modulatory processes 
(Fraser and Holland, 2019). 
There are a number of important distinctions that separate occasion setting, and 
the events that perform such modulatory actions called occasion setters, from simple 
Pavlovian conditioning, discriminative stimuli, and configural learning (Holland, 1992; 
Fraser and Holland, 2019). I will present here a brief discussion of the findings in 
Chapter 2 to provide additional context for the motivation to exploit occasion setting as a 
model of hierarchical control. One of the primary obstacles to identifying occasion 
setting is that it can reflect summation between the probabilities of the occasion setter 
and conditioned stimulus. In a novel preparation we recently developed, modeled after 
positive patterning designs (Woodbury, 1943), the occasion setter and conditioned 
stimulus presented alone never predict reward, but their serial presentation indicates a 
conditioned stimulus will predict reward, with the probability of any given cue being 
presented on a trial being equal (Figure 2) (Fraser and Janak, 2019). As expected, rats 
trained in this preparation respond more to the conditioned stimulus when its occasion 
is set, than alone (Figure 3). However, we reliably observed responding at the time of 
expected conditioned stimulus presentation on trials when only the occasion setter was 
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presented. To rule out such summation from explaining results, we explicitly 
extinguished responding to the occasion setter, making obvious that this cue has no 
relationship with reward. If rats summated the probabilities of reinforcement this 
manipulation would eliminate differences in responding to the conditioned stimulus 
when it was or was not occasion set. In contrast, rats exhibited identical levels of 
modulation to the conditioned stimulus absent any responding to the occasion setter 
ruling out summation. 
The ability of occasion setters to modulate the relationships between cues and 
rewards are not well captured by popular theories of reinforcement learning (Fraser and 
Holland, 2019). For instance, the famous Rescorla-Wagner model only allows for a cue 
to be updated on a trial by trial basis on its ability to have earned reward or not 
(Rescorla and Wagner, 1972). In the model we present in Chapter 2 for occasion 
setting, both the probability of the occasion setter and the conditioned stimulus of 
predicting reward are equivalent, so an agent making use of reinforcement learning 
algorithms should always rely on the average reinforcement rate to guide their behavior. 
This is clearly not the case as animals are able to exploit occasion setters to modulate 
their response to the same conditioned stimulus on different instances, reflecting a 
process not well captured by models like Rescorla-Wagner and Pearce-Hall that require 
local updating of value by the most recent instance of reinforcement (Figure 3) 
(Rescorla and Wagner, 1972; Pearce and Hall, 1980; Sutton and Barto, 2018). 
Configural accounts may overcome this difficulty as they treat the combination of the 
occasion setter and its conditioned stimulus as a single cue distinct from either occasion 
setter or conditioned stimulus alone (Pearce, 1987, 1994). However, data from 
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experimental studies, including data from our preparation, indicate that occasion setting 
is a distinct process from configural learning. For instance, configuration of cues should 
be resistant to the order (occasion setter->conditioned stimulus is the same as 
conditioned stimulus->occasion setter) as they are combined into a unique stimulus, yet 
in occasion setting the order is necessary and generally requires the occasion setter to 
be presented before the conditioned stimulus it modifies (Figure 3) (Ross and Holland, 
1982; Holland, 1992). Moreover, the trace between the occasion setter and conditioned 
stimulus is often quite long, and the trace between the occasion setter and potential 
reinforcement is even longer, presumably making it difficult for backpropagation of 
reinforcement signals to the occasion setter from the conditioned stimulus and the rare 
instance of reinforcement to occur. Together these support a view that occasion setting 
is the result of a hierarchical representation between modulatory events and the 
conditioned stimuli they act on (Fraser and Janak, 2019).  
The nature of the representation modulated by occasion setters has lacked 
investigation and remained unclear. Occasion setting has primarily been described as 
an alteration in the value of the conditioned stimulus, in accordance with model-free 
theories of reinforcement learning (Delamater, 2012; Bonardi et al., 2017; Fraser and 
Holland, 2019). In contrast, occasion setting appears to engage hierarchical 
representations, and in turn it is possible that occasion setters actually act to shape a 
rich representation of the reinforcer predicted by a conditioned stimulus, and this 
anticipation of the sensory qualities of the reinforcer are what guide behavior (Dayan 
and Berridge, 2014). We sought to provide evidence to bear light on this discrepancy 
and made use of sensory-specific satiety to investigate if occasion setting involves 
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model-free or model-based representations. In our preparation of occasion setting, 
devaluation of the normally received reward by pre-feeding resulted in a reduction in 
reward-seeking on trials in which the occasion setter indicated the conditioned stimulus 
would be reinforced, but in contrast when rats were pre-fed on a novel reward that was 
just as preferred and consumed in equal amounts there was no effect on behavior 
(Figure 3). These hierarchical occasion setting cues thus appear to actually alter the 
nature of the representation evoked by conditioned stimuli and the ability of these 
occasion setting cues to modulate reward-seeking is in part due to the sensory features 
of the expected reward.  
Much focus on occasion setting and hierarchical control has focused on the 
ability of these events to modulate the predictability of a conditioned stimulus. However, 
the predictive and motivational properties of cues can be dissociated (Berridge and 
Robinson, 2003; Robinson and Flagel, 2009). In Chapter 2, we directly tested if 
occasion setters can not only modulate the predictive relationship between a 
conditioned stimulus and reward, but if these hierarchical cues can shape the 
motivational significance of these cues (Fraser and Janak, 2019). In tests of conditioned 
reinforcement, where animals report the value of a given cue by executing a novel 
response, we found that occasion setters indeed enhance the motivational value of 
conditioned stimuli, and that these conditioned stimuli absent their occasion setter lack 
any inherent motivational value (Figure 3). Interestingly, occasion setters themselves 
had motivational value and we found that this motivational value, evidenced by 
conditioned reinforcement, persisted even in rats for whom the occasion setter was 
extinguished and responding to the occasion setter alone was absent (Figure 3). Taking 
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these behavioral findings together, 1) occasion setting is a model of hierarchical control 
that involves modulation of an association between a cue and reward, 2) acts to modify 
the nature of that representation that involves the sensory properties of the predicted 
outcome, is resistant to extinction of the hierarchical cue, 3) involves the generation of a 
motivational state triggered by the hierarchical cue, and 4) can modify the motivational 
value of a conditioned stimulus. 
Occasion setting lacks a plausible theory-driven model of how such a 
representation can be structured and enacted, unlike the case for the simplest of 
conditions that are explained by error-driven models like the Rescorla-Wagner model 
(Bonardi et al., 2017; Fraser and Holland, 2019). One possibility that is alluring is that 
occasion setters act as some scalar to influence the strength of an association. In a 
model of reinforcement learning put forth originally by Berridge and colleagues to 
describe the influence of an internal motivational state on behavior (e.g, appetite or 
stimulant-induced sensitization), they proposed a scalar factor, kappa, that allowed for 
dynamic updating without new learning (Zhang et al., 2009). However, the exact 
manner that these states are constructed and represented remains difficult to ascertain 
as this model merely introduces a factor into computations designed after the Rescorla-
Wagner model. Moreover, it lacks a way for the scalar factor to be incorporated during 
learning or a means by which this factor is computationally updated to allow its use 
apart from demonstrations of it capturing the influence of drastic changes in 
physiological state. It is also possible that occasion setting could be described by state-
based learning models such as a Markov-based decision model (Daw et al., 2006; 
Dayan and Daw, 2008; Langdon et al., 2018). These approaches could prove useful in 
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capturing the state-based transitions inherent in occasion setting and hierarchical 
control, yet the application of these models in capturing the many behavioral 
characteristics of occasion setting beyond modeling the basic features of occasion 
setters to enhance or reduce responding to an ambiguous conditioned stimulus is 
unclear, especially given the unique transfer and extinction functions of these 
hierarchical cues (Fraser and Holland, 2019). As such, more theory-driven 
computational approaches are needed to capture hierarchical processes in 
reinforcement learning and will be an important direction for research outside the scope 
of the present work.  
Contexts and contextual control – potential failures of models of context-
influenced behavior 
While we have focused on occasion setting as the prototypical model for the 
hierarchical control of reward-seeking, other approaches have attempted to model the 
modulation of reward-seeking. The most popular of which is to use essentially a very 
distinct room, referred to as a context, to indicate that during the length of a behavioral 
session a cue will or will not be rewarded. In rodents, a popular model is one created to 
mimic the effects of rehabilitation therapy in humans seeking treatment for a variety of 
psychiatric disorders like PTSD and addiction (Crombag et al., 2008; Maren et al., 2013; 
Liberzon and Abelson, 2016). In essence, the animals learn in one physically distinct 
box composed of unique smells, lights, and tactile properties that a cue predicts a given 
outcome, then without warning are placed into a new box with a new arrangement of 
lights, smells, etc. and the same cue as before is presented but without its outcome. 
The animal learns over a number of days being in this new context that they should stop 
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seeking reward when the cue comes on. Interestingly, if you place the animal back into 
the original context and play the cue they respond exactly as if they had never had the 
extinction treatment (Figure 4). This model has been adapted for a variety of 
approaches including with drugs of abuse and has been commonly described as a 
model of context-induced relapse.  
In this context-induced relapse models be it for drugs of abuse, aversive 
footshocks, or food reward, the primary learned relation is that of a conditioned 
inhibitory association between the extinction context and reward (Holland and Bouton, 
1999; Bouton, 2002, 2004; Bouton et al., 2006; Crombag et al., 2008; Janak and 
Chaudhri, 2010; Maren et al., 2013; Liberzon and Abelson, 2016; Valyear et al., 2017). 
There is a lack of evidence that the original context itself has a hierarchical relation with 
either the cue or the outcome, it may merely just be a background stimulus of little 
importance. It remains unclear under which conditions this initial context will or will not 
be encoded in a manner relevant for it to actually modulate behavior (e.g. (Zinn et al., 
2020)).  In contrast, the presence or absence of the extinction context is the sole 
determinant of behavior. Depending on the arrangement of actions, cues, and outcomes 
the extinction context can directly inhibit the production of actions or act to inhibit 
representations of the outcomes (Holland and Bouton, 1999; Bouton, 2002; Trask et al., 
2017). While this may appear a semantic point, these differences ultimately shape 
different neural substrates involved in the modulation of behavior and are essential to 
our understanding of the underlying neural circuits. The use of the term context-induced 
has thus been a filler term that lacks an appropriate psychological mechanism to 
describe the actions of the stimuli that result in reinstated responding in these scenarios 
19 
 
(Krakauer et al., 2017). In many of these cases, the use context-induced implies that it 
is the action of the original drug-, fear-, or reward-paired context that uniquely triggers 
relapse and renewal, yet this is perhaps better envisioned as a loss of contextually-
controlled extinction. 
Beyond a difference in psychological mechanisms triggering active renewal or 
relapse of responding as opposed to a failure of inhibitory control, there exist a number 
of confounding effects not always accounted for in these approaches. One primary 
concern is that the probability of reward in each context is not equal, and solely based 
on the reward rates there is a direct association between the original context and 
reward. Direct associations between the initial context and reward make difficult claims 
that the action of the context is to modulate responding. Even if there is evidence for the 
initial context to modulate responding, it is not apparent how to distinguish between 
contextually-modulated responding from a summation of cue-reward and context-
reward associations at test, particularly as it is not apparent how to measure or observe 
extinction of context-reward associations. Moreover, it is not evident that the original 
context itself enters into a hierarchical relationship with the reward-predictive cue. If the 
animal were returned not to the initial training context, but instead a novel or familiar 
context where no training had occurred at test they would frequently respond to the cue 
as if it still predicted its outcome (Holland and Bouton, 1999; Bouton, 2002; Bouton et 
al., 2006; Remedios et al., 2014; Millan et al., 2015; Sciascia et al., 2015). This 
observation most strongly challenges the idea that the original context hierarchically 
controls the strength of the initial cue-outcome association and results in relapse. 
Ultimately, this model of contextually-mediated extinction is best viewed as a model of 
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the failure of rehabilitation to transfer to novel scenarios. Extinction learning itself is a 
unique phenomena that is prone to failure as it is well-documented that the strength of 
extinction training wanes with time and the initial cue-outcome memory eventually 
outcompetes the extinction memory (Bouton, 2002, 2004; Millan et al., 2011; Dunsmoor 
et al., 2015; Trask et al., 2017). 
Two prominent psychiatric disorders, PTSD and addiction, are characterized by 
their frequent relapsing into either extreme fear and anxiety or drug use, respectively. It 
is critical then for our models to capture the dynamic and profound influence of cues 
and contexts in resulting in relapse. It has long been noted that rehabilitation treatments 
are not extremely effective in reducing the risk of relapse for these disorders (Bouton, 
2002; Maren et al., 2013; Dunsmoor et al., 2015). That relapse can occur long-after 
treatment and the return to contexts associated with distress or drug use implies more 
complex psychological interactions underlie the ability of these cues to suddenly 
become motivational magnets and generate intense craving, for example in substance 
abuse. To better understand these influences we need our models to have tractable and 
fluctuating control over the motivational impact of cues and allow for dynamic reward-
seeking that is accompanied by a precise understanding of the psychological 
mechanisms at play. Many of these issues are achieved by utilizing an occasion setting 
framework in an effort to capture the rapid, dynamic, and experimenter-controlled 
utilization of hierarchical information to guide reward-seeking in the face of ambiguity. A 
shift from a view of contexts as the main experimental method to observe modulation of 
responding to embracing occasion setting in its many forms will ultimately better guide 
behavioral and neurobiological interventions.   
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Neural substrates of hierarchical control 
Given the complexity of occasion setting it is critical to identify potential neural 
circuits and systems could underlie the ability of hierarchical cues to rapidly and 
dynamically modulate the associative strength between a conditioned stimulus and 
reward. In contrast to the decades of work on the neural substrates underlying classical 
one cue – one outcome Pavlovian conditioning, there is little experimental work in 
comparison on the neurobiology of occasion setting. What evidence exists was recently 
reviewed and suggested a role for orbitofrontal and striatal circuits being involved in 
negative occasion setting (Meyer and Bucci, 2016a; Fraser and Holland, 2019). 
However, the mechanisms and manner in which these systems participate remains 
unclear based on these early studies as they employed manipulations that make it 
difficult to distinguish effects on simple conditioning from occasion setting. I wish here to 
highlight experimental approaches in simple Pavlovian conditioning that share features 
captured by occasion setting which may make clear routes for future investigations to 
bear light on the neural substrates of hierarchical control. In particular, I emphasize the 
potential contribution of mesolimbic dopamine and its striatal targets as critical avenues 
for future research. 
The most well-characterized system in Pavlovian conditioning is the mesolimbic 
dopamine system arising from the ventral tegmental area. Dopaminergic neurons 
arising from the ventral tegmental area project throughout the limbic system primarily 
targeting the ventral striatum, prefrontal cortex, and amygdala (Fields et al., 2007; 
Breton et al., 2019). The activity of these neurons supports reinforcement and their 
activity has been well-characterized in simple conditioning tasks where they appear to 
22 
 
track the learning of a cue-reward association in accordance with error-based theories 
of learning, like the Rescorla-Wagner model (Olds and Milner, 1954; Schultz and 
Dickinson, 2000; Stuber et al., 2008; Steinberg et al., 2014; Keiflin and Janak, 2015; 
Coddington and Dudman, 2019). In contrast, manipulations of dopaminergic function in 
their terminal regions, in particular the ventral striatum, suggest a role for dopamine in 
invigorating reward-seeking and tracking the motivational value of cues to spur 
responding and not necessarily in learning the association between cues and outcomes 
(Berridge and Robinson, 1998; Berridge, 2007; Flagel et al., 2011; Clark et al., 2012, 
2013; Berke, 2018). This contrast remains an active area of debate that is difficult to 
disentangle given multiple levels of complexity in differentiating the contributions of 
dopamine neuron firing and synaptic control dopamine neuron release in terminal fields 
(Berke, 2018; Collins and Saunders, 2020). To make accurate predictions for the 
function of the dopamine system in hierarchical control more generally we will focus 
separately on properties of mesolimbic dopaminergic neurons that make them 
exquisitely tuned for encoding occasion setting and potential mechanisms for dopamine 
release in the ventral striatum to contribute to behavioral flexibility. 
The initial report of dopaminergic neurons firing in accordance with a Rescorla-
Wagner reward prediction error ignited research into the computational properties of 
dopamine neurons (Schultz et al., 1997). The bulk of this focus has remained on the 
conditions under which dopamine neuron firing is consistent or inconsistent with 
predictions from popular learning theories (Schultz and Dickinson, 2000; Keiflin and 
Janak, 2015; Watabe-Uchida et al., 2017; Langdon et al., 2018). While these theories 
have influenced and inspired much work, here we wish to focus on properties of 
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dopamine neurons revealed by these theories that may indicate potential for the coding 
of hierarchical cues. Particularly, hierarchical regulation requires to some extent a 
neural substrate to be sensitive to information about probability and uncertainty. In 
foundational experiments probing the influence of probabilities on prediction error-style 
signaling, dopamine neurons were recorded while animals learned about cues that had 
a fixed probability with predicting reward and the magnitude of reward was stable 
(Fiorillo et al., 2003). Interestingly, dopamine neuron firing was highest to cues that 
always predicted reward, but the increase in firing resulting from reward receipt was 
highest to the most uncertain cues, predicting reward with 0 probability (Fiorillo et al., 
2003). Probabilities that are stable as these can be combined with information about the 
amount of reward to generate an expected value of how good a given cue is on 
average. If the probability and reward magnitude are altered in a way that produces 
differences in expected value, then dopamine neuron firing is in accordance with peaks 
for the highest expected value (Tobler et al., 2005). Dopamine neurons have thus been 
ascribed with calculating the expected value of a cue based on the probability of reward 
delivery and amount of reward it predicts. Thus, sensitivity to probability in dopamine 
neurons is confounded by the probability coinciding with alterations in expected value of 
reward. Whether dopamine neurons encode exclusively the long-running expected 
value of a given cue or are capable of rapidly integrating contextual and state-relevant 
information to generate a current estimation of expected value remains to be 
determined. 
Recent investigations in rodents, primarily, have focused on the ability of 
dopamine neurons to become sensitive to predictions about “states” in the world as an 
24 
 
extension of uncertainty shaping error-based models of learning (Gershman and 
Uchida, 2019). For instance, experiments have made use of tasks where rodents must 
infer whether the current block of trials indicates reward will follow a cue with 100% or 
90% probability or if the current reward size in a block of trials is now large or small 
(Starkweather et al., 2017, 2017; Babayan et al., 2018). Dopamine neurons do indeed 
appear to report errors about the transitions into an unsignaled state change at the time 
of reward owing to the receipt or absence of the changing reward. This is true for both a 
single cue and experiments where two cues are used to bridge the gap between the first 
cue and reward, with second cue omission restoring dopamine firing to expected reward 
as a result of an error in temporal expectancy (Pan et al., 2005; Starkweather et al., 
2017; Babayan et al., 2018). Dopamine neurons in these cases are primarily altered at 
the time of reward, not the time of the cue nor is it always clear that such cue-generated 
expectations are shaped by these changes in firing at the time of reward receipt. This 
transfer of error at the time of reward to the preceding cues is theorized to explain 
learning and the updating of behavior. In contrast there lacks clear evidence that these 
reports of prediction error at reward receipt are always causal in updating behavior on 
the next trial, in many cases reward related activity in dopamine neurons exist long after 
behavior has stabilized (Coddington and Dudman, 2018; Saunders et al., 2018; Mohebi 
et al., 2019). Regardless, these belief-based models require extensive experience and 
depend on the delivery of reward to shape these representations as they are modified 
variants of a Rescorla-Wagner model (Gershman and Uchida, 2019). As we have noted 
before, in hierarchical situations these models would erroneously attribute reward 
prediction solely to a hierarchical occasion setting cue, not well accounting for 
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behavioral findings explaining such control of cue-motivated behavior (Fraser and 
Holland, 2019). In hierarchical scenarios, the significance of a cue and its relationship 
with reward is the unit of modification, not merely the report of reward delivery. As a 
result, how well accounts of deterministic or stable uncertainty attributed to single cues 
account for the hierarchical control of cue-reward associations is not obvious. It remains 
less clear how the activity of dopamine neurons, which has primarily been investigated 
as reporting beliefs about uncertainty at the time of reward receipt, could account for 
hierarchy in cue-motivated behavior. 
Perhaps motivational accounts of cue-triggered behavior are better explained by 
investigations into actual dopamine signaling within the striatum. Dissociations between 
reports of dopamine firing and dopamine release in accounting for simple Pavlovian 
behavior have been a topic of debate that are well described elsewhere (Berridge, 
2012; Berke, 2018). There is much less evidence of dopamine release during uncertain 
or probabilistic tasks compared to dopamine neuron activity owing to the technical 
difficulty of previous techniques like fast-scan cyclic voltammetry to reliably detect 
dopamine release over many sessions. In one such study, dopamine release was 
recorded in the nucleus accumbens in rats learning that a cue predicted reward, with 
separate groups learning different probabilities of that cue predicting reward (Hart et al., 
2015). In contrast to the finding that dopamine neurons respond highest to cues that 
fully predict reward, dopamine release was highest to the cue that had maximal 
uncertainty about reward delivery with a probability of 0.5 (Fiorillo et al., 2003; Hart et 
al., 2015). This finding is in accordance with behavioral and pharmacological data that 
uncertain cues are motivationally desirable, can attract approach more than certain 
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cues, and can sensitize the dopamine system (Anselme et al., 2013; Robinson et al., 
2014a; Anselme and Robinson, 2019). Extrapolating from even this probabilistic 
scenario for predictions about dopamine release would suggest that there would be 
stable and equivalent dopamine release for both the occasion setting cue and the 
conditioned stimulus as the probability of these cues predicting reward is equal and set 
at 50%. In contrast, hierarchical accounts would predict more dynamic cue-triggered 
dopamine that would shift rapidly on a trial-to-trial basis. 
In most preparations for observing occasion setting and hierarchical control there 
is a serial presentation of cues, requiring any neural substrate to be sensitive to the 
order of the cues and the instances in which either cue is relevant for motivation. A 
pioneering study by Pan and colleagues investigated potential ways in which dopamine 
neurons could generate a report of expected value. In their task, dopamine neuron 
activity was recorded while rats learned a task in which two cues presented in a 
sequence were followed by reward (Pan et al., 2005). In this task, every trial was 
composed of the ordered presentation of cues, neither was presented in isolation. 
Dopamine neurons responded to both cues equally, with some cells having a stronger 
response to the first cue, in accordance with expectations from Rescorla-Wagner based 
models where the earliest predictor of reward should be the only source of error after 
learning (Rescorla and Wagner, 1972; Schultz and Dickinson, 2000; Collins et al., 2016; 
Sutton and Barto, 2018). Interestingly, there was no report of error at the time of the 
second cue in the series if the presentation of the second cue was omitted, which 
suggests that the firing to this cue primarily was the result of its bridging the gap to 
reward delivery and not derived from a reward prediction per se (Schultz et al., 1993; 
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Pan et al., 2005). In a similar task in freely behaving rats, Smith and colleagues 
recorded neural activity in the ventral pallidum, a major output of the nucleus 
accumbens, when rats learned that an ordered presentation of two cues indicated the 
delivery of sucrose directly into their mouth (Smith et al., 2011). Neurons within the 
ventral pallidum, a region with direct inputs onto dopamine neurons, fired to each of 
these cues although intriguingly, firing to the first cue in the series was greater than for 
the second, in contrast with the pattern observed in dopamine neurons (Pan et al., 
2005; Smith et al., 2011). If dopamine signaling was enhanced in the nucleus 
accumbens by infusing amphetamine, only neural responses to the second cue was 
enhanced (Smith et al., 2011). Similar findings were observed for more permanent 
alterations in dopaminergic function through the induction of psychomotor sensitization 
to amphetamine (Tindell et al., 2005). Although there lacks evidence of the influence of 
such serial cue presentation on dopamine release in the nucleus accumbens, it appears 
that both dopamine neurons and regions directly downstream of their striatal targets are 
sensitive to task structure. We hypothesize that nucleus accumbens neurons 
themselves can become sensitive to task structure in a way that can support 
hierarchical control and occasion setting. Moreover, on the basis of the influence of 
dopamine enhancing drugs selectively altering neural responses to reward-proximal 
cues, occasion setting may be observed by coincident alterations in dopamine release 
and striatal firing to a conditioned stimulus.   
Discrepancies between dopamine firing and release to uncertain and probabilistic 
cues may result from interactions between dopamine release and terminal modulation 
from glutamatergic inputs to the striatum. In particular, glutamate inputs from the 
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thalamus and amygdala to the nucleus accumbens have been shown in anesthetized 
animals to enhance dopamine release (Floresco et al., 1998; Parsons et al., 2007). In 
awake, behaving animals it is possible for such interactions to shape release and in turn 
guide flexible behavior. For instance, basolateral amygdala input to the accumbens is 
necessary for the proper execution of a lever-press following an discriminative stimulus 
and inactivation of this amygdala input also reduces dopamine release to this 
discriminative stimulus (Ambroggi et al., 2008; Jones et al., 2010a, 2010b). Given that 
the basolateral amygdala is necessary for the updating of the significance of a cue 
given broad alterations in internal states, it is hypothesized that such input into the 
nucleus accumbens is critical for shaping not only the behavioral response to 
hierarchical cues, but does so as a result of shaping accumbal firing and dopamine 
release (Gallagher and Holland, 1994; Holland and Gallagher, 1999; Sharpe and 
Schoenbaum, 2016). However, most investigations into the interaction between striatal 
dopamine release, neural activity, and glutamatergic input have been conducted in 
instrumental tasks, so even such speculations of their contribution during cue-guided 
behavior requires clarification. Current accounts of glutamatergic input dynamically 
scaling dopamine release could provide a computational basis for the scalar kappa 
factor proposed by Berridge and colleagues, but we reiterate again that this model can 
not well capture occasion setting in its current form (Zhang et al., 2009). Such data for a 
contribution of basolateral amygdala input in shaping striatal responses and dopamine 
release is lacking and is an area requiring more extensive investigation, particularly as it 
comes to understanding dynamic reward-seeking. 
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Dopamine neurons and dopamine release in the nucleus accumbens are thus 
sensitive to the probability of reinforcement predicted by reward-associated cues. 
However, it remains to be shown if dopamine neurons can encode the relevance of a 
reward-associated cue in a hierarchical manner that would allow rapid updating of the 
probability of reward on a trial-to-trial basis. As dopamine neurons ultimately have been 
shown to encode the expected value of a single cue, presumably acquired as a result of 
the repeated pairing of that cue and both the probability and magnitude of reinforcement 
it predicts over extensive encounters, this raises questions about how such hierarchical 
coding could be implemented. Occasion setting acts to modulate the association 
between cues and rewards which dynamically scales the motivational value and 
expected value of a single conditioned stimulus. How dopamine neurons could signal 
such rapid changes is not obvious as the expected value of the cue remains stable and 
unchanging over long timescales, yet it is obviously apparent in behavior that the actual 
predictive and motivational value of this cue is rapidly scaled by occasion setters. We 
propose that dopamine neurons could inherent such a calculation from its striatal 
targets, as these are engaged in serial loops with their recipient midbrain dopaminergic 
sites (Haber et al., 2000; Haber and Knutson, 2010). Striatal dopamine signaling is 
under tighter control and has numerous potential mechanisms to allow the shaping of 
not only dopamine release but encoding within striatal projection neurons is likely gated 
by their glutamatergic input. This input may ultimately shape the striatal signals that in 
turn coordinate behavioral responding and dopamine signaling. Thus, the dopaminergic 
substrate of hierarchical control may be made more apparent from investigations into 
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striatal dopamine release in coordination with careful measurements and manipulations 
of defined glutamatergic input. 
What sources of input, then, may be critical? The nucleus accumbens integrates 
diverse glutamatergic signals from prefrontal and orbitofrontal cortex, thalamus, 
hippocampus, and amygdala (Figure 5; Cardinal et al., 2002). While each of these 
structures is likely essential for some aspect of hierarchical control, we wish to highlight 
potential for the basolateral amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex to participate in this 
process. These structures both project densely into the ventral striatum but are also 
highly interconnected sharing reciprocal connections and projection targets, like the 
mediodorsal thalamus (Heilbronner et al., 2016). Given this anatomical basis, it is 
perhaps not surprising that lesions or manipulations of activity in basolateral amygdala 
and orbitofrontal cortex have similar impacts on behavior. For instance, lesions of these 
structures interfere with reinforcer devaluation, conditioned reinforcement, Pavlovian-to-
instrumental transfer, and second-order conditioning (Everitt et al., 1989; Burns et al., 
1993, 1999; Hatfield et al., 1996; Schoenbaum et al., 1998; Blundell et al., 2001; 
Holland et al., 2001; Setlow et al., 2002; Pickens et al., 2003, 2005; Corbit and Balleine, 
2005; McDannald et al., 2005, 2011; Ostlund and Balleine, 2007; Johnson et al., 2009; 
Rudebeck and Murray, 2011; Parkes and Balleine, 2013; Stalnaker et al., 2015). 
Moreover, lesions of basolateral amygdala impairs reward- and cue-encoding in the 
orbitofrontal cortex and vice-versa (Saddoris et al., 2005; Takahashi et al., 2013; 
Lucantonio et al., 2015; Sharpe and Schoenbaum, 2016). Collectively it appears that 
these structures are essential to updating and behaving flexibly in the face of changing 
circumstances – suggesting a role in the hierarchical control of reward-seeking. 
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Indeed, early evidence has suggested that the orbitofrontal cortex and its 
interactions with the nucleus accumbens are critical for occasion setting. In a paradigm 
where occasion setters inform that a rat must withhold reward-seeking as the upcoming 
conditioned stimulus will not be rewarded alterations in the activity of orbitofrontal cortex 
and nucleus accumbens simultaneously resulted in behavioral impairments (Meyer and 
Bucci, 2016b). In a recent investigation, recordings of single neurons within the 
orbitofrontal cortex have found that these neurons can be modulated by occasion 
setters in a similar task adapted for head-fixed mice (Shobe et al., 2017). The 
orbitofrontal cortex is well studied with respect to its role in behavioral inhibition and 
control so whether there is a role for the orbitofrontal cortex in instances in which 
occasion setters facilitate reward-seeking remains unknown (Stalnaker et al., 2015). 
There is substantial evidence that basolateral amygdala and its interactions with the 
nucleus accumbens are essential when discriminative stimuli indicate the availability of 
actions to lead to reward (Ambroggi et al., 2008; Jones et al., 2010b, 2010a), yet 
whether there is any involvement of the basolateral amygdala in a purely Pavlovian 
occasion setting task is unclear. Despite a clear test of occasion setting, the basolateral 
amygdala is critical for the control of Pavlovian reward-seeking by distinct contexts, 
which may act as occasion setters (Bouton and Swartzentruber, 1986; Remedios et al., 
2014; Valyear et al., 2017). Manipulations of activity and glutamatergic signaling in the 
basolateral amygdala interrupt the ability of rats to use a context to renew responding to 
previously extinguished cue, and this arises in part due to interactions with the nucleus 
accumbens and dopamine release in this structure (Fuchs et al., 2005; Chaudhri et al., 
2013; Millan et al., 2015; Sciascia et al., 2015; Valyear et al., 2020). While evidence 
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suggests a role for both orbitofrontal cortex and basolateral amygdala in occasion 
setting their precise contributions and how neural activity in these regions could be 
dynamically shaped is not well known. Taking advantage of the ability to parse and 
separate the hierarchical stimulus from the target of its actions is an obvious boon to 
occasion setting that can provide novel mechanistic insight into the interactions of 
cortico-amygdalo-striatal loops in the control of behavior. The application of hierarchical 
control in neurobiological investigations of reward-seeking has the potential to highlight 
numerous diverse mechanisms relating to the organization and utilization of higher-
order information in the ongoing resolution of uncertainty and production of dynamic 
reward-seeking that better mirrors real-world cue-motivated behaviors. 
Main objectives 
As I have summarized above there are numerous open questions concerning not 
only the behavioral features of hierarchical control but also the underlying 
neurobiological basis for such a process. The main goal of this dissertation is to provide 
a tractable model for the observation of occasion setting that is amenable to 
neurobiological investigation. The ability to exploit such a behavioral model would then 
make possible the ability to resolve outstanding questions concerning the contributions 
of mesolimbic dopamine neurons to cue-driven behavior, the functions and actions of 
nucleus accumbens in the resolution of uncertainty, and the potential interactions of 
basolateral amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex in the control of reward-seeking. 
 In Chapter 2 I provide a number of lines of behavioral evidence from a novel 
preparation to observe occasion setting in freely behaving rodents. This approach 
allowed the verification that reward-seeking in this task met characteristics to observe 
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occasion setting. Additionally, I took advantage of the ability to equate the probability of 
reward delivery among the occasion setting cue and conditioned stimulus to assess the 
motivational value of these cues. In a surprising finding it was the occasion setter, not 
conditioned stimulus, that acquired motivational value which is discussed with 
implications for our understanding of how hierarchical stimuli may act to influence 
reward-seeking. These findings provide a behavioral basis that is exploited in the rest of 
dissertation. 
 In Chapter 3 I turn to the function of midbrain dopamine neurons in the 
generation of cue-elicited reward-seeking. By taking advantage of the ability to 
selectively manipulate dopamine neurons by combining optogenetics with the use of 
transgenic rats I reveal that dopamine neuron activity is necessary for occasion setters 
to influence reward-seeking. I then attempt to rule out potential alternative hypotheses 
for this effect – mainly concerning the potential necessity of activity in midbrain 
dopamine neurons for responding to probabilistic cues. These findings provide evidence 
for the involvement of the mesolimbic dopamine system in the hierarchical organization 
of behavior. 
 For Chapter 4 I investigated the potential involvement of the nucleus accumbens, 
the primary target of midbrain dopamine neurons assayed in Chapter 3, in occasion 
setting. I reveal that manipulations of neural activity or dopamine signaling in this region 
interferes with the expression of occasion setting. To better understand these effects, I 
exploited the ability to record individual neurons and dopamine release in the nucleus 
accumbens that was made possible only by our behavioral design in Chapter 2. I find 
that occasion setters are strongly encoded within the nucleus accumbens, and that 
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dopamine release and neural responses to a conditioned stimulus are under the control 
of occasion setters. These findings are discussed with respect to the function of the 
nucleus accumbens in reward-seeking writ large. 
 In Chapter 5 I sought to provide answers to potential brain regions upstream of 
the nucleus accumbens that could be critical inputs for occasion setting and in turn 
future investigation. I find that activity within either basolateral amygdala or orbitofrontal 
cortex is essential for occasion setting. 
 In Chapter 6 I begin to detail potential mechanisms within basolateral amygdala 
and orbitofrontal cortex that make these structures necessary for occasion setting. I find 
more evidence of encoding and utilization of occasion setters in basolateral amygdala 
than in orbitofrontal cortex. In addition, optogenetic inhibition of the basolateral 
amygdala, but not orbitofrontal cortex, affected behavioral performance. 
 I provide a general discussion of the main findings in Chapter 7 while highlighting 
future directions and potential limitations with the approaches taken in this work. 
Ultimately, I provide evidence in numerous interconnected regions for the hierarchical 
control of reward-seeking and leave open the precise ways in which these regions 
interact for future investigations. 
Conclusions 
Cue-triggered behavior can appear simple to produce in the laboratory yet has 
appreciable complexity in the psychological mechanisms underlying behavior and the 
multitude of neural systems engaged. Appreciating this complexity is essential not only 
for a robust understanding of behavior, but to properly link an observed neural response 
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or manipulation to the psychological process supporting that behavior. It is apparent that 
dopamine neuron activity and release is critical for learning and responding to reward-
predictive cues, but the ability of these neurons to be flexible in highly complex, rich, 
and dynamic cue-triggered behaviors is not well-defined. Moreover, animal models of 
psychiatric illness will benefit from increased complexity that can more closely capture 
the myriad cues, contexts, settings, states, and rewards that interact to spur our desires 
and choices. In particular, I hope that a greater appreciation of more rapid and dynamic 
reward-seeking in addiction can better capture the ability of hierarchical cues to spur 
motivation and trigger relapse. 
The form of hierarchical control we have focused on is one that is precise and 
explicit in the time-course and mechanisms that allow the dynamic shaping of reward-
seeking. Analogues of this control have been identified in certain models of animal drug 
self-administration and have promise for clarifying nuance in the triggers that spur 
relapse driven by discrete cues (Collins and Saunders, 2019). Hierarchical processes 
are likely at play in most behaviors as we integrate information about internal state and 
recent history to update our expectations and motivations. Such a framework is also 
useful in capturing the influence of drug-generated interoceptive states on influencing 
not just continued drug-seeking but also the factors and neural substrates that spur the 
co-abuse of drugs like alcohol and nicotine (Palmatier and Bevins, 2008; Bevins and 
Besheer, 2014; Jaramillo et al., 2016; Randall et al., 2016, 2019). Even the 
physiological response to drugs of abuse can be directly controlled in a hierarchical 
manner, determining tolerance or sensitization to a given dose of a drug, that have 
important implications for preventing overdose and drug-use related death (Badiani et 
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al., 1995; Anagnostaras and Robinson, 1996; Anagnostaras et al., 2002; Ramos et al., 
2002). Hierarchical processes are evident at each step in substance abuse disorders, 
from the initial spur to take drug, the continued use of drug, the physiological response 
to drugs, and ultimately relapse and must be considered in our experimental 
approaches and investigations. 
Here I have highlighted occasion setting as a model that allows for a precise 
understanding of the hierarchical control of behavior. Occasion setting allows for 
experimenter-based control of the nature of the hierarchy and in turn the modulation of 
behavior and allows not only for nuance in psychological investigations into such 
mechanisms but offers immense opportunities for neurobiological investigation. In 
contrast to approaches making use of physical settings such as a room, occasion 
setting allows for observations of immediate transformation of ambiguous cues into 
motivationally relevant triggers for reward-seeking. This precision is necessary to 
understand the ability of drug- and fear-related stimuli to become triggers for relapse in 
substance abuse disorders and PTSD. Ultimately, this approach offers numerous 
opportunities for a well-defined and tractable model for neurobiological investigations 
into hierarchical control of cue-motivated behavior that directly relate to a well-
characterized psychological process. While simple cue-reward associations are 
standard in the laboratory, hierarchical control of cue-triggered behavior is the norm 
rather than the exception in guiding our decisions, actions, and desires. The time is ripe 
for behavioral and systems neuroscience to move beyond reduced models of learning 





Figure 1.1. Representations and cue-triggered motivations arising as a result of 
the pairing of a cue with reward. The consequences of learning that a given cue 
predicts a given reward are perhaps not best captured by the evidence that a cue elicits 
responding. A, General example of Pavlovian conditioning where an auditory cue, in 
this case white noise, is paired with the delivery of a reward at its offset, in this case 
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banana-flavored sucrose pellets. As a result of the continued pairing of the white noise 
and sucrose pellets, rats begin to show behavior during the white noise, treating it as a 
CS. B, In some cases, rats can develop rich representations of the sensory features of 
the reward that are triggered when the CS is presented that spurs their responding. As 
a result, when the reward is devalued by either pre-feeding or pairing consumption of 
that food with nausea, responding to the cue decreases. C, In contrast, a CS can 
sometimes trigger a general representation of the abstract value of the cue and respond 
as a result of how much value has been ascribed to that CS over time. This 
representation is removed from the actual properties of the reward so responding to the 
CS is insensitive to devaluation of its associated outcome. D, A CS eliciting conditioned 
responding does not confer that CS with motivational value and there exists individual 
variation in the extent to which a given CS is likely to acquire this incentive salience. 
One way to assess this is to measure the amount of approaches and interactions with 
the CS during its presentation, termed sign-tracking, if the CS is localized and able to be 
easily contacted. Apart from these CS-directed approaches, the incentive salience 
attributed to a cue can be assessed by requiring the animal to acquire a novel response 
to earn just the CS. A CS that is imbued with incentive motivational value will support 
this conditioned reinforcement and is thus a useful measure in instances where the CS 




Figure 1.2. A model to observe hierarchical control of reward-seeking through 
occasion setting. Outline of a behavioral task designed by Fraser and Janak (2019) to 
observe occasion setting in freely moving rats. In a daily 2-hour session rats are 
presented with 10 each of three different trial types and their responding in a food cup is 
measured. On reinforced trials, a light and tone are serially presented with a gap 
between and sucrose reward is delivered at the offset of the white noise. The other trials 
are presentations of just the light or just the white noise alone. As a result of this 
arrangement of trials, rats use the light as an occasion setter to modulate their 
responses to the white noise conditioned stimulus. In contrast to previous models for 
occasion setting, the probability of reward predicted by either the light or tone are 
matched and there is a robust number of trials to support neurobiological investigation. 
OS, occasion setter; CS, conditioned stimulus. 
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Figure 1.3. Occasion setting deviates from predictions derived from popular 
theories of learning. Observations from male Long-Evans rats trained in an occasion 
setting paradigm according to the procedures in Fraser and Janak (2019) are 
contrasted with predictions based on the Rescorla-Wagner model, Temporal Difference 
Reinforcement Learning, and configural learning. The data for the switched order of 
occasion setter and conditioned stimulus and the satiety-induced devaluation are 
unpublished data from a cohort of n=46 male Long-Evans rats. For switched order 
testing, 5 trials were added to a standard session in the style of Fraser and Janak 
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(2019) where the order of the occasion setter and conditioned stimulus were presented 
and the responding shown in orange is time in food cup during the occasion setter. For 
the devaluation, rats were pre-fed for one hour on the normally predicted outcome, 15% 
sucrose, or an alternative but equally consumed outcome, 15% maltodextrin, prior to a 
session in the style of Fraser and Janak (2019) conducted with no reward delivered. 
Open bars indicate the session where sucrose was devalued by pre-feeding, closed 
bars indicate the sucrose valued condition when maltodextrin was pre-fed. OS, 




Figure 1.4. Loss of inhibitory control by an extinction-associated context, not the 
modulatory actions of the training context, explains renewal of responding. An 
example of the common use of different sights, smells, and textures in a conditioning 
chamber to produce a unique context during Pavlovian conditioning. A, In the original 
context a cue is paired with an outcome according to Pavlovian conditioning procedures 
and conditioned responding to the CS develops. B, Animals are then placed into a 
different context where the CS is presented but without its associated outcome, nor are 
43 
 
any unsignaled outcomes delivered. Conditioned responding to the CS decreases as a 
result of extinction learning. C, At test, placement of the animal back into the training 
context, a novel context, or a context that is familiar and equated in exposure to the 
training context, generally results in renewal of responding to the CS. Given that all of 
these contexts result in renewal, it is not apparent that the training context “induces” 
renewal by some modulatory action or by a direct association with reward. In contrast, 
this pattern is best captured by the loss of inhibitory modulatory control of the extinction 





Figure 1.5. Neurobiological substrates of occasion setting. Sagittal section of a rat 
brain illustrating regions implicated in occasion setting and their relevant circuitry is 
indicated by the directional arrows. Green shading indicates regions for which evidence 
implicates activity within this region as being critical for the acquisition or expression of 
occasion setting. Other regions shaded in blue are implicated in simple Pavlovian 
conditioning but a role for these regions in occasion setting remains to be 
demonstrated. Evidence for the involvement of the dHIPP, shaded in red, in occasion 
setting is mixed and requires further study. BLA basolateral amygdala, dHIPP dorsal 
hippocampus, mPFC medial prefrontal cortex, NAc nucleus accumbens, OFC 
orbitofrontal cortex, PVT paraventricular nucleus of the thalamus, vHIPP ventral 







Occasion setters attain incentive motivational value: implications for contextual 
influences on reward-seeking 
INTRODUCTION 
Cues paired repeatedly with reward not only acquire a predictive relationship with 
reward but also attain incentive motivational properties, or incentive salience, that 
render Pavlovian reward-paired cues attractive and desirable. Indeed, the incentive 
motivational properties of cues are thought to be a primary trigger for food-seeking as 
well as relapse in drug-abstinent addicts (Stewart et al. 1984; Robinson and Berridge 
1993; Flagel et al. 2009; Robinson et al. 2014b; Milton and Everitt 2010; Kelley 2004). 
Cue-based exposure therapy is employed clinically, sometimes alongside cognitive 
behavioral therapies, in an effort to extinguish the incentive motivational properties of 
drug-paired cues but is generally ineffective in producing lasting reductions in drug-
seeking behavior and in preventing relapse (Carter and Tiffany, 1999a, 1999b; Conklin 
and Tiffany, 2002; Kavanagh et al., 2006; Martin et al., 2013; Mellentin et al., 2017). A 
possible explanation for these failures comes from viewing drug-seeking as controlled 
directly by a simple cue-reward relationship, which fails to capture the multitude of 
situations in which the cue may or may not be motivationally relevant (Bouton, 2002).  
These issues are exemplified in the ability of a reward-associated context to 
renew responding to Pavlovian cues previously associated with reward despite their 
extinction in a separate, distinct setting. These findings indicate that the contexts in 
which reward-predictive cues are encountered can modulate the ability of those cues to 
trigger reward-seeking (Bouton et al., 2006; Chaudhri et al., 2008; Crombag et al., 
2008). However, the exact underlying psychological process by which contexts act to 
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produce renewal of reward-seeking has remained unclear (Bouton, 1988; Holland and 
Bouton, 1999). For instance, a context may enter into a direct relationship with reward 
such that when a weakly predictive cue is presented it triggers responding as a result of 
summing the strength of the context-reward and cue-reward relationships. Others have 
proposed that contexts act in a more complex way as occasion setters which would 
instill them with the ability to resolve the ambiguity of reward-predictive cues (Grahame 
et al., 1990; Holland and Bouton, 1999; Valyear et al., 2017; Fraser and Holland, 2019). 
To date, however, there has been little investigation into the precise psychological 
mechanisms underlying context-induced effects on reward-seeking behavior. 
To address these issues, we adapted an animal behavioral model of occasion 
setting to directly probe the underlying psychological mechanisms by which occasion 
setters, like a context, may act to modulate reward-seeking. In this model, a brief cue 
informs that in the near future a typical conditioned stimulus will be followed by reward. 
If either the occasion setting cue or conditioned stimulus are presented in isolation, they 
are nonreinforced. In essence, this model reduces a context to a brief, phasic, and 
localizable event in the environment. We investigated if occasion setting may act by 
magnifying the underlying incentive motivational value of ambiguous reward-predictive 
cues in tests of conditioned reinforcement. Indeed, occasion setters modulated both the 
predictive and motivational properties of their conditioned stimuli, but to our surprise we 
found that occasion setters acquired incentive motivational value in their own right and 
that the modulatory actions and motivational value of occasion setters were resistant to 
extinction. Together, these findings have important implications for our understanding of 
complex cue interactions in triggering reward-seeking and relapse. 
47 
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Subjects 
Male Long-Evans rats (n=50) weighing 250 g were purchased from ENVIGO 
(Frederick, MD) and were single-housed in a temperature- and humidity-controlled 
colony (lights on at 07:00) with enrichment in their cages. Following one week of 
acclimation to the colony room, rats were food-restricted (95% of free-feeding weight). 
To acclimate them to the reinforcer used during training, rats were given 24 hour access 
to 15% sucrose (w/v in tap water) one day before behavioral procedures began. All 
behavioral training took place during the light cycle. Sample sizes were determined 
based on pilot studies. All procedures were approved by the Animal Care and Use 
Committee at Johns Hopkins University and are in accordance with the Guidelines for 
the Use and Care of Animals in Research, 8th Edition. 
Apparatus 
Behavioral training and testing took place in 10 MedAssociates chambers in 
individual sound- and light-attenuating cabinets and were controlled by a computer 
running MedPC IV software. Each chamber was equipped with a recessed port on the 
front wall of the chamber where liquids could be delivered via tubing attached to a 60 
mL syringe placed in a motorized pump outside the cabinet. Port entries and exits were 
detected by infrared beams located within the recessed port. A white houselight (28 V) 
was located on the wall opposite the recessed port along with a white noise generator. 
Outside the behavioral chamber but within the cabinet was a red houselight (28 V) that 





Rats were initially trained to drink reward freely from the port in a single session 
where the reward pump was randomly activated 80 times for 2 s (~0.08 mL per delivery) 
with a 60 s variable time schedule. Conditioning began the following day with 30 trials 
with a 200 s average (100-300 s range) inter-trial interval. We gradually introduced 
different trial types in this task as pilot studies indicated rats failed to learn if presented 
with all trial types from the onset of training. Initially, for each trial, the white houselight 
(occasion setter; OS) was illuminated for 5 s, followed by a 5 s gap with no stimuli, then 
the white noise generator (conditioned stimulus; CS) was active for 5 s, and, finally, 
upon CS termination, the reward pump was active for 5 s delivering ~0.2 mL of 15% 
sucrose reward. There was one session a day with each session lasting approximately 
2 hours. Following 4 sessions, rats began discrimination training where 12 trials were 
reinforced as before, but the remaining 18 trials were nonreinforced presentations of the 
CS alone. After 6 more sessions, rats proceeded to the full occasion setting task where 
10 trials were reinforced, 10 were nonreinforced presentations of the CS alone, and 10 
were nonreinforced presentations of the OS alone, with trial type determined 
pseudorandomly, such that no trial type occurred more than 4 times in succession. Rats 
were trained for 8 sessions in the full task prior to either extinction or conditioned 
reinforcement tests. 
The OS was a visual cue and the CS was an auditory cue as this arrangement 
has been previously found to promote the development of occasion setting and 
maximize differences in behavior (Holland, 1992). In particular, the use of an auditory 
cue for the CS encourages food cup approach (Holland, 1977), and given the cue is 
49 
 
only presented for 5 s, this encouraged an easily quantifiable and unbiased metric of 
conditioned reward-seeking. 
Rats in the unpaired condition received an identical number of trial types in all 
phases with conserved timing of presentation of cues, but reward was delivered 
according to a separate ITI schedule that matched the rate of reward delivery in the 
paired condition. 
For rats undergoing extinction of the OS, following the eighth day of training in 
the full occasion setting task, they were first tested in a session under extinction 
conditions where reward delivery was withheld. The OS was then extinguished across 4 
sessions by presenting the OS alone for 30 unrewarded trials per session. The day after 
the last OS extinction session the rats were tested again in the final occasion setting 
task also without reward delivery. The following day rats proceeded to conditioned 
reinforcement testing without rewarded retraining in the occasion setting task. 
Conditioned Reinforcement 
Each conditioned reinforcement test lasted 40 minutes during which levers on 
either side of the recessed port were extended or nose pokes were available for 
responding. Each rat received two tests for different cues on one operant (e.g. CS alone 
and OS+CS) and then two tests on the other operant (e.g. OS+CS and OS alone), with 
a test to earn the OS+CS conducted on each. There was only cue available to be 
earned during each test. The order of testing, the identity (nosepoke vs lever), and the 
side (left vs right) of the active and inactive operant were counterbalanced and reversed 
between tests on the same operant. This required rats to acquire a unique operant 
response during each test. There was at least one day without testing between each 
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conditioned reinforcement test. In OS alone tests, responses on the active operant 
produced a 2 s presentation of the houselight OS. In CS alone tests, responses on the 
active operant produced a 2 s presentation of the white noise CS. In OS+CS tests 
active responses produced simultaneous 2 s presentation of the houselight OS and the 
white noise CS; we presented these cues simultaneously as brief cue presentations 
promote conditioned reinforcement (Taylor and Robbins, 1984; Robinson and Flagel, 
2009; Fraser et al., 2016; Saunders et al., 2018) and because we surmised that a time 
gap in their presentation during free operant responding would make it difficult for the 
subject to link their responses to serial cue presentation. In each test, responses on the 
inactive operant were without consequence. 
Statistical Analysis  
Linear mixed-models were used to assess behavior across training using SPSS 
24 (IBM) with session and trial type as repeated measures and group was a between 
subjects factor. Time in port was normalized by subtracting average time in port during 
a 10 s period prior to the onset of the first cue during a trial from time during the CS 
period. Repeated measures ANOVA were used to analyze the impact of extinction of 
the occasion setter on behavior. For extinction tests, we examined the microstructure of 
reward port approach by calculating the probability of observing a given rat in the 
reward port across all trials in 1 s bins, and then averaging these across all rats. Bias 
scores were calculated by subtracting responding during the CS period on either CS or 
OS alone trials from OS+CS trials and dividing by the sum of these values (e.g. 
([OS+CS]-OS Alone) / ([OS+CS]+OS Alone)) giving a score between 1 and -1, with a 
value of 1 representing perfect discrimination in responding exclusively on OS+CS trials 
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relative to either CS alone or OS alone trials. One-way repeated measures ANOVA 
were used to analyze active to inactive responding, cues earned, and port entries in the 
conditioned reinforcement tests. There were 2 OS+CS tests for each rat, one on each 
operant, and we averaged responding across these tests. For conditioned 
reinforcement, active to inactive responding was analyzed two ways 1) using ANOVA to 
compare between tests and 2) using Wilcoxon signed-rank tests to assess if active 
ratios were significantly different than random responding (median value of 0). In cases 
where data were non-normally distributed, nonparametric tests were used. One rat was 
excluded from the paired group for the CS alone test due to his responding on all 
measures being an outlier as detected by Grubbs’ test. Post hoc comparisons were 
conducted when significant main effects and interactions were observed. For all 
analyses, α=0.05. 
RESULTS 
A novel procedure to observe occasion setting 
Rats were trained in an occasion setting task in which a conditioned stimulus 
(CS) was reinforced only if its presentation had been preceded by the presentation of a 
separate occasion setter (OS) cue. If either the OS or the CS were presented in 
isolation they were not reinforced (Fig. 1A). This produced a situation in which rats had 
to constantly update their expectations of reinforcement based on the events 
surrounding encounters with the ambiguously predictive CS. To understand how the OS 
might affect responding produced by the CS we examined food cup activity when the 
CS was present, or in the corresponding time interval when the CS was withheld in the 
case of OS alone trials (the ‘period of interest’, depicted in Fig. 1A). The primary form of 
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the conditioned response was head jerk-related movements inside the food cup 
throughout the CS, in agreement with previous reports that in occasion setting the 
primary conditioned response resembles the form supported by the CS (Holland 1977, 
1992). Rats in the paired condition responded maximally on OS+CS trials, i.e., when the 
OS preceded the CS, and this pattern of responding was identical for those rats who 
would undergo (n=20) or not undergo (n=20) extinction of the OS (interaction of session 
x group x trial type F(40,106)=1.589; p=0.032; simple effect of trial type within each group 
p<0.0001; all within group Bonferroni post hoc comparisons between OS+CS versus CS 
alone and OS alone for sessions 11-18 p<0.001 for paired groups; all Bonferroni post 
hoc comparisons between paired groups for each session p>0.9; Fig. 1B). In contrast, 
the unpaired group (n=10) did not develop a noticeable degree of conditioned 
responding during the CS period (no simple effect of trial type within the unpaired group 
across sessions). Thus, this procedure, with a relatively large number of trials per 
session, and equal presentations of all trial types in a session, produces behavior akin 
to occasion setting with minimal training.  
Occasion setters have incentive motivational value 
We then assessed the motivational value of the OS, CS, and the combination of 
the OS+CS in a series of conditioned reinforcement tests for a subset of paired rats 
(n=20) and rats who received unpaired training (n=10). In this test, rats are asked to 
learn a novel response to earn presentation of one of the following stimuli in the 
absence of food reward: the OS alone, the CS alone, or a combination OS+CS 
stimulus. We found that paired rats earned the combination OS+CS stimulus and the 
OS alone more than unpaired rats (Main effect of cue F(1.856, 51.03)=3.958, p=0.0289, 
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main effect of group F(1,28)=8.095, p=0.0082, interaction F(2,55)=3.28, p=0.0451; post 
hocs p<0.05; Fig. 2A). There was no effect of cue within unpaired rats suggesting that 
there was no contribution of differences in the degree of sensory reinforcement among 
tests to the pattern of responding we observed in paired rats (Meyer et al. 2014). Paired 
rats earned the combination of the OS+CS more than CS alone (p=0.0006), but also 
earned more OS alone presentations than CS alone (p=0.0403) while the number of 
cues earned did not differ between OS+CS and OS alone tests suggesting these cues 
had similar conditioned reinforcing value (p=0.285). This pattern was similar for the 
difference between active and inactive responses (planned comparisons in paired group 
OS+CS vs CS alone p=0.0089; OS alone vs CS alone p=0.0443; OS+CS vs OS alone 
p=0.4085; Fig. 2B). In addition, only in tests where rats could earn the OS+CS or OS 
alone did paired rats discriminate and respond significantly more on the active over 
inactive lever than expected by chance (Wilcoxon tests p<0.01). To better understand 
potential differences in the representations evoked by earning the OS+CS in 
combination and the OS alone we examined port entries made during the brief 2 s cue 
for each cue type. Although port entries during the 2 s cues were predictably low, paired 
rats made more port entries during each cue presentation when the cue they earned 
was the CS alone or the combination of OS+CS than for the OS alone (interaction of 
cue and group F(2,83)=3.991, p=0.0221; post hoc comparisons p<0.001; Fig. 2C). This 
suggests that earning the OS alone in these tests did not evoke immediate reward-
seeking behavior, but the addition of the OS to the CS increased both motivation to earn 
the CS and spurred reward-seeking. In contrast, rats did not work to earn the CS alone 
suggesting that in this preparation a reward-adjacent and ambiguous CS does not 
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support conditioned reinforcement. Collectively, this pattern of results indicates that an 
occasion setter, typically thought to be a cue that modulates the predictive significance 
of a cue-reward relationship, can increase the motivational value of an otherwise 
undesirable CS, as well as develop incentive motivational properties in its own right. 
Extinction of an occasion setter does not alter its ability to resolve predictive information 
of its conditioned stimulus 
Behavior in the occasion setting task and the subsequent conditioned 
reinforcement tests could be explained by either of two hypotheses: 1) animals use the 
visual stimulus as an occasion setter to modulate the significance of the auditory CS 
and/or 2) the occasion setter and conditioned stimulus each are relatively weakly 
associated with reward and rats sum these two strengths to increase reward-seeking 
during combined OS+CS presentation, compared to OS or CS alone. The latter could 
explain why paired rats spent more time in the food cup following the OS alone than 
unpaired rats (Fig. 1B), and why paired rats work to earn just the occasion setter (Fig. 
2), as the occasion setter itself could have become weakly associated with reward. To 
directly assess these possibilities, a separate group of rats (n=20; to be extinction group 
from Fig. 1B) were tested in the occasion setting procedure under extinction conditions 
where reward was withheld to examine the microstructure of their behavior across trial 
types. By quantifying the probability of being in the reward port on a second by second 
basis across the serial presentation of the OS and CS, it appeared that the OS alone 
evoked a small increase in the chance a rat would enter the reward port prior to CS 
onset (Fig. 3A). We then extinguished responding to the OS alone in a series of 4 
sessions consisting only of OS presentations resulting in percent time in port on the final 
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day of OS extinction being 3.023 ± 0.9 % SEM. After this, we asked if this extinction of 
any direct links between the OS and reward would reduce its ability to serve as an 
occasion setter in a subsequent extinction test with all trial types. The effect of this 
manipulation was apparent in the microstructure of behavior across all three trial types, 
with rats no longer exhibiting any increase in reward port approach to the OS alone 
following OS extinction, yet still using the OS to increase their reward-seeking on trials 
where both the OS and CS were presented (Fig. 3B). Analyzing time in port during the 
CS period also revealed that, while responding in the second extinction test, after OS 
extinction, was lower overall (main effect of test F(1,19)=113.4, p<0.0001), extinction of 
the OS did not produce a deficit in the ability of rats to use the OS as an occasion 
setter, as responding was still highest on the OS+CS trials (main effect of trial type 
F(1,19)=87.3, p<0.0001; test x trial type interaction F(2,38)=4.122, p=0.0240; post hoc 
comparisons between OS+CS and CS alone and OS alone post OS extinction, all 
p<0.01; Fig. 3C).  
The preservation of occasion setting abilities of the OS after extinction was also 
readily apparent when looking at bias scores which are resistant to changes in the total 
amount of conditioned approach (see Methods). When analyzing their behavior during 
the CS period of interest, rats were better at discriminating between OS+CS versus OS 
alone trials than OS+CS versus CS alone trials (main effect of discrimination 
F(1,19)=51.42, p<0.001; Fig. 3D). An interaction between extinction and discrimination 
(F(1,19)=8.608, p=0.0085) revealed that after OS extinction rats responded even less 
during OS alone trials than before OS extinction (p=0.0169) but discrimination between 
CS alone and reinforced trials was unaffected by OS extinction (p>0.9999). These data 
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also confirm that the behavior observed during conditioning meet an important criterion 
for occasion setting, and is not simple summation of responding between the partially 
reinforced OS and CS. Thus, in the absence of possible direct predictive associations 
with reward, the OS cue still acts to set the occasion for reward-seeking.  
The incentive motivational properties of an occasion setting cue are extinction resistant 
We next asked whether direct extinction of the OS would affect the conditioned 
reinforcing properties of the OS by using the same conditioned reinforcement tests as 
before, immediately following the second extinction test. Rats who underwent OS 
extinction did not work for the CS alone but did work to earn combined presentations of 
the OS+CS, replicating our original finding (Friedman statistic for cue effect = 15.1, 
p=0.0005; post hoc p=0.0008; Fig. 4A). Critically, OS extinction did not alter the 
willingness of rats to earn the OS alone and rats earned significantly more presentations 
of the OS alone compared to the CS alone test (p=0.008; Fig. 4A). This pattern of 
responding was similarly reflected in the magnitude of active-inactive responses with 
rats working more on the active lever to earn the OS+CS and OS alone but not for the 
CS alone (Friedman statistic for cue effect = 6.3, p=0.0429; Wilcoxon tests for OS+CS 
and OS alone p<0.05; Fig. 4B). Interestingly, despite it being more than 2 weeks since 
these rats had received reward, they still made more port entries when they earned the 
combination of the OS+CS than the OS alone and CS alone (Friedman statistic for cue 
effect = 13.59, p=0.001; post hoc p<0.05; Fig. 4C). Taken together, these findings 
indicate that the incentive motivational value of an OS, and the ability of that OS to 





  Cues repeatedly paired with reward become predictors of reward availability, but 
may also acquire incentive motivational properties that can render these cues desirable 
on their own and endow them with the ability to spur and energize action (Bindra, 1974, 
1978; Stewart et al., 1984) . While much is known about the predictive and incentive 
properties of cues that have a deterministic, absolute relationship with reward 
availability (Flagel et al., 2009; Meyer et al., 2014; Ahrens et al., 2016), considerably 
less is known about ambiguous cues and the factors that regulate their predictive and 
motivational value. We assessed whether a special class of cues that regulate the 
strength of an ambiguous cue-reward relationship, called occasion setters (Holland, 
1992; Meyer and Bucci, 2016a; Shobe et al., 2017; Fraser and Holland, 2019), could 
engender their own incentive motivational properties. We find that while cues trained as 
occasion setters do not obligatorily elicit reward seeking on their own, they acquire 
incentive salience and can act to enhance both the predictive and motivational value of 
a conditioned stimulus.  
That occasion setters support conditioned reinforcement may suggest that this 
result is the consequence of second-order conditioning to the occasion setting cue 
(Rizley and Rescorla, 1972; Gewirtz and Davis, 2000), but a number of distinctions rule 
out that second-order conditioning could be responsible. First, second-order 
conditioning is most frequently observed when the introduction of the second-order cue 
follows the formation of a strong associative pairing of the first-order cue with reward, 
whereas training here proceeded from the outset with serial pairings of the cues. 
Second, the presence of reward generally discourages second-order conditioning, 
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requiring the introduction of the second-order cue in extinction. In our preparation the 
serial presentation of cues was always followed by reward, but either cue in isolation 
was never reinforced, making it unlikely that the motivational and predictive value of the 
conditioned stimulus is resulting in new learning about the occasion setting cue. 
Moreover, what is learned about the conditioned stimulus should be equivalent for the 
occasion setter if second-order conditioning is occurring, but we observed conditioned 
reinforcement for the occasion setter and not the conditioned stimulus. Third, we rarely 
observed behavior in the food cup during the occasion setter suggesting that the 
representations evoked by the occasion setter were distinct from those evoked by the 
conditioned stimulus. Finally, extinction of the occasion setter did not prevent 
conditioned reinforcement, whereas extinction of a first-order conditioned stimulus 
prevents the observation of conditioned reinforcement (Lindgren et al., 2003; Holland, 
2016). Given second-order stimuli directly inherit their predictive and motivational 
properties from first-order stimuli, their conditioned reinforcing properties, if any, should 
also be sensitive to extinction (Sharpe et al., 2017a). While occasion setting and 
second-order conditioning may appear procedurally similar, there is little indication that 
second-order conditioning can explain the conditioned reinforcing properties of an 
occasion setting cue and the ability of this cue to enhance conditioned approach to an 
ambiguous conditioned stimulus. This suggests that the incentive and predictive 
properties of the occasion setting cue are not readily explained by existing associative 
models (Fraser and Holland, 2019). 
A common model to assess the modulation of reward-seeking is the use of 
physical contexts to denote situations where cues will or will not lead to various 
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outcomes like food reward, aversive footshock, or drugs of abuse (Bouton and Bolles, 
1979; Holland and Bouton, 1999; Bouton, 2002; Chaudhri et al., 2008; Crombag et al., 
2008). However, it has remained difficult to isolate and mechanistically understand the 
underlying psychological processes that allow contexts to facilitate reward-seeking as 
contexts are multidimensional and have long-lasting temporal effects. To overcome this, 
we empirically assessed one of the proposed mechanisms of physical contexts, 
occasion setting, by substituting a brief and phasic event for a context. This overcame 
obstacles associated with using physical contexts and in particular this allowed us to 
extinguish behavior resulting from the occasion setter, which has been attempted but as 
contexts alone fail to evoke obvious observable behavior it has been unclear if context 
extinction occurs (Remedios et al., 2014). Surprisingly, extinction of an occasion setter 
did not impair its ability to resolve ambiguity about reward-paired cues, nor did 
extinction of the occasion setter affect its motivational value. Because we found that an 
occasion setter acquired incentive motivational value, as well as serving to 
disambiguate both the incentive motivational and predictive properties of conditioned 
stimuli, we suggest by extension that physical contexts may act in these ways. Taken 
together, occasion setting may be an essential and enduring process contributing to 
relapse as contexts, physiological states, and discrete cues can each function as 
occasion setters to generate states of motivation preceding encounters with cues 
directly associated with drug use that may ultimately overcome goal-directed attempts 
to maintain abstinence.  
Our data suggest that occasion setters meet at least one of these criteria for an 
incentive stimulus, as the occasion setter on its own was able to reinforce the 
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acquisition of novel responses to earn its brief presentation. Incentive stimuli are 
learned cues that are able to evoke motivational and emotional states (Bolles, 1972; 
Bindra, 1978; Stewart et al., 1984; Toates, 1998). These stimuli can elicit conditioned 
approach upon their presentation, reinforce behavior in the absence of reward, and spur 
action  (Berridge, 2001; Cardinal et al., 2002). In our procedure, we rarely if ever 
observed conditioned approach to the occasion setter, a localizable houselight, and it 
remains to be demonstrated if an occasion setter can act to invigorate reward-seeking 
actions in tests of Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer. It was also rare to observe any 
approach to the food cup during the occasion setter’s presentation, so in the absence of 
any overt behavioral response the occasion setter still became imbued with incentive 
motivational properties and was later able to support conditioned reinforcement. 
However, it is evident that the occasion setter regulated both the predictive and 
incentive motivational properties of reward-paired cues as evidenced by enhancing 
conditioned approach to the food cup during the conditioned stimulus and enhancing 
the conditioned stimulus’s otherwise minimal or nonexistent conditioned reinforcing 
value. Despite both the occasion setter and the conditioned stimulus having an equal 
overall probability of reward, we only observed conditioned reinforcement for the 
occasion setter. This is counter to observations that uncertainty amplifies the incentive 
motivational value of Pavlovian cues (Anselme et al., 2013; Robinson et al., 2014a; 
Zack et al., 2014), but perhaps the hierarchical nature of occasion setting focuses the 
motivational enhancing aspects of uncertainty to the resolving, occasion setting cue. 
Together, these data suggest a dissociation between predictive and incentive 
motivational properties of occasion setters, in that an occasion setter can produce a 
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state of incentive motivation upon its presentation, but on its own it does not act as a 
predictor of reward to trigger reward-seeking. Instead, we argue that this occasion 
setter-evoked motivational state makes reward-associated cues desirable targets of 
motivation thereby facilitating reward-seeking for food, and potentially other rewards 
such as drugs of abuse.  
Given that occasion setters support conditioned reinforcement, it is likely 
mesolimbic dopaminergic projections from the midbrain to the nucleus accumbens, 
which have been proposed to mediate both incentive motivation and reward prediction 
error, are involved in this behavioral process (Taylor and Robbins, 1984; Berridge, 
2012; Saddoris et al., 2015; Saunders et al., 2018; Keiflin et al., 2019). Glutamatergic 
input to the nucleus accumbens from the basolateral amygdala may also be essential 
for the occasion setting studied here (Holland and Gallagher, 1999; Everitt et al., 2003; 
Wassum and Izquierdo, 2015). Lesions of the basolateral amygdala result in a profound 
deficit in updating the value attributed to a simple conditioned stimulus and adapting 
responding appropriately, suggesting that in the amygdala’s absence the proper 
encoding, updating, and utilization of state value is lost (Hatfield et al. 1996; Sharpe and 
Schoenbaum 2016; Morrison and Salzman 2010). The occasion setting procedure 
utilized here could be especially helpful for facilitating investigations into neural circuitry 
underlying dynamic regulation of cue-triggered motivation in freely-moving rodents. 
That occasion setters have conditioned reinforcing value may suggest that their 
actions are the result of a model-free representational system (Parkinson et al., 2005; 
Dayan and Berridge, 2014). Our evidence supports this, as manipulations of association 
between the occasion setter and reward, via direct extinction, failed to alter motivation 
62 
 
to work for the occasion setter in isolation. A strong test of model-free versus model-
based systems is whether a given cue engages a representation of the outcome it 
predicts (Dayan and Berridge, 2014). In our conditioned reinforcement tests we left the 
food cup available despite the absence of reward availability in an effort to test this 
possibility. As rats earned the occasion setter in isolation they did not immediately 
proceed to check the food cup, suggesting that the occasion setter did not evoke a 
representation of the outcome that was sufficient to result in reward-seeking actions. 
However, when the occasion setter was paired with its conditioned stimulus in this test 
rats frequently made entries into the food cup during this brief cue. These data suggest 
that the representations evoked solely by an occasion setter in isolation may be model-
free, that is, they are reflective of an averaged value that is independent of 
representation of reward. However, in conjunction with its conditioned stimulus the 
actions of the occasion setter to enhance both conditioned reinforcement may reflect 
the actions of a model-based system given that the combination of these cues trigger 
reward-seeking behaviors. These could suggest differing underlying neural substrates 
for the motivational states evoked by occasion setters versus their actions to guide 
appropriate reward-seeking triggered by ambiguous cues. In particular, conditioned 
reinforcement for Pavlovian cues can be sensitive to manipulations of the value of the 
outcome that they predict and that this sensitivity is dependent on the orbitofrontal 
cortex and basolateral amygdala (Burke et al., 2007, 2008). In contrast, conditioned 
reinforcement for well-trained, perhaps model-free, Pavlovian cues is dependent on 
dopamine and its actions within the nucleus accumbens core (Taylor and Robbins, 
1984; Saunders et al., 2018). This suggests an observation of conditioned 
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reinforcement for a cue may not represent the sole contribution of either a model-free or 
model-based system and that there may be different neural substrates for model-based 
versus model-free conditioned reinforcement. It will be important to determine in future 
studies if direct manipulations of outcome value differentially affect responding for an 
occasion setter alone or in combination with its conditioned stimulus.  
We have demonstrated that a unique class of cues that modulate the significance 
of a cue-reward relationship has the potential to generate states of motivation, even in 
the absence of direct associations with reward, which may energize and ultimately lead 
to pursuit of rewards like food and drugs. This property of occasion setters may explain 
the ability of physical contexts to renew food- and drug-seeking and, more broadly, the 
invigoration of reward-seeking brought about by the myriad cues encountered in the 
environment. Occasion setting need not solely be for regulating conditioned reward-
seeking as other behavioral responses to a given dose of a drug of abuse, such as 
sensitization and tolerance, can also come under control of occasion setting 
mechanisms (Anagnostaras et al., 2002; Ramos et al., 2002). Further investigations into 
both the psychological and neurobiological processes underlying occasion setting may 
provide new avenues for future clinical interventions with lasting benefits for chronic 





Figure 2.1. A novel model for occasion setting. A, Schematic of the final stage of the 
occasion setting task. In each session rats randomly receive one of three trials types, 10 
of each per session. Only when the OS and CS are paired (with a 5 s gap between) is 
the termination of the CS followed by reward delivery. B, Normalized percent time in 
port during the CS period across training. Paired rats reinforced as in A acquire 
discriminatory responding in the task, and this is not true for Unpaired rats receiving 
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truly random delivery of reward (n=10; small gray circles). Paired rats who would (n=20; 
open symbols) or would not (n=20; solid symbols) undergo OS extinction following 
training did not differ from each other at any point during training. Data are presented as 
mean ± SEM. OS, occasion setter. CS, conditioned stimulus. Purple represents 





Figure 2.2. Occasion setters have incentive motivational value. A, Number of cues 
earned during the conditioned reinforcement test for each cue. B, Magnitude of 
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responses on the active minus inactive operant. C, Number of port entries made while 
the 2s cue was present following a response on the active operant. D-F, same as A-C 
but the individual data. For all figures bars indicate mean + SEM.  Purple reflects the 
OS+CS test, red reflects the OS alone test, and blue reflects the CS alone test. OS, 
occasion setter. CS, conditioned stimulus. *p<0.05 for post hoc comparisons, ^p<0.05 





Figure 2.3. Extinction of an occasion setter does not impair its ability to enhance 
the predictive value of its conditioned stimulus. A, Probability of observing a rat in 
the reward port across each trial type during the initial extinction test (Interaction 
between seconds and trial type F(78,1482)=42.69, p<0.0001). Lines indicate periods when 
OS+CS trials are significantly greater (Bonferroni post hoc p<0.05) than CS alone 
(purple) and CS alone is significantly greater than OS alone (blue), and OS alone is 
significantly greater than CS alone (red). B, Probability of observing a rat in the reward 
port across each trial type in the second extinction test following OS extinction 
(Interaction between seconds and trial type F(78,1482)=40.52, p<0.0001). Lines indicate 
periods when OS+CS trials are significantly greater (Bonferroni post hoc p<0.05) than 
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CS alone (purple) and CS alone is significantly greater than OS alone (blue). C, 
Normalized percent time in port during the CS period for each extinction test. Purple 
represents reinforced trials, blue represents CS alone trials, and red represents OS 
alone trials. D, Discrimination scores for each extinction test. Empty bars represent data 
from the session prior to OS extinction and filled bars data from the session following 
OS extinction. For all figures symbols indicate mean ± SEM. OS, occasion setter. CS, 





Figure 2.4. The incentive motivational properties of an occasion setter are 
extinction resistant. A, Number of cues earned during the conditioned reinforcement 
test for each cue. B, Magnitude of responses on the active minus inactive operant. C, 
Number of port entries made while the 2s cue was present following a response on the 
active operant. D-F, same as A-C but the individual data. For all figures bars indicate 
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mean + SEM.  OS, occasion setter. CS, conditioned stimulus. *p<0.05 for post hoc 





Dopamine neurons are necessary for the hierarchical organization of cue-
triggered reward-seeking 
INTRODUCTION 
The ability to determine the importance of a given environmental stimulus and in turn 
generate the appropriate behavioral response is essential for survival. Dopamine 
neurons in the midbrain are suggested to be critically involved in one aspect of this 
evaluative process – determining the expected value of the outcome associated with a 
given stimulus (Rescorla and Wagner, 1972; Schultz et al., 1997; Schultz and 
Dickinson, 2000; Fiorillo et al., 2003; Pan et al., 2005; Tobler et al., 2005; Cohen et al., 
2012; Watabe-Uchida et al., 2017). This foundational proposal is built on the finding that 
the activity of dopamine neurons at the time of a given environmental stimulus paired 
with reward is directly in relation to the amount and probability of reward predicted by 
that stimulus (Fiorillo et al., 2003; Tobler et al., 2005). This expected value encoding of 
dopamine neuron’s is thought to be generated over the course of learning, where 
numerous pairings of that stimulus with its fixed probability and reward amount 
generates prediction errors that allow for the refinement of this value signal over 
numerous trials and, ultimately, the appropriate behavioral response (Fiorillo et al., 
2003; Tobler et al., 2005; Hart et al., 2015; Keiflin and Janak, 2015).  
 Despite this, there exists little evidence that provides a link between alterations in 
the expected value of a conditioned stimulus and the utilization of such a signal in 
dopamine neurons to in turn generate behavior. In probabilistic situations where freely-
behaving animals learn about numerous distinct stimuli with distinct expected values, 
conditioned responding commonly appears similar despite marked differences in the 
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response of dopamine neurons and in turn dopamine release in downstream striatal 
regions (Hart et al., 2015). As a result, whether such expected value encoding is a 
feature of dopamine systems that is critical for adaptive behavior remains unclear. Here, 
we took advantage of the ability to manipulate the activity of dopamine neurons in 
freely-behaving rats in a temporally precise manner to test their necessity in utilizing an 
expected value function to generate conditioned responding (Witten et al., 2011). We 
exploited occasion setting, an approach in which the long-running expected value of a 
conditioned stimulus is dissociated from its trial-to-trial value as the relation between 
this stimulus and reward is predicated on the prior presence of a separate, distinct 
stimulus (Holland, 1992; Fraser and Holland, 2019; Fraser and Janak, 2019). Ultimately, 
we reveal that dopamine neuron activity is necessary for the rapid utilization of an 
updated expected value to adjust behavioral responding, yet manipulations at the time 
of cues with stable expected values fail to alter behavior.  
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Subjects 
 Subjects were 12 experimentally naïve male and female TH-Cre transgenic rats 
(on a Long-Evans background) and 12 male and female wildtype littermates bred in our 
laboratory. These rats express the bacterial recombinase Cre under the control of the 
tyrosine hydroxylase (TH) promoter, the rate-limiting enzyme for the synthesis of 
dopamine. Rats were single-housed in ventilated cages with ad libitum access to food 
and water in a temperature- and humidity-controlled room and maintained on 12:12 
light/dark cycle (lights on at 07:00). After recovery from surgery, feeding was restricted 
to maintain weights at ~95% of ad libitum feeding weights. All behavioral procedures 
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took place between 13:00 and 20:00. All procedures were approved by the Animal Care 
and Use Committee at Johns Hopkins University and followed the recommended 
guidelines in the Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals: Eighth Edition, 
revised in 2011. 
Surgery 
 Rats were anesthetized with isoflurane (5% induction, 1-2.5% maintenance) and 
standard stereotaxic procedures were used to infuse a Cre-dependent viral vector 
containing halorhodopsin (AAV5-Ef1a-DIO-eNpHR3.0-eYFP; titer 3.1 x 1012 viral 
particles/mL; University of North Carolina) for TH-Cre animals (n=12) or a control GFP 
virus (AAV5-hsyn-EGFP; titer 1 x 1013 viral particles/mL; University of North Carolina) 
for wildtype littermates (n=12) bilaterally into the VTA (AP: -5.8 ML: ±0.7 DV: -8.0 for 
males; DV -7.7 for females; 700 nL per site). A volume of 700 nL of virus was infused 
per site at a rate of 100 nL/min through a 31-G, gas-tight Hamilton syringe controlled by 
a Micro4 Ultra Microsyringe Pump 3 (World Precision Instruments). The needle was left 
in place for 10 minutes following the infusion to allow for diffusion of the virus from the 
injection site. In the same surgery, rats were bilaterally implanted with custom made 
optic fiber implants (300 µm glass diameter) targeted to the VTA (15° angle; AP: -5.8 
ML: ±2.61 DV: -7.55 for males; DV -7.1 for females). Implants were secured to the skull 
with 4-5 screws placed in the skull and dental acrylic. After surgery, rats received 
injections of cefazolin (70 mg/kg, subcutaneous) to prevent infection and carprofen (5 
mg/kg, subcutaneous) to relieve pain. Rats were allowed to recover for 10 days prior to 
the beginning of behavioral procedures, with at least 4 weeks passing before any 
optogenetic manipulations were performed. 
75 
 
Occasion Setting Task 
 Training in the occasion setting task was identical to procedures in (Fraser and 
Janak, 2019). In brief, in a single session rats there were 3 trial types, 10 of each trial, 
with a 3.3 minute average intertrial interval. On reinforced trials, the illumination of a 
white houselight for 5 s, a 5 s gap, and the presentation of white noise for 5 s (OSCS 
trials) was followed by the activation of a reward pump containing 15% sucrose (w/v) for 
5 s (~0.18 mL of sucrose delivered). The other trials consisted of either the sole 
illumination of the houselight for 5s (OS Alone trials) or the presentation of the white 
noise for 5s (CS Alone trials). Behavioral equipment and responses were controlled by 
a computer running MedPC IV software (MedAssociates). Rats had 18 total days of 
training before being habituated to being connected via a ceramic mating sleeve 
bilaterally to 200 µm core patch cords (Doric), which were connected to a fiber optic 
rotary join (Doric), connected to a separate 200 µm patch cord that interfaced with a 532 
nm DPSS laser (Opto-Engine LLC). Laser delivery was controlled by transistor-
transistor logic pulses from MedPC SmartCTRL cards that interfaced with a Master9 
Stimulus Controller (AMPI), which dictated the duration of stimulation. During tests, 
constant laser light (15-20 mW) was delivered bilaterally for a constant duration of 5.5s, 
beginning either before a trial, beginning 0.5 s before either the houselight or white 
noise (or the time in which they would be presented in CS Alone and OS alone trials), 
beginning 4.75 s into the houselight and terminating 0.25 s into the white noise, or for 
one test in 3 1.5 s second pulses separated by 0.5 s intervals during the houselight. The 
order of tests were randomly determined with 1-2 days of performance in the task 
without light delivery, but still tethered to patch cables, to allow for the mitigation of any 
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possible observed carry-over effects at test. All tests were reinforced. The primary 
behavioral event of interest was the time rats spent in the port during the white noise 
stimulus. 
Fictive Occasion Setting 
After the tests described above, the presentation of the houselight was replaced 
by bilateral delivery of 532 nm light (15-20 mW) to attempt to create an optogenetic 
occasion setting stimulus. There were still 3 trial types, 10 of each type, with a 3.3 
minute average intertrial interval. In these tests, 5 s delivery of light into the VTA was 
followed by a 5 s gap, the 5 s white noise but no reward was delivered for 10 trials. For 
10 trials, the white noise was presented absent prior laser delivery and was followed by 
15% sucrose reward. On the remaining 10 trials, light was delivered to the VTA for 5 s 
but no other events occurred. Rats were tested in this manner for 12 sessions. 
Probabilistic Conditioning 
Following a one week break after occasion setting tests, rats were trained in a 
probabilistic conditioning task. In this task, a 5 s 2900 Hz tone was followed by 15% 
sucrose reward on 50% of trials and a 5 s 4500 Hz tone was followed by 15% sucrose 
reward on 50% of trials. There were 40 trials total per session, with 20 presentations of 
each tone, separated by an average intertrial interval of 2.2 minutes. For each session 
in this task, 532 nm light (15-20 mW, constant) was delivered for 5.5 s bilaterally into the 
VTA beginning 0.5 seconds before one of the two tones (light-paired tone identity was 
counterbalanced). Rats were tested in this task for 6 sessions, with light delivery 
occurring in each session. 
77 
 
After these tests rats were trained to associate the flashing (5s, 0.5 Hz) of two 
stimulus lights to the right and left of the reward port, or on separate trials the darkening 
of the illuminated chamber for 5s with reward delivery. There were 40 trials each 
session, 20 for each cue, with an average intertrial interval of 2.2 minutes. Each cue, 
either the flashing lights or termination of chamber illumination was followed by 15% 
sucrose on 50% of trials. Constant, bilateral 532 nm light was delivered during the 
delivery of reward (5.5 s starting immediately at the end of the chosen cue if the rat was 
already in the port, or when rats first entered the port within 15 s following cue 
termination) for one of these two light cues (counterbalanced). Rats were tested in this 
manner for 10 sessions.  
Histology 
Following the conclusion of experiments, rats were deeply anesthetized with 
sodium pentobarbital and perfused transcardially with 4% paraformaldehyde. Brains 
were post-fixed for 24 hours in 4% paraformaldehyde, cryoprotected in 25% sucrose in 
0.1 M NaPB, and then sectioned on a freezing cryostat at -20° C in 50 um sections. 
Sections were processed for detection of GFP and TH using fluorescent 
immunohistochemistry. Sections were first washed in 0.1 M PBS containing 0.2% 
Triton-X (PBST) for 20 minutes and blocked for 30 minutes in 0.1M PBST containing 
10% normal donkey serum. Primary antibody incubation (mouse anti-GFP, 1:1500, 
Invitrogen A11120, Lot#2180270; rabbit anti-TH, 1:500, Fisher AB152M1, Lot # 
3510772) occurred overnight at 4C. The following day sections were washed in PBST 
for 15 minutes, blocked in PBS containing 2% normal donkey serum for 10 minutes, 
then secondary antibody incubation (Alexafluor 488 donkey anti-mouse, 1:200, 
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Invitrogen A21202, Lot# 2229195; Alexafluor 594 donkey anti-rabbit, 1:200, Invitrogen 
A21207, Lot# 2145022) occurred at room temperature for 2 hours. Following 15 minutes 
of washing in PBS sections were mounted onto Fisher SuperFrost Plus slides and 
coverslipped with Vectashield mounting medium containing DAPI. Brain sections were 
imaged with a Zeiss Axio 2 microscope for the reconstruction of final placements of 
optic fibers and virus expression with the VTA. 
Statistics and Analysis 
The primary behavioral metrics of interest for all tests was the time spent in port 
(indicated here as a percentage of the 5 s stimulus) during the white noise in the 
occasion setting task or the tones and lights in the probabilistic conditioning tasks. We 
normalized behavioral responding by subtracting average time in port measured in a 
period 10 s prior to the presentation of any stimuli. For the occasion setting task we also 
computed differences between responding on trials in which the white noise would be 
reinforced (OSCS trials) and trials in which the white noise (CS Alone) was presented 
alone or the houselight presented alone (OS Alone) to allow for an assessment of each 
individual rat’s representative ability to discriminate amongst the trial types. Repeated 
measure ANOVAs were used to compare time in port across trial types or difference 
scores between virus groups for each test separately. When applicable, post hoc 
comparisons were made with Sidak’s correction. Statistical comparisons and graphics 
were made with Prism 9 (GraphPad). For all statistical tests α=0.05. 
RESULTS 
VTA Dopamine Neuron Activity is Necessary for Occasion Setting 
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We trained male and female TH-cre rats and their wildtype littermates (n=12 per 
group; 6 males and 6 females per group) in an occasion setting task (Figure 1). In this 
task, rats must discriminate when an auditory conditioned stimulus (CS) is predictive of 
reward by exploiting the prior and non-overlapping presentation of a houselight 
occasion setter (OS). There were no differences in the behavior of TH-cre rats with 
halorhodopsin (Halo) or GFP expressed in the ventral tegmental area during training. At 
test we delivered 5.5s of 15-20 mW 532 nm light bilaterally into the VTA. Light delivery 
starting 10s before any trial was without effect on behavior (Figure 2A). Both rats with 
GFP and Halo exhibited higher reward-seeking on OSCS trials than CS alone (Figure 
2A; effect of trial type F(1,34)=55.68, p<0.001; effect of group F(1,22)=0.06043, p=0.8081; 
Halo p=0.0004; GFP p=0.0002) and OS alone trials (Halo p<0.0001; GFP p<0.0001), 
and the average discrimination for each group of rats in discerning when the CS would 
be rewarded was similar between groups (Figure 2B; effect of group F(1,22)=3.760, 
p=0.5063; effect of difference F(1,22)=3.299, p=0.0830). We next tested whether VTA 
dopamine neuron activity during the OS would be necessary for this cue to modulate 
reward-seeking. Light delivery during the OS disrupted reward-seeking for rats with 
Halo (Figure 2C; effect of group F(1,22)=7.1, p=0.0142; effect of trial type F(2,44)=33.02, 
p<0.0001; interaction F(2,44)=5.457, p=0.0076), reducing their reward-seeking on 
OSCS trials (p=0.0151) and OS Alone trials (p=0.0065) relative to GFP controls. In 
addition, rats with Halo no longer exhibited a significant elevation in reward-seeking on 
OSCS trials relative to CS alone trials (p=0.0651). This reduction in reward-seeking 
resulted in a significant reduction in the ability of rats with Halo to discriminate between 
trials in which the CS was versus was not reinforced relative to GFP controls (Figure 
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2D; interaction F(1,22)=5.080, p=0.0345; CS difference p=0.0025; OS difference 
p=0.9465). In contrast, when light delivery occurred during every CS, or the period in 
which it would be expected on OS Alone trials, reward-seeking for Halo rats was 
impaired (Figure 2E; effect of group F(1,22)=7.375, p=0.0126; effect of trial type 
F(1,37)=40.54, p<0.0001; interaction F(2,44)=10.58, p=0.0002) although each group of rats 
still exhibited the expected behavioral pattern with no differences between GFP and 
Halo rats. Despite this, when examining the ability of rats to discriminate VTA dopamine 
neuron inhibition reduced reward-seeking selectively for rats with Halo in VTA dopamine 
neurons in telling apart trials in which the CS was reinforced versus not (Figure 2F; 
interaction F(1,22)=16.25, p=0.0006; CS difference p=0.0129; OS difference p=0.0813).  
 We further asked what aspects of neural activity in VTA dopamine neurons 
underly the dramatic impairment produced by inhibition during the OS, and the 
reduction in discrimination with inhibition during the CS. It has been demonstrated that 
pulsed inhibition of VTA dopamine neurons for many trials can result in conditioned 
inhibition, a phenomenon related to occasion setting (Chang et al., 2018). We asked if 
delivery of 3, 1.5 s pulses of 532 nm light during the OS would recapitulate our 
behavioral effects. During this test there were no detectable differences between Halo 
and GFP rats in either reward-seeking (Figure 2G; effect of group F(1,22)=3.414, 
p=0.0.781; effect of trial type F(2,44)=51.27, p<0.0001; interaction F(2,44)=4.032, 
p=0.0247; all p between GFP and Halo p>0.05, within group all p<0.001 relative to 
OSCS trials) or discriminations (Figure 2H; effect of group F(1,22)=0.3002, p=0.5893; 
effect of discrimination F(1,22)=1.797, p=0.1937). VTA dopamine neuron activity has 
been implicated in working memory and performance in this task requires the retention 
81 
 
of the prior presentation of the OS to organize appropriate responding to the CS. To test 
a potential explanation of working memory, we delivered light for the final 250ms of the 
OS period through the first 250ms of the CS period (Cools and D’Esposito, 2011; 
Arnsten et al., 2012; Choi et al., 2020). Although we observed an overall effect of this 
manipulation on behavior for Halo rats relative to GFP control animals, there were no 
statistically significant differences between GFP and Halo rats for reward-seeking on 
any trial type, nor for did this affect within-group differences in total reward-seeking 
(Figure 2I; effect of group F(1,22)=7.612, p=0.0115; effect of trial type F(1,35)=57.41, 
p<0.0001; interaction F(2,44)=0.7488, p=0.4788; all p between GFP and Halo p>0.05, no 
differences within group all p<0.001 relative to OSCS) or discriminations (Figure 2J; 
effect of group F(1,22)=0.01141, p=0.7387; effect of discrimination F(1,22)=0.9352, 
p=0.3440; interaction F(1,22)=0.9680, p=0.3359). Finally, we asked if light delivery 
selectively during reward delivery would alter behavior, given the prominent role of VTA 
dopamine neural activity at the time of reward in driving learning and updating behavior 
(Steinberg et al., 2013; Chang et al., 2016, 2017; Keiflin et al., 2019). Even with this 
manipulation, we observed no effect of light delivery on behavior between GFP and 
Halo groups on overall reward-seeking (Figure 2K; effect of group F(1,22)=4.002, 
p=0.0579; effect of trial type F(1,33)=34.5, p<0.0001; interaction F(2,44)=2.598, p=0.0858) 
or in the ability of individual rats to discern between reinforced and non-reinforced CS 
presentations (Figure 2L; effect of group F(1,22)=0.2549, p=0.6187; effect of 
discrimination F(1,22)=1.327, p=0.2617). Collectively this pattern of effects suggest VTA 
dopamine neuron activity is necessary for the detection and use of hierarchical cues to 
flexibly respond to ambiguous reward-paired stimuli. 
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Dopamine neuron inhibition alone in insufficient for occasion setting 
Our lab has demonstrated that under some circumstances, alterations in 
dopamine neuron activity itself is sufficient to act as a reward and drive Pavlovian 
learning (Saunders et al., 2018). We wondered if manipulating dopamine neuron activity 
alone would be sufficient in instructing rats that an upcoming ambiguous conditioned 
stimulus would not be rewarded, a behavioral pattern termed negative occasion setting 
(Holland, 1992; Meyer and Bucci, 2016a). We modified the timings of inhibitions in our 
task such that light delivery completely replaced the prior houselight OS, and now 
selectively delivered sucrose only when the CS was presented absent any prior OS 
(Figure 3A). We trained rats in this optogenetic occasion setting task to assess whether 
those rats with Halo in VTA dopamine neurons could use a brief inhibition in dopamine 
activity as a hierarchical cue to withhold reward-seeking. If rats with Halo were able to 
do so, reward-seeking for this group should be higher when the CS is presented alone 
relative to OSCS trials, and as GFP rats express no functional virus and there is no 
real world OS stimulus, these rats should exhibit equal levels of reward-seeking the CS 
regardless of trial type – treating this cue as a probabilistic CS. We analyzed behavior in 
this optogenetic occasion setting task after 12 sessions of training. Contrary to our 
predictions, there was no evidence of rats with Halo in dopamine neurons of the VTA in 
being able to use a brief inhibition as an occasion setter. Rats in both the GFP and Halo 
exhibited a similar level of reward-seeking during the white noise CS (Figure 3B; effect 
of group F(1,22)=0.2407, p=0.6286; effect of trial type F(1,31)=211.7, p<0.0001; interaction 
F(2,44)=0.0414, p=0.9595) that was similar irrespective of the prior delivery of light into 
the VTA for either group (within group comparison between OSCS and CS alone 
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p’s>0.05). We analyzed the discrimination amongst trials for each as before which 
confirmed the lack of effect of VTA dopamine neuron inhibition in acting as a negative 
occasion setter (Figure 3C; effect of group F(1,22)=0.05737, p=0.8129; effect of 
discrimination F(1,22)=404.2, p<0.0001). These findings support the notion that VTA 
dopamine neuron activity is necessary during a real-world hierarchical stimulus for that 
stimulus to act as an occasion setter.  
Dopamine neuron inhibition is without effect on responding to probabilistic cues 
 Perhaps the effects of dopaminergic inhibition on occasion setting reflect not the 
rapid updating of expected value but instead can solely be attributed to altering the long 
running expected value of stimuli. If this were true, we would expect that VTA 
dopaminergic inhibition during one of two probabilistic conditioned stimuli, each with a 
50% probability of reward delivery, should alter conditioned approach to the laser-paired 
CS selectively for Halo rats. We trained rats to learn that two distinct 5 s auditory stimuli 
(a high tone and a low tone) were associated each with the delivery of sucrose reward 
on 50% of trials. One of these probabilistic cues was paired with 5.5s of 15-20 mW 532 
nm light delivery, starting 500 ms prior to its presentation and terminating with the tone. 
We trained rats in this manner for 6 sessions. Overall, while laser delivery altered 
reward-seeking, it did so in a manner consistent for both rats with GFP and Halo when 
we examined time in the food cup during each CS (Figure 4A; effect of group 
F(1,22)=6.539, p=0.0180; effect of session F(3,78)=9.652, p<0.001; effect of laser 
F(1,22)=8.962, p=0.0067; no significant interaction of group and laser nor group by laser 
by session) and when analyzing CS-elicited food cup entries (Figure 4B; effect of group 
F(1,22)=3.344, p=0.0810; effect of session F(5,110)=4.313, p=0.0013; effect of laser 
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F(1,22)=9.133, p=0.0063; no significant interaction of group and laser nor group by laser 
by session). We examined the difference in conditioned behavior between the laser-
paired probabilistic CS and the non-laser paired probabilistic CS for each rat to 
determine if discriminations between these cues were not manifest in total levels of 
reward-seeking. Despite this, there was no difference between groups in the influence 
of laser-delivery impairing reward-seeking for both GFP and Halo rats for either the 
difference for time in the food cup between the two cues (Figure 4C; effect of session 
F(2,46)=5.235, p=0.0079; effect of group F(1,22)=2.241, p=0.1486) or when differences in 
food cup entries were analyzed (Figure 4D; effect of session F(3,77)=2.958, p=0.0300; 
effect of group F(1,22)=3.640, p=0.0695). 
As a final test, we wondered if the lack of effect of inhibition during the CS itself 
could result from functional dopamine neuron activity during the time of reward 
consumption as being sufficient for learning the value of a probabilistic CS. To test this, 
we then trained rats to learn that two distinct visual stimuli (flashing cue lights or 
darkening of the operant box) were each associated with a 50% probability of sucrose 
reward. We delivered 5s of 15-20 mW 532 nm light as rats consumed the sucrose 
reward following one of these two visual stimuli (identity counterbalanced). We trained 
rats in this manner for 10 sessions and found that although both groups of rats learned 
the task (Figure 5A; port time; effect of session F(3,76)=23.14, p<0.0001; Figure 5B; port 
entries; effect of session F(9,198)=29.60, p<0.0001) there was a consistent lower level of 
overall reward seeking during each CS in for Halo rats relative to GFP rats (port time 
effect of group F(1,22)=11.99, p=0.0022; port entries effect of group F(1,22)=6.478, 
p=0.0164). Despite this, there was no significant effect of light delivery paired with 
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reward consumption selectively following one of the two CSs on behavior (port time 
effect of laser F(1,22)=0.124, p=0.7281; port entries effect of laser F(1,22)=0.006, 
p=0.9383). In agreement, when analyzing the difference in reward-seeking between the 
two CSs we found no difference between groups (Figure 5C; port time; effect of group 
F(1,22)=0.5110, p=0.4822; Figure 5D; port entries; F(1,22)=0.6414, p=0.4318). Together 
these data suggest that inhibition of VTA dopamine neuron activity is insufficient to alter 
learning or behavior for probabilistic CSs for whom there is no hierarchical control of its 
relationship with reward. 
DISCUSSION 
 Here we made use of optogenetic inhibition in combination with transgenic TH-
Cre rats to test the involvement of midbrain dopamine neurons in the hierarchical 
control of cue-triggered reward-seeking. We reveal that VTA dopamine neuron activity 
during hierarchical cues, namely occasion setters, is necessary for these cues to 
modulate reward-seeking to ambiguous conditioned stimuli. Inhibition of dopamine 
neurons alone was insufficient to substitute for an occasion setter, nor was dopamine 
neuron inhibition able to alter reward-seeking to probabilistic conditioned stimuli. 
Together, these results argue for an essential contribution of VTA dopamine neuron 
activity in exploiting hierarchical stimuli in the rapid updating and utilization of the value 
of reward-associated stimuli to guide reward-seeking. 
 Dopamine neurons in the midbrain are well-known for their ability to signal 
prediction errors – the difference between cue-elicited expectations and the outcome 
that was received (Schultz and Dickinson, 2000; Keiflin and Janak, 2015; Watabe-
Uchida et al., 2017). Importantly, the degree of cue-elicited excitation in midbrain 
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dopamine neurons is sensitive to the probability and magnitude of reward predicted by a 
given stimulus leading to the notion that cue-elicited responses in VTA dopamine 
neurons reflect the expected value of a given reward-associated stimulus (Fiorillo et al., 
2003; Tobler et al., 2005). Despite this, a link between expected value and cue-elicited 
behavior has remained unclear as freely-behaving animals exhibit similar levels of 
conditioned approach for cues of varying expected values (Hart et al., 2015). Exploiting 
occasion setting, we were able to dissociate long-running expected value from the 
current value of a conditioned stimulus and in turn observe a behavioral report that rats 
had an accurate estimation of the likelihood of reward receipt. Interestingly, we find that 
only in this preparation, where the current value of a conditioned stimulus is dynamically 
shaped, did VTA dopamine neuron inhibition alter behavior. These findings suggest the 
contribution of VTA dopamine neuron activity to behavior is not by signaling the long-
running expected value of cues, but in utilizing a much more flexible and rapidly 
generated value signal to guide cue-triggered reward-seeking. This notion is particularly 
in agreement with the role of VTA dopamine neurons in a number of tasks that 
underscore a role for these in so-called model-based scenarios, where these neurons 
are proposed to integrate and have access to more computations than merely 
averaging value over long timescales (Chang et al., 2017; Sharpe et al., 2017b; 
Starkweather et al., 2017; Langdon et al., 2018; Gershman and Uchida, 2019; Keiflin et 
al., 2019). 
 Occasion setting is a process that captures the control of behavioral responding 
by contexts (Grahame et al., 1990; Holland, 1992; Holland and Bouton, 1999; Bouton et 
al., 2006; Fraser and Holland, 2019). Despite decades of evidence that dopamine 
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neurons and their striatal targets are essential for the contextual-control of reward-
seeking it has been difficult to disentangle the contribution of dopamine neuron activity 
to hierarchical control by contexts or the generation of reward-seeking by cues as 
traditional context-based approaches are not able to parse these processes (Crombag 
et al., 2008; Floresco, 2015; Valyear et al., 2020). By reducing a context to a brief and 
discrete event, an occasion setter, we reveal a critical role for dopamine neuron activity 
during the presentation of this context-like occasion setting cue for that cue to then gate 
reward-seeking to an ambiguous conditioned stimulus that will now predict reward. 
Interestingly, despite a weaker effect of inhibition during the ambiguous conditioned 
stimulus on behavior, this manipulation also reduced discrimination in rats between to-
be reinforced and non-reinforced conditioned stimuli. These results are generally 
consistent with the notion of a hierarchical control of reward-seeking by VTA dopamine 
neurons – activity is necessary at the time of a higher-order stimulus to update behavior 
and is also necessary at the time of the target of this higher-order cue to utilize such 
updating to guide reward-seeking. These individual processes, encoding the occasion 
setter versus its utilization during ambiguous conditioned stimuli, may be manifest by 
different striatal targets – the nucleus accumbens core and shell, respectively (Chaudhri 
et al., 2010; Floresco, 2015; Valyear et al., 2020). Future investigations should make 
use of optogenetic inhibition of VTA dopamine terminals in theses striatal subregions to 
test their potential contributions to the hierarchical control of reward-seeking. 
 Here we reveal a necessary role for VTA dopamine neuron activity for the 
hierarchical control of reward-seeking by discrete external stimuli. VTA dopamine 
neuron activity is also regulated by internal states such as hunger and thirst and their 
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associated hormones and neuropeptides (Cone et al., 2016; Fortin and Roitman, 2018; 
Hsu et al., 2020; Konanur et al., 2020). How VTA dopamine neuron and dopamine 
release, in turn, are affected by occasion setters remains an open question and may 
reveal similarities and differences between the control of reward-seeking by external 
versus internal stimuli. Interestingly, internal states are able to serve as occasion 
setters, and so by extension is likely that similar mechanisms are involved in the 
regulation of reward seeking by alterations in homeostasis and by external stimuli 
(Randall et al., 2019). Together, this implicates that the regulation, versus the 
generation, of conditioned reward-seeking is the norm rather than the exception when it 
comes to the contribution of VTA dopamine neuron activity in Pavlovian responding. 
Determining the circuits and computations that underlie this nuanced role of VTA 
dopamine neurons in the rapid regulation of behavior will be essential to understanding 






Figure 3.1. Histology and placement of optic fibers. A, Representative expression of 
YFP-tagged cre-dependent halorhodopsin the VTA of TH-Cre rats. B, 
Immunohistochemical staining for TH protein from the same slice in A. C, Localization 
of optic fiber placements for Halorhodopsin-expresing rats and the largest, in light 
green, and smallest, in dark green, extent of cre-dependent halorhodopsin in the VTA. 
Numbers indicate distance from bregma in millimeters and the coronal sections were 
obtained from (Paxinos and Watson, 2007).   
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Figure 3.2. Optogenetic inhibition of VTA dopamine neurons during occasion 
setters disrupts the hierarchical control of cue-triggered reward-seeking. A, 
Average time in port during the conditioned stimulus period when light was delivered 
10s before a trial. B, Individual differences in time in port during the conditioned 
stimulus period on OSCS trials minus either conditioned stimulus alone or occasion 
setter alone trials when light was delivered 10s before a trial. C,D, same as A,B but 
when light was presented during the OS. E,F, same as A,B but when light was 
presented during the CS. G,H, same as A,B but when 3 1.5s pulses of light were 
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delivered during the OS. I,J, same as A,B but when light was presented for the last 
500ms of the OS through the first 500ms of the CS. K,L, same as A,B but when light 
was during reward delivery. For all figures bars indicate mean ± SEM. Empty bars 
represent data from the GFP animals and filled bars from rats with cre-dependent 
























Figure 3.3. VTA dopamine inhibition alone is insufficient for the hierarchical 
control of reward-seeking. A, Task design for these tests where rats were trained for 
12 sessions with light delivery acting as a negative occasion setter for 12 sessions. A, 
Average time in port during the conditioned stimulus period on the final session. B, 
Individual differences in time in port during the conditioned stimulus period on OSCS 
trials minus either conditioned stimulus alone or occasion setter alone trials on the final 
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session. For all figures bars indicate mean ± SEM. Empty bars represent data from the 
GFP animals and filled bars from rats with cre-dependent halorhodopsin. OS, occasion 






Figure 3.4. VTA dopamine inhibition paired with the presentation of a probabilistic 
CS does not alter learning nor conditioned approach. A, Time in port during the 
laser paired (solid circles) and non-laser paired (open circles) probabilistic CS. B, 
Number of port entries port during the laser paired (solid circles) and non-laser paired 
(open circles) probabilistic CS. C, Difference in the time in port during the laser paired 
CS minus the the non-laser paired CS. D, Difference in port entries made during the 
laser paired CS minus the the non-laser paired CS. For all figures data points indicate 
mean ± SEM. Black symbols represent data from the GFP animals and green symbols 






Figure 3.5. VTA dopamine inhibition paired with the consumption of reward 
associated with a probabilistic CS does not alter learning nor conditioned 
approach. A, Time in port during the probabilistic CS with laser-paired reward 
consumption (solid circles) and non-laser reward-paired (open circles) probabilistic CS. 
B, Time in port during the probabilistic CS with laser-paired reward consumption (solid 
circles) and non-laser reward-paired (open circles) probabilistic CS. C, Difference in the 
time in port during the laser paired CS minus the the non-laser paired CS. D, Difference 
in port entries made during the laser paired CS minus the the non-laser paired CS. For 
all figures data points indicate mean ± SEM. Black symbols represent data from the 
GFP animals and green symbols from rats with cre-dependent halorhodopsin. OS, 




Hierarchical control of mesolimbic dopamine and striatal encoding of reward-
paired cues governs behavioral flexibility 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The nucleus accumbens is essential for the generation of motivated behaviors directed 
towards reward-paired cues. This is thought to arise in part from the integration of 
glutamatergic signals arising from the amygdala, frontal cortex, thalamus, and 
hippocampus and a dense dopaminergic input arising from the ventral tegmental area 
(Mogenson et al., 1980). Moreover, dissociations exist between two primary 
subdivisions of the nucleus accumbens: the core and shell (Floresco, 2015). The core of 
the accumbens, in particular dopamine release, is necessary for the attribution of 
motivational value to reward-paired cues and the generation of approach behavior to 
Pavlovian conditioned stimuli (Blaiss and Janak, 2009; Chaudhri et al., 2010; Saunders 
and Robinson, 2012; Fraser and Janak, 2017; Saunders et al., 2018; Valyear et al., 
2020). In contrast, the shell has been ascribed a role of inhibiting inappropriate 
behavioral responding and the retention of such inhibitory behavioral phenomenon like 
extinction learning (Floresco et al., 2008; Blaiss and Janak, 2009; Chaudhri et al., 2010; 
Ambroggi et al., 2011; Millan et al., 2015; Valyear et al., 2020). 
 Despite decades of investigation into the nucleus accumbens as an interface 
between motivation and action a mechanism linking neural activity and dopamine 
release in this structure to the control of Pavlovian motivated approach has remained 
unclear. While dopamine release in the nucleus accumbens is necessary and sufficient 
for the generation of Pavlovian motivated behavior, lesions and manipulations of neural 
activity during the learning or performance of Pavlovian conditioned reward-seeking 
97 
 
have minimal impact on behavior (Blaiss and Janak, 2009; Chang et al., 2012; Chang 
and Holland, 2013; Fraser and Janak, 2017). In contrast, when reward-associated 
stimuli are linked with the availability of actions to be performed to earn reward there 
exists widespread neural encoding in nucleus accumbens and alterations in neural 
activity dramatically affect such cue-motivated actions (Ambroggi et al., 2008, 2011). A 
potential explanation for this dissociation is that nucleus accumbens neural activity is 
necessary only for instrumental reward-seeking actions but not Pavlovian conditioned 
reward-seeking. However, the role of cues to direct instrumental reward-seeking actions 
centers on the resolution of uncertainty surrounding the relationship between and a 
given response and reward. In standard Pavlovian conditioning procedures, while 
conditioned cues resolve uncertainty surrounding when reward will become available, 
there is no inherent uncertainty to if this cue will deliver rewards as these preparations 
almost exclusively make use of cues with fixed, all-or-nothing probabilities of reward 
delivery. 
 Cue-generated uncertainty is a critical feature of reward-associated stimuli in the 
real-world and the ability to resolve the current motivational relevance of a given cue is 
necessary for adaptive behavior. We hypothesized that the nucleus accumbens is 
essential in generating behaviors as a result of this resolution of uncertainty. To test 
this, we exploited a Pavlovian paradigm called occasion setting, where the relationship 
between a given Pavlovian conditioned stimulus and reward is controlled by a separate, 
non-overlapping, and discrete stimulus called an occasion setter (Fraser and Holland, 
2019). Indeed, we find that in this scenario neural activity and dopamine release in the 
nucleus accumbens is obligatory for occasion setting. Interestingly, we find a 
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dissociation in the contribution of glutamate release in the core, but not shell, as 
controlling the accurate processing of occasion setting cues as hierarchical stimuli. By 
exploiting in vivo electrophysiology and calcium imaging we detail correlates of the 
resolution of uncertainty by both single neurons and by dopamine release in the nucleus 
accumbens core. Ultimately, these data provide a link between neural activity and 
dopamine release in the generation of flexible cue-motivated reward-seeking. 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Subjects 
Subjects were male and female Long-Evans rats (n=32) aged P60 obtained from 
ENVIGO. Rats were single-housed in ventilated cages with ad libitum access to food 
and water in a temperature- and humidity-controlled room and maintained on 12:12 
light/dark cycle (lights on at 07:00). Despite time allowed for recovery from surgery, 
feeding was restricted to maintain weights at ~95% of ad libitum feeding weights. All 
procedures were approved by the Animal Care and Use Committee at Johns Hopkins 
University and the University of Minnesota and followed the recommended guidelines in 
the Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals: Eighth Edition, revised in 2011. 
Surgery 
 Rats were anesthetized with isoflurane (5% induction, 1-2.5% maintenance) and 
standard stereotaxic procedures were used. For microinfusion experiments 22 gauge 
stainless steel cannula (Plastics One) were implanted 1mm over the nucleus 
accumbens core (n=12; AP: +1.8 ML: ±1.5 DV: -6) or shell (n=12; AP: +1.6 ML: ±1 DV: -
6.5). For electrophysiological recordings, a custom-built microdrive containing 16 50 µm 
tungsten wires soldered to 8-pin Omnetics connectors was lowered slowly to the 
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nucleus accumbens core (n=3; AP: +1.8 ML: ±1.5 DV: -6.5) with a silver reference wire 
wrapped around a screw in contact with the cerebellum. For fiber photometric 
recordings (n=6), a volume of 800 nL of AAV5-CAG-dLight1.3b-GFP (titer 1.03 x 1013 
viral particles/mL) was infused per site at a rate of 100 nL/min through a 31-G, gas-tight 
Hamilton syringe controlled by a Micro4 Ultra Microsyringe Pump 3 (World Precision 
Instruments) into the nucleus accumbens core (AP: +1.3 ML: ±1.3 DV: -6.9 300nL, -6.7 
500nL). The needle was left in place for 10 minutes following the infusion to allow for 
diffusion of the virus from the injection site. In the same surgery, rats were implanted 
with optic fiber implants (400 µm glass diameter) targeted just dorsal to the infusion site 
(AP: +1.3 ML: ±1.3 DV: -6.5). For all surgeries, implants were secured to the skull with 
4-8 screws placed in the skull and dental acrylic. After surgery, rats received injections 
of cefazolin (70 mg/kg, subcutaneous) to prevent infection and carprofen (5 mg/kg, 
subcutaneous) to relieve pain. Rats were allowed to recover for 7 days prior to the 
beginning of behavioral procedures or neural recordings. 
Apparatus 
Behavioral testing occurred in Med Associates conditioning chambers (St. 
Albans, VT) housed in sound- and light-attenuating cabinets and controlled by a 
computer running MedPC IV software. In the center of one wall was a fluid receptacle 
that was located in a recessed port. On the opposite wall near the ceiling of the 
chamber was a white houselight (28 V) and to the right of the houselight was a white-
noise generator (10-25 kHz, 20 dB). Outside of the behavioral chamber but within the 
sound- and light-attenuating cabinet was a red houselight (28 V) that provided 
background illumination during each behavioral session. Fluids were delivered to the 
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port via tubing attached to a 60 mL syringe placed in a motorized pump located outside 
each cabinet. 
Behavioral Procedures 
 For at least two days prior to any procedures rats were extensively 
handled and acclimated to the experimenter. Rats were also given free access to 15% 
sucrose in water for 24 hours in their homecage to prevent any neophobia and 
accustom them to the future reward solution. At least one day after sucrose pre-
exposure, pretraining was conducted in an approximately one-hour session in which 
rats were able to drink sucrose from the recessed reward port. During this session there 
were 80 2-second activations of the syringe pump (~0.07 mL per delivery) on a variable 
time 60 s schedule (30-90 s range). All rats consumed all sucrose delivered in the 
pretraining session.  
Training in the occasion setting task took place in 3 distinct phases with each 
session lasting ~2 hours on average with 30 total trials and an average inter-trial interval 
of 3.3 minutes. There was one session a day. In the first phase, all trials were reinforced 
presentations of the following sequence of events: occasion setter houselight for 5 s, a 
5 s empty period, and 5 s of the conditioned stimulus white noise. Reward consisted of 
5 s activation of the syringe pump resulting in delivery of ~0.18 mL of 15% sucrose in 
the reward port occurred immediately upon termination of the conditioned stimulus white 
noise.  Phase one training lasted for 4 sessions. In phase two, 40% of trials were 
reinforced as before, but the other 60% of trials were conditioned stimulus alone trials 
consisting of presentation of the white noise for 5 s with no reward. Phase two training 
lasted for 6 sessions. In the final phase of training, rats were exposed to the full 
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occasion setting task (Figure 1A) consisting of 10 reinforced trials, 10 conditioned 
stimulus alone trials, and 10 occasion setter alone trials where the houselight was 
activated for 5 s with no subsequent stimuli or reward. Note that this task is purely 
Pavlovian; there was never a response requirement. Training in the final phase lasted 
for 8 sessions prior to microinfusions or electrophysiological recordings began. Fiber 
photometric recordings occurred throughout phase 3. 
Microinfusion Procedures 
Rats were accustomed to the handling and infusion procedure for 1-2 days prior 
to infusion by being transported to the procedure room after a training session, dummy 
stylets removed, a flat cut 28 gauge injector inserted into each cannula, and dummy 
stylets replaced. On the day prior to testing, a regular injector extending 1 mm past the 
guide cannula was used to confirm cannula patency. At test rats received infusions of 
either saline, a mixture of the GABA-B and GABA-A agonists, baclofen and muscimol 
(1.0 mM and 0.1 mM, respectively), the dopamine receptor antagonist flupenthixol (100 
mM), or a combination of the AMPA and NMDA receptor antagonists CNQX and MK-
801 (20 mM each) infused in a volume of 0.3 µL over 1 minute. After 1 additional minute 
to allow for diffusion away from the infusion site, injectors were removed, dummy stylets 
were replaced, and rats returned to their homecage for 5-10 minutes before test. There 
were four tests for each rat, one in each condition, in a random order and with at least 
one day of retraining without manipulation between. Test sessions were reinforced. 
Fiber Photometric Recordings 
Fiber photometry recordings were conducted in a manner similar to previously 
published (Saunders et al., 2018). A fluorescence mini-cube (Doric Lenses) transmitted 
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streams of sinusoidally modulated light from a 465 nm LED at 211 Hz through a GFP 
excitation filter and 405 nm LED at 531 Hz through a 405 nm bandpass filter. Rats were 
connected to the light source for delivery of light by a ceramic sleeve on their implanted 
optic fiber via a ceramic sleeve to a low autofluorescence fiber cable (400 nm, 0.48 NA). 
Fluorescence elicited from dLight1.3b was transmitted via the same cable back to the 
mini-cube where it was passed through a GFP emission filter, amplified, and focused 
onto a high-sensitivity photoreceiver (Newport, Model 2151). Demodulation of the 
brightness produced by 465 nm excitation, which stimulated dLight1.3 fluorescence, 
versus 405 nm excitation, which elicits fluorescence in a dLight1.3b independent 
manner, allowed for the correction of motion artifacts and bleaching of the recorded 
signal. A real-time signal processor (Tucker-Davis Technologies) modulated the output 
of each LED, recorded photometry signals, as well as logged behavioral events via TTL 
from the MedAssociates software.  
Electrophysiological Recordings 
Electrical signals and behavioral events were collected from freely behaving 
animals with the OmniPlex (Plexon) recording system as in (Ottenheimer et al., 2018, 
2020). Waveforms were sorted into units offline using Offline Sorter software (Plexon), 
and any units that were not recorded throughout a behavioral session were discarded. 
We only included neurons that were identified as single-units through careful 
examination of auto and cross correlations, plotting waveform features over time to 
ensure stability and continuity, and discarded units with more than 0.2% of spikes within 




Following the conclusion of experiments, rats were deeply anesthetized with 
sodium pentobarbital and perfused transcardially with 4% paraformaldehyde. For rats 
with electrode implants, a brief 10 µA DC current was passed through each electrode to 
mark its final location in the brain. Brains were post-fixed for 24 hours in 4% 
paraformaldehyde, cryoprotected in 25% sucrose in 0.1 M NaPB, and then sectioned on 
a freezing cryostat at -20° C in 50 um sections. Brains with electrode or cannula 
implants were mounted onto Fisher SuperFrost Plus slides, dried, stained with cresyl 
violet solution (FD Neurotechnologies) and coverslipped with Permount mounting 
medium.  
Statistics and Data Analysis 
Data analysis and visualization were performed with MATLAB (Mathworks) and 
Prism 9 (Graphpad). Two-way repeated measures ANOVAs were used to analyze the 
impact of microinfusions at test, with each drug separately being compared to data from 
the saline control session. For electrophysiology data we first normalized the firing rate 
for each neuron relative to a 10 s (-12 to -2 s before OS period) period before the OS 
would be presented on a trial. We then used Wilcoxon signed rank tests to determine 
significant responses in a period just after each event (0 to 0.5 s for cues) or around -
0.5s to 0.1 s for port entries. PSTHs were constructed around each event in 0.01 s bins 
with a half-normal filter (σ=6.6) that used only activity in previous but not upcoming bins. 
We sorted neurons by trial based on either significant excitations or inhibitions or 
additionally by analyzing neurons for whom there were significant differences in activity 
at the time of the CS for OS+CS versus CS alone trials. We analyzed strength of 
responses among different cue responses with Wilcoxon rank sum tests. To analyze 
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activity of neurons across the duration of the CS, z-scored data was analyzed in 10 ms 
bins with ANOVA from 250 ms before CS onset through the 5 s duration of the CS. 
Fiber photometry signals were fit to the isosbestic control signal as in (Patriarchi et al., 
2018; Saunders et al., 2018) and z-scored relative to a period 5s before the OS period.  
Photometry data were then analyzed in 100 ms bins with ANOVA, and peak response 
for each event was analyzed with ANOVA. We only analyzed data from 
electrophysiology and fiber photometry data when rats exhibited greater responding, 
evidenced by time in port, during the CS on OS+CS trials relative to both CS alone and 
OS alone. Depending on the structure of the data, posthocs were performed either with 
Bonferroni’s or Tukey’s method. For all statistical tests α=0.05. 
RESULTS 
We trained rats to exploit a hierarchical cue, an occasion setter, to inform 
whether or not they should expect reward delivery following an auditory conditioned 
stimulus. If the occasion setting cue or the conditioned stimulus were presented in 
isolation there was no sucrose delivery. Importantly, in a single session there were 
equal numbers of presentation of both the occasion setter and the conditioned stimulus, 
equating the probability of reward delivery amongst the two cues, but only when the 
occasion setter was presented prior to the conditioned stimulus did rats receive reward 
(Figure 1A). Following training in this task we performed manipulations and recordings 
of nucleus accumbens with histology for each experiment in Figure 1B-C. 
Contributions of Nucleus Accumbens Core and Shell to Occasion Setting 
 We tested the contribution of diverse neural signals in the nucleus accumbens 
core and nucleus accumbens shell to occasion setting. First, we asked whether neural 
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activity in either region was necessary for performance in this task by reversibly 
inactivating either structure. Inactivation of the nucleus accumbens core reduced 
reward-seeking during the conditioned stimulus period compared to behavior under 
saline (Figure 2A; effect of trial type F(1,18)=33.78, p<0.0001; effect of drug F(1,11)=92.15, 
p<0.0001; interaction F(1,13)=6.108, p=0.0220). Inactivation significantly reduced time in 
the port on OS+CS (p=0.0001), CS alone (p=0.0001), and OS alone trials (p=0.003) 
relative to saline. In contrast to significantly higher port time on OS+CS trials relative to 
CS alone (p=0.0058) and OS alone trials (p<0.0001) following saline, there was no 
difference in time on OS+CS trials relative to CS alone (p=0.7028) or OS alone trials 
(p=0.4240) following inactivation. As a result, inactivation reduced the ability to rats to 
discriminate amongst reinforce trials and CS alone and OS alone trials (Figure 2B; 
effect of drug F(1,11)=9.974, p=0.0091; within each discrimination p<0.01). Despite cue-
triggered reward-seeking, inactivation of the core was without impact on intertrial port 
entries (Figure 2C; t(11)=0.5779, p=0.5750) or intertrial port time (Figure 2D; t(11)=1.917, 
p=0.0816). Surprisingly, we observed a similar impact of inactivation for rats with 
cannula in the nucleus accumbens shell. Inactivation reduced reward-seeking across all 
trial types (Figure 2E; effect of trial type F(1,15)=38.22, p<0.0001; effect of drug 
F(1,11)=32.09, p=0.0001; interaction F(1,21)=5.369, p=0.0139) resulting in significantly 
reward-seeking relative to saline infusion on OS+CS (p=0.0011) and CS alone trials 
(p<0.0001) and eliminated differences in responding between OS+CS trials relative to 
OS alone trials (p=0.1514) but, interestingly, not CS alone trials (p=0.0388). Despite 
this, inactivation of the shell resulted in significantly reduced overall discrimination in the 
task (Figure 2F; effect of drug F(1,11)=13.10, p=0.0040; within each discrimination 
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p<0.05). In contrast to its effects on cue-triggered responses, inactivation of the nucleus 
accumbens shell did not have a significant impact on intertrial port entries (Figure 2G; 
t(11)=1.697, p=0.1178) or intertrial port time (Figure 2H; t(11)=0.4630, p=0.6524). 
Collectively these data indicate neural activity in both nucleus accumbens core and 
shell is necessary for occasion setting, with a more prominent impact of inactivation 
within the nucleus accumbens core. 
 Next, we asked whether dopamine signaling was essential for performance in 
this task. Flupenthixol delivered into the core significantly reduced cue-elicited reward-
seeking (Figure 3A; effect of trial type F(1,21)=29.58, p<0.0001; effect of drug 
F(1,11)=51.65, p<0.0001; interaction F(1,20)=4.952, p=0.0198). This reduced reward-
seeking on all trials relative to saline (OS+CS p=0.006; CS alone p=0.0028; OS alone 
p=0.0008) and also resulted in rats being unable to elevate reward seeking on OS+CS 
trials relative to CS alone (p=0.3447) trials. In turn, nucleus accumbens core dopamine 
antagonism reduced overall discrimination in this task between reinforced and non-
reinforced trials (Figure 3B; effect of drug F(1,11)=12.36, p=0.0048; within each 
discrimination p<0.05). As is common for dopamine antagonists, there were small but 
significant decreases in intertrial port entries (Figure 3C; t(11)=4.874, p=0.0005) or 
intertrial port time (Figure 3D; t(11)=4.705, p=0.0006). Dopamine antagonism within 
nucleus accumbens shell had an overall similar impact of reducing cue-triggered 
reward-seeking in the occasion setting task (Figure 3E; effect of trial type F(1,17)=22.94, 
p<0.0001; effect of drug F(1,11)=165.4, p<0.0001; interaction F(1,17)=15.62, p=0.0002). 
Following flupenthixol administration reward-seeking was significantly lower on OS+CS 
(p<0.0001), CS alone (p=0.0007), and OS alone trials (p<0.0001) relative to saline, with 
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no significant differences following flupenthixol between OS+CS trials and CS alone 
(p=0.8291) or OS alone (p=0.0667) trials. This was reflected by an overall impact of 
flupenthixol in reducing discriminations among trial types (Figure 3F; effect of drug 
F(1,11)=51.51, p<0.0001; within each discrimination p<0.01). Dopamine antagonism in 
the nucleus accumbens shell significantly reduced intertrial port entries (Figure 3G; 
t(11)=7.336, p<0.001) but not intertrial port time (Figure 3H; t(11)=1.296, p=0.2215). As a 
result, functional dopamine signaling in the nucleus accumbens core and shell is 
equivalently necessary for the performance of occasion setting. 
 Finally, we assessed whether functional glutamate signaling in either nucleus 
accumbens subregion was essential for occasion setting. In the nucleus accumbens 
core, blockade of AMPA and NMDA receptors increased overall responding in the 
occasion setting task (Figure 4A; effect of trial type F(1,19)=32.47, p<0.0001; effect of 
drug F(1,11)=33.16, p=0.0001; interaction F(1,17)=2.904, p=0.0904). Analysis of the impact 
of drug infusion revealed that glutamate antagonism selectively increased reward-
seeking on OS alone trials relative to saline (p=0.0069). This resulted in behavior under 
nucleus accumbens core glutamate antagonism on OS alone trials statistically 
indistinguishable from behavior on OS+CS trials following saline infusion (p=0.3524). 
Despite this, rats still discriminated at a similar level under glutamate antagonism 
(Figure 4B; effect of drug F(1,11)=0.0305, p=0.8644) and while there was no impact of 
treatment on intertrial port time (Figure 4D; t(11)=0.6838, p=0.5082) there was a 
significant elevation in intertrial port entries (Figure 4C; t(11)=3.579, p=0.0043). In 
contrast, glutamate antagonism within the nucleus accumbens shell was without 
significant effect on reward-seeking (Figure 4E; effect of trial type F(1,14)=44.39, 
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p<0.0001; effect of drug F(1,11)=1.976, p=0.1875; interaction F(1,15)=0.1706, p=0.8315), 
discrimination amongst reinforced and non-reinforced trials (Figure 4F; ; effect of drug 
F(1,11)=0.3291, p=0.5778), or intertrial port time (Figure 4D; t(11)=0.2096, p=0.8378). 
Glutamate antagonism in the shell did however result in a significant increase in 
intertrial port entries (Figure 4C; t(11)=3.548, p=0.0046). As a result, it appears that 
glutamatergic inputs in the nucleus accumbens core, but not shell, constrain the 
processing of hierarchical cues and are necessary for occasion setters to be recognized 
as higher-order stimuli and not weakly reinforced conditioned stimuli. 
Nucleus Accumbens Core Neurons Encode and Utilize Occasion Setters to Modulate 
Cue-responses 
 The surprising impact of inactivation of the nucleus accumbens on eliminating 
responding to cues in the occasion setting task suggests that single neurons within the 
nucleus accumbens encode information directly relevant for performance. To assess 
this we implanted rats with microdrives of 16 tungsten wires in the nucleus accumbens 
core and recorded neural activity as rats performed the occasion setting task. We 
recorded 235 putative single nucleus accumbens neurons. We first analyzed the 
proportions of neurons that encoded task-relevant events: the houselight occasion 
setter, the white noise conditioned stimulus, port entries, and reward delivery (Figure 
5B). We observed that 55% of nucleus accumbens had significant modulation following 
OS presentation, while only 33% were significantly modulated following CS 
presentation. We then analyzed the relative strength of excitations and inhibitions to 
these cues. We found that nucleus accumbens neurons were more strongly strongly 
excited to the OS than to the CS (Wilcoxon signed rank test p=0.0281) but there was no 
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difference in the strength of the inhibition between the OS and CS (Wilcoxon signed 
rank test p=0.1461). Overall, these suggest that nucleus accumbens neurons strongly 
encode occasion setters, and do so more than conditioned stimuli, with primarily 
excitations.  
 We then sought to explore potential modulation of CS responses by the prior 
presence or absence of the OS. We graphed the activity of CS-excited and CS-inhibited 
neurons by trial type and throughout the duration of the CS. For CS-excited neurons 
though there was a significant interaction of trial and time during the CS, these were 
driven by similar changes in CS-excited neurons on OS+CS and CS alone trials relative 
to OS alone trials (Figure 6A; interaction F(1050,67845)=1.543, p<0.0001). Interestingly, we 
found that for CS-inhibited neurons there was a stronger inhibition to the CS when this 
cue was preceded by its occasion setter than when this cue was presented alone 
(Figure 6B; interaction of time x trial type F(1050,67854)=4.746, p<0.0001; OS+CS vs CS 
Alone p<0.05 for 0.64 to 0.84 s post CS). We also identified a subpopulation of neurons 
whom their activity in the first 500 ms post CS onset was significantly different on 
OS+CS relative to CS alone trials (n=23 neurons). When we graphed the activity of this 
subpopulation across trials we observed a striking flip in the response direction of these 
neurons from excitation to the CS when it was not predictive to inhibitions when the CS 
was predictive. As a result the average activity of these neurons was significantly 
different on OS+CS trials relative to CS alone trials (Figure 6C; interaction of time x trial 
type F(1050,34716)=4.910, p<0.0001; OS+CS vs CS Alone p<0.05 for 0.13 to 1.28 s post 
CS). These collectively indicate that neurons within nucleus accumbens core encode 
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and utilize hierarchical stimuli to resolve the immediate motivational value of a 
conditioned stimulus. 
Nucleus Accumbens Core Dopamine Release Dynamically Encodes the Motivational 
Value of Conditioned Stimuli 
 We previously demonstrated a necessary role for the activity of dopamine 
neurons during occasion setters for their ability to modulate reward-seeking and here 
found that long-lasting antagonism of dopamine signaling in the nucleus accumbens 
occludes the expression of occasion setting. We sought to understand how dopamine 
release in the nucleus accumbens would be regulated by occasion setters and what 
aspects of dopamine release, if any, would be related to occasion setting performance. 
We made use of in vivo bulk single-photon imaging of dopamine release with the 
genetically-engineered fluorescent sensor dLight1.3b which allowed for dopamine 
release to be recorded as rats freely behaved and performed in the occasion setting 
task (Patriarchi et al., 2018; Mohebi et al., 2019). We first analyzed the peak dopamine 
response following OS and CS presentation as well as after reward delivery. Overall, 
there was significant modulation of peak dopamine release across trials and events 
(Figure 7B; effect of trial type F(1,7)=23.64, p=0.0012; effect of event F(1,5)=89.10, 
p<0.0001; interaction F(1,9)=23.18, p=0.0003). Dopamine release was equivalent to the 
OS when that stimulus was presented as would be expected, yet surprisingly we found 
that dopamine release was significantly greater to the CS if the OS had previously been 
presented (OS+CS vs CS alone p=0.007; OS+CS vs OS alone p=0.0118). We next 
analyzed the time course of dopamine release throughout a trial and again found similar 
effects of modulation of dopamine release by trial type to the CS (Figure 7C; effect of 
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trial type F(1,6)=6.478, p=0.0377; effect of time F(3,18)=7.275, p=0.0012; interaction 
F(700,3500)=3.691, p<0.0001). Dopamine release to the OS was equivalent for OS alone 
and OS+CS trials and was greater than CS alone trials beginning 300 ms following OS 
presentation (p’s<0.05). In agreement with the findings of peak fluorescence, dopamine 
release to the CS was significantly greater than OS alone and CS alone beginning 300 
ms after the CS was presented on OS+CS trials and lasting 900 ms following its onset 
(p’s<0.05). These findings indicate that occasion setters drive dopamine release in the 
nucleus accumbens core and gate dopamine release to conditioned stimuli, with 
dopamine release only occurring if this cue currently predicts reward. 
DISCUSSION 
The nucleus accumbens is an interface between glutamatergic forebrain regions 
like the amygdala, frontal cortex, and hippocampus and midbrain dopaminergic inputs 
from the ventral tegmental area that integrates these signals to guide cue-elicited 
behaviors (Mogenson et al., 1980; Nicola, 2010; Floresco, 2015). Despite this, it 
remains unclear the precise role dopamine release and neural activity in the nucleus 
accumbens play in Pavlovian cue-triggered reward-seeking. Here we made use of 
intracranial pharmacology, in vivo electrophysiology, and fiber photometry to assess the 
contributions of nucleus accumbens to the resolution of cue-generated uncertainty. We 
find that the nucleus accumbens core is an essential neural substrate for the resolution 
of uncertainty surrounding reward-paired cues, and that both dopamine release and 
glutamate signaling are essential for the hierarchical control of behavior. We reveal 
novel neural correlates in the nucleus accumbens core for this process, with widespread 
encoding of hierarchical cues, and detail dopaminergic substrates that underlie this 
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occasion setting process. As a result, we provide a number of mechanisms for 
dopamine release and neural activity in the nucleus accumbens core to allow for the 
dynamic and rapid updating of the motivational value of reward-paired stimuli and the 
generation of adaptive reward-seeking. 
Our data indicate a similar overall contribution of neural activity in the nucleus 
accumbens core and shell in occasion setting, although there were nuanced behavioral 
effects suggesting neural activity in the core was more essential. We were surprised by 
this, as our lab and others have previously demonstrated a dissociable contribution of 
nucleus accumbens core neural activity to generating cue-triggered reward-seeking 
whereas nucleus accumbens shell neural activity was critical for a context to inhibit 
reward-seeking (Blaiss and Janak, 2009; Chaudhri et al., 2010; Ambroggi et al., 2011; 
Millan et al., 2015; Fraser and Janak, 2017). However, occasion setting is a process 
that requires both of these psychological processes – accurately scaling conditioned 
approach to targets of motivation and inhibiting inappropriate responding when cues will 
not be rewarded (Holland, 1992; Meyer and Bucci, 2016a; Fraser and Holland, 2019). 
The manipulations we performed were long-lasting and prevent us from claiming when 
neural activity nor dopamine release are precisely necessary in either subregion for the 
hierarchical control of behavior. It is possible then, for future investigations to make use 
of methods like optogenetics with more precise temporal control to assess whether 
manipulations of neural activity or dopamine terminals in either region reveal precise 
contributions of these nucleus accumbens subregions to occasion setting. 
By recording single neurons within the nucleus accumbens during occasion 
setting we discovered a widespread encoding of these hierarchical stimuli that 
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surpassed the number of neurons modulated by a Pavlovian conditioned stimulus. 
These data are reminiscent of the encoding of stimuli that indicate the availability of 
actions to be performed to earn reward (Ambroggi et al., 2008, 2011; Nicola, 2010; 
Richard et al., 2016; Sicre et al., 2020). In these scenarios, these discriminative stimuli 
act to instruct when an action will directly lead to reward and resolve uncertainty 
surrounding the relationship between actions and reward, although the nature of training 
also results in these stimuli also being directly related to reward. Interestingly, neural 
activity and dopamine signaling in the nucleus accumbens core is also essential in 
these scenarios (Ambroggi et al., 2008, 2011; du Hoffmann and Nicola, 2016, 2016; 
Sicre et al., 2020). This is in contrast to relatively modest effects observed with lesions 
or inactivations of the nucleus accumbens core, and while dopamine release is 
necessary in the nucleus accumbens core for Pavlovian conditioned approach, the 
magnitude of effect is not as extreme as in these scenarios where stimuli disambiguate 
the relationship between cues and reward or actions and reward (Di Ciano et al., 2001; 
Blaiss and Janak, 2009; Chang et al., 2012; Saunders and Robinson, 2012; Chang and 
Holland, 2013; Fraser and Janak, 2017; Sicre et al., 2020). These data in combination 
with our finding that nucleus accumbens neurons can dynamically encode the 
motivational value of Pavlovian conditioned stimuli strongly suggest that the resolution 
of uncertainty is a critical function of neurons within the nucleus accumbens core. 
By making use of recent advances in biosensors, we were able to use fiber 
photometry to record dopamine release as rats performed in the occasion setting task 
(Patriarchi et al., 2018). Interestingly, we found that dopamine release only occurred 
during the conditioned stimulus if an occasion setter had indicated that on the current 
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trial that stimulus would be followed by reward. This is in contrast to theories of 
dopamine function that ascribe dopamine release as encoding the expected value of the 
conditioned stimuli, if this were the case we would have observed equivalent dopamine 
release across trials, and even have expected equivalent magnitudes of release to both 
the occasion setter and the conditioned stimulus (Schultz and Dickinson, 2000; Fiorillo 
et al., 2003; Tobler et al., 2005; Watabe-Uchida et al., 2017). The scaling of dopamine 
release in the nucleus accumbens core suggests the ability of dopamine neurons to 
dynamically encode the immediate motivational relevance of reward-paired cues 
(Berridge, 2007, 2012; Smith et al., 2011; Dayan and Berridge, 2014; Aitken et al., 
2016). In fact, it has been well-demonstrated that dopamine release in the accumbens 
can be influenced by alterations in homeostasis, as dopamine release to water-paired 
cues increases if animals are made thirst or increases in release to food-cues if made 
hungry (Cone et al., 2016; Fortin and Roitman, 2018; Hsu et al., 2020). Our preparation 
tested the involvement of a well-controlled and isolated class of hierarchical stimuli, 
occasion setters, and we were able to parse about neural encoding and dopamine 
release to the state-defining stimulus, the occasion setter, and the target of its 
modulation, the conditioned stimuli. This is an obvious advantage compared to the long-
lasting and overlapping influence of changes in internal states, like hunger or thirst, 
have on cue-triggered motivation and in addition allowed for the ability to identify 
“contextual” encoding within the nucleus accumbens and by dopamine release in this 
structure. These results suggest that flexibility in encoding reward-associated stimuli is 
an essential feature of the mesolimbic dopamine system. 
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Ultimately, our findings provide a mechanism for single neurons and for 
dopamine release in the nucleus accumbens to allow for the dynamic control of cue-
triggered motivation. It remains to be determined the precise cell-types and circuit-
defined inputs to the nucleus accumbens that are essential for this process. As 
inhibitions in dopamine D1-receptor expressing neurons in the nucleus accumbens are 
essential for approaching and ultimately consuming rewards, it is possible that these 
neurons are those that are modulated by occasion setters (O’Connor et al., 2015). In 
contrast, paired recordings and identification have suggested that cue-triggered 
dopamine release instead rapidly modulates primarily D2-receptor expressing neurons, 
potentially indicating the modulated neurons we identify here are instead indirect 
pathway medium spiny neurons. Exploiting cell-type specific viral approaches and 
transgenic lines will be critical to identifying the precise accumbens neurons that 
underlie occasion setting. In addition, only when glutamate function was interrupted in 
the nucleus accumbens core did this manipulation alter behavioral responding to the 
hierarchical occasion setter. In instrumental scenarios where discriminative stimuli 
resolve the availability of actions to generate reward, inputs from the basolateral 
amygdala to the nucleus accumbens core are essential for both neural encoding of 
these stimuli and behavioral responding (Ambroggi et al., 2008). Investigations into 
potential contributions of diverse glutamatergic inputs, particularly from the basolateral 
amygdala, is a critical future direction for understanding the neural circuits of flexible 
cue-triggered motivation. The inability to accurately regulate motivational responses to 
ambiguous cues is a hallmark of psychiatric illness and resolving the neural circuitry 
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Figure 4.1. Task design and histology. A, Schematic of the task design used in all 
experiments. Long-evans rats discriminated whether a conditioned stimulus would be 
followed by reward delivery by exploiting the prior and non-overlapping presentation of a 
distinct occasion setting cue. B, Reconstruction of cannula tips for microinfusion 
experiments. C, Reconstruction of locations of electrodes for in vivo electrophysiological 
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recordings. D, Reconstruction of optic fiber locations and expression of dLight1.3 for 
fiber photometry recordings. Numbers indicate distance from bregma in millimeters and 




Figure 4.2. Reversible inactivation of either nucleus accumbens core or shell 
impairs occasion setting. A, Average time in port during the conditioned stimulus 
period for each trial type. B, Individual differences in time in port during the conditioned 
stimulus period on reinforced trials minus either conditioned stimulus alone or occasion 
setter alone trials. C, Intertrial port entries during the behavioral session. D, Intertrial 
port time during the behavioral session. E-H, same as A-D but for rats with cannula over 
the nucleus accumbens shell.  For all figures bars indicate mean + SEM. Empty bars 
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represent data from the saline session and filled bars data from the inactivation session. 
Individual rats are overlaid and represented by the colored lines. OS, occasion setter. 





Figure 4.3. Dopamine signaling in the nucleus accumbens core and shell is 
essential for occasion setting. A, Average time in port during the conditioned stimulus 
period for each trial type. B, Individual differences in time in port during the conditioned 
stimulus period on reinforced trials minus either conditioned stimulus alone or occasion 
setter alone trials. C, Intertrial port entries during the behavioral session. D, Intertrial 
port time during the behavioral session. E-H, same as A-D but for rats with cannula over 
the nucleus accumbens shell. For all figures bars indicate mean + SEM. Empty bars 
represent data from the saline session and filled bars data from the inactivation session. 
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Individual rats are overlaid and represented by the colored lines. OS, occasion setter. 




Figure 4.4. Glutamate release in the nucleus accumbens core, but not shell, is 
necessary for accurate processing of hierarchical stimuli. A, Average time in port 
during the conditioned stimulus period for each trial type. B, Individual differences in 
time in port during the conditioned stimulus period on reinforced trials minus either 
conditioned stimulus alone or occasion setter alone trials. C, Intertrial port entries during 
the behavioral session. D, Intertrial port time during the behavioral session. E-H, same 
as A-D but for rats with cannula over the nucleus accumbens shell. For all figures bars 
indicate mean + SEM. Empty bars represent data from the saline session and filled bars 
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data from the inactivation session. Individual rats are overlaid and represented by the 




Figure 4.5. Nucleus accumbens core neuronal responses during occasion setting. 
A, Schematic of recording approach. B, Proportion of neurons that are significantly 
excited (yellow), inhibited (blue), or those with no significant response (gray) for the four 
relevant task-related events. C, Heatmap of individual neuron responses to the 
occasion setting houselight sorted by greatest inhibition at the top to greatest inhibition 
at the bottom. D, Mean ± SEM for neurons with significant inhibitions to the OS cue. E, 
Mean ± SEM for neurons with significant excitations to the OS cue. F-H, same as C-E 
but for the white noise conditioned stimulus. I-K, same as C-E but for entries to the 
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reward port. Sorting for heatmaps is independent for each event. OS, occasion setter. 





Figure 4.6. Occasion setters determine nucleus accumbens core neuronal 
responses to an ambiguous conditioned stimulus. A, Normalized firing rate (z-
score) throughout the CS of neurons with significant excitations to the CS that are 
sorted by trial type. B, Normalized firing rate (z-score) throughout the CS of neurons 
with significant inhibitions to the CS that are sorted by trial type. C, Normalized firing 
rate (z-score) throughout the CS of neurons whose firing rate was identified as being 
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significantly different between OS+CS and CS alone trials sorted by trial type. For all 





Figure 4.7. Dopamine dynamics in nucleus accumbens core during the 
hierarchical control of reward-seeking. A, Schematic of approach to record 
fluorescence from rats expressing dLight1.3b in nucleus accumbens core. B, Average 
peak dopamine response (z-scored ΔF/F; mean + SEM) for each event and across trial 
types. C, Average dopamine response (z-scored ΔF/F) throughout a trial expressed as 






Basolateral amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex, but not dorsal hippocampus, are 
necessary for the control of reward-seeking by occasion setters 
 
INTRODUCTION 
A given reward-paired cue may have myriad relationships with rewards, leading to 
difficulty ascertaining its motivational and predictive value at any given moment. To 
overcome this uncertainty, it is critical to make use of other environmental stimuli that 
resolve ambiguity about reward-predictive cues and promote flexible reward-seeking. 
These ambiguity-resolving cues are often referred to as occasion setters, historically 
termed ‘features’, as they act to set the occasion for reward-seeking but do not drive 
reward-seeking on their own nor acquire a direct relationship with reward (Holland, 
1991, 1992; Schmajuk and Holland, 1998; Trask et al., 2017). Occasion setters are thus 
a unique class of Pavlovian cues that can powerfully modulate the predictive and 
motivational value of a traditional conditioned stimulus, historically termed the ‘target’, 
without engendering many of the properties associated with conditioned stimuli. Despite 
this, little research has explored occasion setting and its relationship to reward-seeking 
in comparison to standard Pavlovian conditioning preparations where conditioned 
stimuli have absolute relations with the presence or absence of reward. As a result, very 
little is known about the neurobiological basis of occasion setting despite its implications 
across a wide spectrum of neuropsychiatric disorders like schizophrenia and addiction 
(Lubow and Gewirtz, 1995; Anagnostaras and Robinson, 1996; Anagnostaras et al., 
2002; Ramos et al., 2002; Valyear et al., 2017). 
 The basolateral amygdala (BLA) and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) are reciprocally 
connected structures that are critical for exploiting acquired knowledge about reward-
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predictive cues to update and guide reward-seeking (Price, 2007; Sharpe and 
Schoenbaum, 2016). Damage to either structure does not produce a drastic impairment 
in simple Pavlovian conditioning, but impairment is revealed in a variety of tasks in 
which acquired cue-based information must be exploited to produce adaptive behavior 
(Hatfield et al., 1996; Schoenbaum et al., 1998; Burns et al., 1999; Gallagher et al., 
1999; Parkinson et al., 2000; Holland et al., 2001, 2002; Setlow et al., 2002; Holland 
and Gallagher, 2003; Pickens et al., 2003, 2005; Schiller and Weiner, 2004; Corbit and 
Balleine, 2005; McDannald et al., 2005, 2014; Izquierdo and Murray, 2007; Ostlund and 
Balleine, 2007; Ambroggi et al., 2008; Ishikawa et al., 2008; Johnson et al., 2009; Jones 
et al., 2012; Moorman and Aston-Jones, 2014; Lopatina et al., 2015; Lichtenberg et al., 
2017; Stolyarova and Izquierdo, 2017). In addition, disruptions in the BLA impair cue-
related neural activity in the OFC and damage within the OFC impairs cue-related 
neural activity within the BLA suggesting communication between these regions is 
necessary for the proper encoding of cue-reward relationships (Schoenbaum et al., 
2003; Saddoris et al., 2005; Lucantonio et al., 2015; Saez et al., 2015, 2017). Within this 
circuit, the BLA has been proposed to encode the current state value of the environment 
which is then conveyed to the OFC to integrate into a broader state space that 
represents multiple features relevant for the current task, that can be used to relay 
information to downstream targets to guide behavior (Belova et al., 2008; Morrison and 
Salzman, 2010; Parkes and Balleine, 2013; Wilson et al., 2014; Stalnaker et al., 2015; 
Sharpe and Schoenbaum, 2016; Wikenheiser and Schoenbaum, 2016; Lichtenberg et 
al., 2017). We hypothesized that activity within either structure would be critical for 
occasion setting, as this task includes cue-driven state transitions that require the 
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constant maintenance and updating of state value to guide reward-seeking. To test this, 
we trained rats in an occasion setting task and then reversibly inactivated either the BLA 
or the OFC. These effects were contrasted with inactivation of the dorsal hippocampus 
(DH), a region implicated in the processing of spatial contexts and in the control of 
behavioral responding by physical settings (Fuchs et al., 2005; Allen et al., 2016). We 
reveal that neural activity in both BLA and OFC is necessary for linking cue-triggered 
expectations across time to resolve ambiguity about a conditioned stimulus and produce 
adaptive reward-seeking. 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Subjects 
Subjects were 73 experimentally naïve male Long-Evans rats (Envigo, Frederick, 
MD) approximately 60 days of age and weighing 250-300 g on arrival. Upon arrival, rats 
were single-housed in ventilated cages with ad libitum access to food and water in a 
temperature- and humidity-controlled room and maintained on 12:12 light/dark cycle 
(lights on at 07:00). After one week of acclimation to the colony room, feeding was 
restricted to maintain weights at ~95% of ad libitum feeding weights. Food restriction 
was maintained for the duration of the experiment except for the post-surgical recovery 
period. All behavioral procedures took place between 08:00 and 12:00. All procedures 
were approved the Animal Care and Use Committee at Johns Hopkins University and 
followed the recommended guidelines in the Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory 




Behavioral testing occurred in ten identical Med Associates conditioning 
chambers (St. Albans, VT) housed in sound- and light-attenuating cabinets and 
controlled by a computer running MedPC IV software. In the center of one wall was a 
fluid receptacle that was located in a recessed port. On the opposite wall near the 
ceiling of the chamber was a white houselight (28 V) and to the right of the houselight 
was a white-noise generator (10-25 kHz, 20 dB). Outside of the behavioral chamber but 
within the sound- and light-attenuating cabinet was a red houselight (28 V) that provided 
background illumination during each behavioral session. Fluids were delivered to the 
port via tubing attached to a 60 mL syringe placed in a motorized pump located outside 
each cabinet. 
Pretraining 
For at least two days prior to any procedures rats were extensively handled and 
acclimated to the experimenter. Rats were also given free access to 15% sucrose in 
water for 24 hours in their homecage to prevent any neophobia and accustom them to 
the future reward solution. At least one day after sucrose pre-exposure, pretraining was 
conducted in an approximately one-hour session in which rats were able to drink 
sucrose from the recessed reward port. During this session there were 80 2-second 
activations of the syringe pump (~0.07 mL per delivery) on a variable time 60 s schedule 
(30-90 s range). All rats consumed all sucrose delivered in the pretraining session. 
Occasion Setting Task 
Training in the occasion setting task took place in 3 distinct phases with each 
session lasting ~2 hours on average with an average inter-trial interval of 3.3 minutes. 
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There was one session a day. In the first phase, all trials (25 for BLA group, 30 for OFC, 
DH, and NAc groups) were reinforced presentations of the following sequence of 
events: occasion setter houselight for 5 s, a 5 s empty period, and 5 s of the conditioned 
stimulus white noise. Reward consisted of 5 s activation of the syringe pump resulting in 
delivery of ~0.18 mL of 15% sucrose in the reward port occurred immediately upon 
termination of the conditioned stimulus white noise.  Phase one training lasted for 4 
sessions. In phase two, 40% of trials were reinforced as before, but the other 60% of 
trials were conditioned stimulus alone trials consisting of presentation of the white noise 
for 5 s with no reward (25 total trials for BLA group, 30 total trials for OFC, DH, and NAc 
groups). Phase two training lasted for 6 sessions. In the final phase of training, rats 
were exposed to the full occasion setting task (Figure 1A) consisting of 10 reinforced 
trials, 10 conditioned stimulus alone trials, and 10 occasion setter alone trials where the 
houselight was activated for 5 s with no subsequent stimuli or reward. Note that this 
task is purely Pavlovian; there was never a response requirement. Training in the final 
phase lasted for 4 sessions prior to surgery. 
Simple Conditioning Task 
 To assess the impact of BLA or OFC inactivation on Pavlovian conditioned 
responding separate groups of rats were instead trained in a task where a 5 s white 
noise was followed by 5 s activation of the reward pump containing 15% sucrose. The 
number of trials (30 per session) and intertrial interval (average 3.3 min) matched that of 
the occasion setting task and rats were trained for 14 days prior to cannula implantation. 




After 14 sessions of training in the occasion setting task rats were anesthetized 
with isoflurane (5% induction, 1-2.5% maintenance) and standard stereotaxic 
procedures were used to implant 22 gauge cannula (Plastics One, Roanoke, VA) 1 mm 
above the intended infusion site in the BLA (n=30; AP: -3.0 ML: ±5.1 DV: -7.4; with 
injector DV: -8.4), OFC (n=31; AP: +3.5 ML: ±2.6 DV: -4.5; with injector DV: -5.5), DH 
(n=12; AP: -3.7 ML: ±2.5 DV: -2.5; with injector DV: -3.5). After surgery, rats received 
injections of cefazolin (70 mg/kg, subcutaneous) to prevent infection and carprofen (5 
mg/kg, subcutaneous) to relieve pain. At all times except for during infusions, dummy 
stylets were placed in each guide cannula. These coordinates were adapted from 
previous studies (Chaudhri et al., 2013; Keiflin et al., 2013; Lichtenberg et al., 2017). 
Rats were allowed to recover for one week after surgery during which they had ad 
libitum access to food and water and then were returned to food restriction. Following 
this period, rats were retrained in the final phase of the occasion setting or simple 
conditioning task for at least 4 sessions. 
Infusions and Test 
Rats were accustomed to the handling and infusion procedure for 1-2 days prior 
to infusion by being transported to the procedure room after a training session, dummy 
stylets removed, a flat cut 28 gauge injector inserted into each cannula, and dummy 
stylets replaced. On the day prior to testing, a regular injector extending 1 mm past the 
guide cannula was used to confirm cannula patency. At test rats received infusions of 
either saline or a mixture of the GABA-B and GABA-A agonists, baclofen and muscimol 
(1.0 mM and 0.1 mM, respectively) infused in a volume of 0.3 µL over 1 minute. After 1 
additional minute to allow for diffusion away from the infusion site, injectors were 
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removed, dummy stylets were replaced, and rats returned to their homecage for 5-10 
minutes before test. There were two tests for each rat, one in each condition, with at 
least one day of retraining without manipulation between. Test sessions were 
reinforced. 
Histology 
At the end of behavioral procedures, locations of cannulae were confirmed using 
standard histological procedures. Brains were extracted and post-fixed in 4% 
paraformaldehyde in 0.1 M NaPB for at least 24 hours and then cryoprotected in 25% 
sucrose in 0.1 M NaPB; 50 µm coronal sections were mounted onto Fisher SuperFrost 
Plus slides, and stained with cresyl violet (FD Neurotechnologies; Ellicott City, MD). 
Microinjection sites were verified by mapping their locations onto images from a rat 
brain atlas (Paxinos and Watson, 2007).  
Experimental Design and Statistical Analysis 
All data were visualized and analyzed in GraphPad Prism 7. For all hypothesis 
tests, α=0.05. The primary behavioral data of interest were the effects of treatment 
(saline vs baclofen/muscimol) on time in port during the conditioned stimulus period on 
each trial type (reinforced, conditioned stimulus alone, occasion setter alone) in the 
occasion setting task or merely time in port between conditions for the simple 
conditioning task. It is important to note that on occasion setter alone trials, there is no 
conditioned stimulus presented, but the period analyzed is the corresponding 5 s period 
when the conditioned stimulus was presented on reinforced trails. These data were 
analyzed using a repeated measures ANOVA with within-subject factors of treatment 
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and trial type. Difference scores were calculated to quantify each subject’s individual 
discrimination performance between time in port during the conditioned stimulus period 
on reinforced and either conditioned stimulus alone or occasion setter alone trials. 
These data were analyzed with a repeated measures ANOVA with treatment and 
discrimination (conditioned stimulus alone vs occasion setter alone) as within-subject 
factors. The observed effects were similar regardless of if time in port was normalized to 
the 10 s period prior to any stimulus onset. As a result, we present percent time in port 
data without normalization since there are overall increases in port time throughout the 
session that could increase the likelihood of observing decreases in responding with 
normalized measures. Intertial time in port and port entries were analyzed with two-
tailed paired t-tests. When appropriate, post hoc comparisons were made with Tukey’s 
or Bonferroni’s procedure. Behavioral data for the BLA and OFC experimental groups 
was collected in separate sequential experiments and therefore were analyzed 
separately. 
RESULTS 
To assess the contributions of the BLA and OFC to occasion setting male rats 
were trained in an occasion setting task and implanted with cannula over either the BLA 
or OFC. In this task, rats received deliveries of sucrose if the occasion setter (OS) and 
conditioned stimulus (CS) were linked in time with a 5 s gap between their 
presentations, whereas presentations of the OS alone or CS alone were non-reinforced 
(Figure 1A). As a result of this configuration of cues, rats exhibit higher conditioned 
approach behavior to the reward port on reinforced trials during CS presentation, than 
on CS alone trials, or during the CS period on OS Alone trials even though the CS was 
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not presented. Overall, this general pattern of reward-seeking is consistent with 
previous reports of occasion setting in freely moving rats (Meyer and Bucci, 2016a, 
2017). To determine the role of BLA and OFC in this differential responding during the 
CS period, rats received reversible inactivation of either structure with a mixture of the 
GABA-A and GABA-B agonists, muscimol and baclofen, or saline vehicle infusions in a 
counterbalanced manner before a reinforced session identical to that of the final phase 
of the occasion setting task. Only rats with microinjector tips verified within the bilateral 
BLA (n=10) or OFC (n=16) were included for analyses and their locations are depicted 
in Figure 1B and Figure 1C. 
Reversible inactivation of the BLA impairs occasion setting 
Under control conditions (saline infusion), rats exhibited discriminated reward-
seeking, as evidenced by heightened time in the reward port on reinforced trials relative 
to CS alone and relative to OS alone trials, and inactivation of the BLA abolished this 
pattern such that rats failed to discriminate among the three trials types, responding 
equivalently during the CS period regardless of the prior presentation of the OS or not 
(Figure 2A). These observations are confirmed by a main effect of trial type 
(F(2,18)=9.231, p=0.0017) and treatment (F(1,9)=22.6, p=0.001), as well as an interaction 
of treatment and trial type (F(2,18)=15.42, p=0.0001). While responding during the CS 
was greater following the OS relative to both CS alone (p=0.041) and OS alone trials 
(p<0.0001), following BLA inactivation rats did not discriminate among trial types, 
resulting in a similar, low level of reward seeking between reinforced and CS alone trials 
(p=0.9995) and OS alone trials (p=0.9999). In addition, comparing responding within 
trial type, inactivation of the BLA significantly reduced reward-seeking during the CS 
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period on reinforced (p<0.0001) and CS alone trials (p<0.0001) compared to saline 
infusions. Conditioned approach to the food cup was already low during OS alone trials, 
given there was no stimulus present during the CS period, and this was not significantly 
reduced by BLA inactivation (p=0.4583).  These effects are also evident when analyzing 
individual rats’ discrimination scores that quantify the difference in responding to the CS 
on reinforced trials vs either the CS alone or OS alone trials in the occasion setting task, 
with higher numbers reflecting better discrimination. Inactivation decreased the mean 
discrimination scores in both cases (Figure 2B; main effect of treatment: F(1,9)=16.42, 
p=0.0029; post hoc CS alone discrimination: p=0.0246; post hoc OS alone 
discrimination: p=0.0040).These findings collectively indicate that inactivation reduced 
the ability to use the occasion setter to produce adaptive reward-seeking. We also 
examined total time in the reward port and total port entries to examine whether 
inactivation generally impaired activity during the 2 hour session. Inactivation did not 
significantly alter intertrial port entries (Figure 2C; t(9)=1.868, p=0.0946) or time in the 
reward port (Figure 2D; t(9)=1.783, p=0.1083) indicating that decreased behavior during 
the CS period cannot be attributable to activity impairment. Rather, the findings suggest 
that rats failed to organize their reward-seeking appropriately in response to the 
presented stimuli. In addition, all rats consumed all sucrose delivered during both test 
sessions, indicating that even the presence of reward was not able to overcome the 
ability of BLA inactivation to disrupt occasion setting.  
Reversible inactivation of the OFC impairs occasion setting 
In a separate group of rats, we tested whether inactivation of the OFC would alter 
occasion setting given its reciprocal connections with the BLA. Notably, we found that 
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inactivation of the OFC produced a strikingly similar pattern of impairment in the 
occasion setting task (Figure 3A; main effect of trial type: F(2,30)=12.01, p=0.0001; main 
effect of treatment: F(1,15)=25.95, p=0.0001; interaction of treatment and trial type: 
F(2,30)=7.486, p=0.001). As above, rats exhibited discriminative reward-seeking in the 
task by using the occasion setter to increase reward-seeking on reinforced trials relative 
to CS alone (post hoc comparisons of reinforced versus CS alone: p<0.0001) and OS 
alone trials (p<0.0001) following saline infusions into the OFC. Similar to the findings 
above, inactivation of the OFC eliminated the ability of rats to use the occasion setter to 
guide reward-seeking and produced an overall low level of conditioned behavior during 
the test session (Figure 3A) as evidenced by no significant difference in time in port 
during the CS period between reinforced trials and either CS alone (p=0.9999) and OS 
alone trials (p=0.4234). For OFC, inactivation significantly reduced responding on 
reinforced (p<0.0001) and CS alone trials (p=0.0045), but did not reduce the already 
low level of responding on OS alone trials (p=.459). As a result, rats’ individual 
discrimination between reinforced trials and CS alone or OS alone trials was abolished 
following reversible inactivation of the OFC (Figure 3B; main effect of treatment: 
F(1,15)=0.0024; post hoc CS alone discrimination: p=0.0024; post hoc OS alone 
discrimination: p=0.0001). We analyzed total time in port and total port entries to assess 
whether the findings could be attributed to an overall lack of engagement during the test 
session. As with BLA inactivation, OFC inactivation did not impair overall activity during 
the session, but instead significantly increased intertrial port entries (Figure 3C; 
t(15)=3.266, p=0.0052) and time in the reward port (Figure 3D; t(15)=5.793, p<0.0001). In 
addition, all rats consumed all sucrose delivered during the test sessions. Together 
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these results indicate that inactivation of the OFC impaired the ability of rats to use an 
occasion setter to resolve ambiguity about conditioned stimuli to guide reward-seeking. 
Reversible inactivation of the DH has no impact on occasion setting 
 We next asked whether the dorsal hippocampus, a region critical for the 
encoding of discrete locations in space, sequences of stimuli, and implicated in the 
control of responding by physical contexts may be critical in occasion setting. We 
trained 12 naïve rats in the occasion setting task as before and 2 rats were excluded for 
incorrect cannula placement (final n=10 for DH; placements in Figure 4E). In contrast to 
the impact of reversible inactivation with baclofen and muscimol in the BLA or OFC, 
there was no significant effect of inactivation of the DH on occasion setting assessed 
with time in port during the conditioned stimulus across trials (Figure 4A; main effect of 
treatment F(1,9)=0.068, p=0.7997; main effect of trial type F(2,18)=16.03, p=0.0001; 
interaction of treatment and trial type F(2,18)=5.111, p=0.0175). Under both saline and 
inactivation rats exhibited more food cup responding on OS+CS trials relative to either 
CS Alone (saline p=0.0010; inactivation p<0.0001) and OS Alone trials (saline 
p<0.0001; inactivation p=0.0002), but there was no impact of inactivation on responding 
within any given trial (OS+CS p>0.9999; CS Alone p=0.6239; OS Alone p=0.2675). In 
agreement, analysis of the ability of each rat to discriminate between reinforced 
conditioned stimuli and non-reinforced trials revealed no significant effect of treatment 
(Figure 4B; F(1,9)=0.006, p=0.9386). Despite a lack of impact on occasion setting 
performance, inactivation of the DH significantly increased intertrial port entries (Figure 
4C; t(9)=3.57, p=0.0060) but had no effect on the time rats spent in the port in the 
intertrial interval (Figure 4D; t(9)=1.536 p=0.1589). Together these indicate that the 
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contributions of the DH to occasion setting are minimal, but that inactivation of the 
dorsal hippocampus can increase locomotor activity and disinhibit behavior in the 
absence of conditioned stimuli. 
Inactivation of either BLA or OFC fails to impair Pavlovian conditioned responding 
 Finally, we sought to confirm whether the impact of inactivation of the BLA or 
OFC on occasion setting could be explained by a potential requirement for activity in 
either structure for generating conditioned responding to reward-predictive cues. 
Despite evidence from multiple laboratories demonstrating that lesions of either 
structure or reversible inactivation are generally without effect on responding to 
Pavlovian cues, we wondered if the procedures employed here with a brief 5s cue 
followed by the non-overlapping delivery of reward might alter the involvement of either 
structure in Pavlovian conditioned approach. Rats were implanted with cannula over 
either the BLA (n=8 after exclusions) or the OFC (n=10 after exclusions) and trained for 
an identical number of sessions in a simple Pavlovian conditioning task where a 5s 
white noise was always followed by sucrose reward, with matched trial timing and trial 
number as the occasion setting task (Figure 5A). Reversible inactivation of the BLA 
after training for 18 sessions in this task was without effect on conditioned responding to 
the white noise (Figure 5B; t(8)=1.037, p=0.3344) but did significantly increase intertrial 
port time (Figure 5C; t(8)=2.476, p=0.0425). For OFC, there was similar a lack of 
impairment of reversible inactivation on conditioned responding to the white noise 
(Figure 5E; t(11)=2.012, p=0.0719), but inactivation did also significantly increase 
intertrial port time (Figure 5F; t(11)=2.868, p=0.0167). Ultimately, there is minimal 
contribution of either BLA or OFC to Pavlovian conditioned approach which suggests 
143 
 
the extreme impairment in the occasion setting task is not due to their involvement in 
the generation of conditioned food cup approach. 
DISCUSSION 
Resolving ambiguity about reward-predictive cues is an essential tool for survival, 
including the proper organization of reward-seeking behavior. However, in many 
experiments Pavlovian reward-predictive cues are deterministic with absolute relations 
with the presence or absence of reward and as a result are unambiguous. To better 
understand situations in which conditioned stimuli are ambiguous, we took advantage of 
an occasion setting task that required rats to use a discrete occasion-setting cue which 
signaled that if a conditioned stimulus was presented shortly after the occasion setter it 
would be followed by reward (Holland, 1992; Fraser and Holland, 2019; Fraser and 
Janak, 2019), while conditioned stimulus presentations not preceded by the occasion 
setting cue would not be followed by reward. We assessed the contributions of the BLA 
and OFC in regulating behavior under these conditions as these structures have been 
shown to be important for the generation and exploitation of cue-elicited expectations. 
We demonstrate that reversible inactivation of either structure produced a profound 
inability of rats to use an occasion setting cue to guide adaptive reward-seeking. 
Inactivation also increased overall time in the reward port, particularly following OFC 
inactivation, suggesting an inability in using cues to guide reward-seeking as opposed 
to a motor impairment. These data suggest activity within these reciprocally-connected 
structures, and likely communication within this circuit, is critical for resolving ambiguity 
about reward-predictive cues. 
Occasion setting mechanisms in conditioned reward-seeking 
144 
 
Despite extensive behavioral work, little is known with respect to the neural 
systems and circuits that are critical to occasion setting. Occasion setting is a rich and 
complex behavioral scenario that requires animals to maintain multiple cue-generated 
representations and link them in time to resolve the predictive and motivational meaning 
of a conditioned stimulus. In recent years there has been a renewed focus on negative 
occasion setting, a task in which the occasion-setting cue signals a conditioned stimulus 
will not be reinforced, thereby inhibiting reward-seeking (Holland, 1992; Meyer and 
Bucci, 2016a). These experiments have suggested that the OFC and nucleus 
accumbens, as well as the dorsal hippocampus, are involved in the acquisition of this 
behavior (Holland et al., 1999; Meyer and Bucci, 2016b; Shobe et al., 2017). Negative 
occasion setting differs in a significant number of ways from the positive occasion 
setting task that we used here, in which the occasion setting cue instructs the animal 
that it may soon encounter a conditioned stimulus that will spur reward-seeking 
(Holland, 1992; Meyer and Bucci, 2016a; Trask et al., 2017). Negative occasion setting 
requires behavioral inhibition, and negative occasion setting cues may act as 
conditioned inhibitors (Meyer and Bucci, 2017; Trask et al., 2017). Interestingly, 
evidence suggests distinct neural systems may underlie negative and positive occasion 
setting (Holland et al., 1999). In support of this distinction, we observed no impact of 
reversible inactivation of the dorsal hippocampus on positive occasion setting. To our 
knowledge ours is one of the first reports of a neurobiological manipulation to selectively 
affect positive occasion setting, laying a groundwork for future investigations into the 




Basolateral amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex are critical for occasion setting 
In many situations the BLA is not necessarily critical for the acquisition and 
expression of simple Pavlovian conditioned responses, but is necessary for exploiting 
and updating previously acquired cue-based information (Hatfield et al., 1996; Setlow et 
al., 2002; Holland and Gallagher, 2003; Pickens et al., 2003; Johnson et al., 2009; 
Chang et al., 2012). In the present study, in the absence of a functioning BLA, rats were 
not able to retrieve the appropriate motivational information associated with either cue in 
the occasion setting task (Averbeck and Costa, 2017), and as a result exhibited a flat, 
low-level of reward-seeking regardless of the cue presented. In contrast to studies of 
the BLA in context-based renewal of Pavlovian conditioned responding (Chaudhri et al., 
2013; Millan et al., 2015; Sciascia et al., 2015), a situation in which a context must be 
used to inform reward-seeking, we observed significant impairments despite testing 
under reinforced conditions. This suggests perhaps that the nature of the occasion 
setting task, characterized by the need to rapidly update cue values every few minutes, 
more strongly engages the BLA. That inactivation of the BLA impairs occasion setting is 
in agreement with suggestions the BLA encodes state value, as occasion setting 
requires subjects to appropriately recognize and transition between cue-driven states 
(Morrison and Salzman, 2010). Neurons within the BLA respond to Pavlovian cues and 
to discriminative stimuli that signal the availability of an action to produce reward (Paton 
et al., 2006; Tye and Janak, 2007; Ambroggi et al., 2008; Morrison and Salzman, 2009; 
Shabel and Janak, 2009; Sangha et al., 2013), but whether or how they encode 
occasion setters themselves remains to be observed. 
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The OFC, like the BLA, is largely not necessary for simple Pavlovian 
conditioning, but is necessary for exploiting and updating acquired cue-based 
representations in new situations (Gallagher et al., 1999; Pickens et al., 2003, 2005; 
McDannald et al., 2005; Ostlund and Balleine, 2007; Chang, 2014). We found that 
inactivation of the OFC impaired occasion setting in well-trained subjects, suggesting an 
essential role of the OFC in the ongoing expression of this behavior. While neurons in 
the OFC acquire responses to reward-predictive stimuli, this information is encoded and 
used in a manner distinct from the BLA (Schoenbaum et al., 1998; Morrison and 
Salzman, 2011; Morrison et al., 2011; Takahashi et al., 2013; Moorman and Aston-
Jones, 2014; Lopatina et al., 2017; Shobe et al., 2017). Neurons in the OFC have been 
argued to encode task space and ultimately construct a composite cognitive map of all 
possible states and their transitions (Wilson et al., 2014; Stalnaker et al., 2015; 
Wikenheiser and Schoenbaum, 2016). Accordingly, we hypothesize that inactivation of 
the OFC eliminated the ability of rats to use state value information, perhaps arising 
from the BLA (Schoenbaum et al., 2003; Sharpe and Schoenbaum, 2016; Lichtenberg 
et al., 2017), to maintain and/or transition in this state space appropriately, seemingly 
rendering all cues to have similar low significance to the subject as evidenced by the 
similar low level of responding across trials following OFC inactivation.  
BLA and OFC interactions in occasion setting 
With the current approach we are unable to ascertain how communication 
between the OFC and BLA contributes to occasion setting. However, it is striking that 
the impairments in occasion setting observed after inactivation of either structure were 
almost identical. This suggests communication between OFC and BLA is critical for 
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linking cue-triggered expectations across time to produce adaptive and flexible reward-
seeking. Indeed, in an odor-guided decision-making task, neural encoding of cue-based 
information in the OFC is dependent on neural activity within the BLA (Schoenbaum et 
al., 2003), and encoding in the BLA is dependent on the OFC (Saddoris et al., 2005). A 
recent report suggests that the BLA encodes and retrieves cue-triggered expectations 
and the OFC exploits this information to guide decision-making (Lichtenberg et al., 
2017). It is possible, however, that the identical effects we observed on occasion setting 
may be mediated by a shared downstream target of the BLA and OFC, such as the 
nucleus accumbens, but this remains to be explored (Heilbronner et al., 2016). Paired 
recordings in the OFC and BLA during this occasion setting task would give insight into 
the unique contributions of each structure and clarify the computations occurring in 
each, while future investigations using chemogenetic or optogenetic tools to restrict 
manipulations to BLA terminals in the OFC or OFC terminals in the BLA to resolve 
contributions of directionality in this circuit for occasion setting. 
Conclusions 
The ability to resolve ambiguity surrounding reward-paired cues is essential for 
survival but often neglected in studies of Pavlovian conditioning. Occasion setting 
allows for a complex understanding of the dynamic regulation of cue-triggered reward-
seeking by discrete events. The present data demonstrate that the BLA and OFC are 
essential neural substrates for exploiting occasion setting cues to produce flexible 
conditioned reward-seeking. Excessive and inappropriate pursuit of rewards is a 
hallmark of neuropsychiatric disorders, like addiction, that may arise from deficits in 
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occasion setting processes, and a better understanding of the neural and behavioral 




Figure 5.1. Experimental design and histological verification of microinjector tips. 
A, Schematic of the occasion setting task. B, Cannulae placements for rats in the BLA 
group (n=10). C, Cannulae placements for rats in the OFC group (n=16). Numbers 
indicate distance from bregma in millimeters and the coronal sections were obtained 




Figure 5.2. Reversible inactivation of the basolateral amygdala impairs occasion 
setting. A, Average time in port during the conditioned stimulus period for both test 
sessions. B, Individual differences in time in port during the conditioned stimulus period 
on reinforced trials minus either conditioned stimulus alone or occasion setter alone 
trials. C, Intertrial port entries during the behavioral session. D, Intertrial port time during 
the behavioral session. For all figures bars indicate mean ± SEM. Empty bars represent 
data from the saline session and filled bars from the inactivation session. Individual rats 





Figure 5.3. Reversible inactivation of the orbitofrontal cortex impairs occasion 
setting. A, Average time in port during the conditioned stimulus period for each trial 
type. B, Individual differences in time in port during the conditioned stimulus period on 
reinforced trials minus either conditioned stimulus alone or occasion setter alone trials. 
C, Intertrial port entries during the behavioral session. D, Intertrial port time during the 
behavioral session. For all figures bars indicate mean + SEM. Empty bars represent 
data from the saline session and filled bars data from the inactivation session. Individual 
rats are overlaid and represented by the colored lines. OS, occasion setter. CS, 




Figure 5.4. Dorsal hippocampus inactivation is without effect on occasion setting. 
A, Average time in port during the conditioned stimulus period for each trial type. B, 
Individual differences in time in port during the conditioned stimulus period on reinforced 
trials minus either conditioned stimulus alone or occasion setter alone trials. C, Intertrial 
port entries during the behavioral session. D, Intertrial port time during the behavioral 
session. E, Cannulae placements for DH rats (n=10). Numbers indicate distance from 
bregma in millimeters and the coronal sections were obtained from (Paxinos and 
Watson, 2007). For all figures bars indicate mean + SEM. Empty bars represent data 
from the saline session and filled bars data from the inactivation session. Individual rats 






Figure 5.5. Inactivation of neither basolateral amygdala nor orbitofrontal cortex 
alters Pavlovian conditioned approach. A, Schematic of task design where 30 trials 
per session were presented with each trial being the presentation of white noise for 5 s 
followed by 5 s activation of a pump containing 15% sucrose. B, Time in port expressed 
as a percentage during the white noise. C, Intertrial time in the port during the 
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behavioral session. D, Cannulae placements for BLA rats (n=8). E, Time in port 
expressed as a percentage during the white noise. F, Intertrial time in the port during 
the behavioral session. G, Cannulae placements for OFC rats (n=11). Numbers indicate 
distance from bregma in millimeters and the coronal sections were obtained from 
(Paxinos and Watson, 2007). For all figures bars indicate mean + SEM. Empty bars 
represent data from the saline session and filled bars data from the inactivation session. 






The basolateral amygdala encodes higher-order contextual cues and is essential 
for the hierarchical control of conditioned reward-seeking 
INTRODUCTION 
 Accurately assessing the likelihood of reinforcement associated with a given 
conditioned stimulus is essential for adaptive behavior and survival. One way in which 
the significance of a given conditioned stimulus can be resolved is by exploiting the 
scenario in which it has been encountered. By making use of other cues, internal states, 
and reinforcement history it is possible to discern the immediate motivational 
significance of conditioned cues and set the occasion for the appropriate behavioral 
response (Holland, 1992; Fraser and Holland, 2019). This occasion setting process is 
crucial to the proper organization of reward-seeking yet its underlying neural basis is 
poorly investigated as it has been primarily investigated by making use of distinctly 
arranged operant chambers that make impossible the parsing of neural systems 
essential for the encoding and utilization of hierarchical stimuli that modulate reward-
seeking (Holland and Bouton, 1999; Bouton et al., 2006; Fraser and Janak, 2019). 
 The basolateral amygdala (BLA) is one critical site proposed to underlie the 
proper organization of cue-controlled reward-seeking (Baxter and Murray, 2002; 
Morrison and Salzman, 2010; Janak and Tye, 2015). Despite a lack of role in generating 
conditioned approach to reward-paired cues, the BLA is essential for flexibly responding 
to cues whose relationship with reward has been altered either by devaluing the reward 
or in scenarios in which inferences must be made regarding its current relationship with 
an outcome (Gallagher and Holland, 1994; Hatfield et al., 1996; Holland and Gallagher, 
2003; Lindgren et al., 2003; Saddoris et al., 2005; Chang et al., 2012; Sharpe and 
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Schoenbaum, 2016). Given this, it seems likely that the BLA is critical for the 
hierarchical control of reward-seeking and the resolution of uncertainty as a result of this 
structure encoding the current motivational value of reward-associated stimuli. Indeed, 
we previously reported that inactivations of the BLA were sufficient to impair occasion 
setting. However, the mechanisms within the BLA and its precise contributions to 
occasion setting have remained unclear as these prior studies have made use of 
manipulations that lack temporal-specificity. Here we sought to test the precise role the 
BLA plays in the hierarchical control of reward-seeking and identify potential 
mechanisms within the BLA that could explain its contribution to this higher-order 
process. These findings were contrasted with investigations into the contributions of the 
orbitiofrontal cortex (OFC) as these regions are interconnected and have been ascribed 
similar roles in the control of Pavlovian conditioned reward-seeking (Schoenbaum et al., 
2003; Saddoris et al., 2005; McDannald et al., 2012; Lucantonio et al., 2015; Sharpe 
and Schoenbaum, 2016). Interestingly, we find that the BLA and not OFC is necessary 
for occasion setters to update conditioned responding to an ambiguous conditioned 
stimulus and that neural encoding of occasion setters is more profound in BLA neurons 
than OFC neurons. These findings point to an essential role for BLA, but not OFC, and 
its related circuitry in the hierarchical control of reward-seeking.  
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Subjects 
 Subjects were 12 experimentally naïve male Long-Evans rats obtained from 
ENVIGO. Rats were single-housed in ventilated cages with ad libitum access to food 
and water in a temperature- and humidity-controlled room and maintained on 12:12 
157 
 
light/dark cycle (lights on at 07:00). After recovery from surgery, feeding was restricted 
to maintain weights at ~95% of ad libitum feeding weights. All behavioral procedures 
took place between 08:00 and 13:00. All procedures were approved by the Animal Care 
and Use Committee at Johns Hopkins University and followed the recommended 
guidelines in the Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals: Eighth Edition, 
revised in 2011. 
Surgery 
 Rats were anesthetized with isoflurane (5% induction, 1-2.5% maintenance) and 
standard stereotaxic procedures were used. Rats for the optogenetics experiments 
were infused with a viral vector containing archaerhodopsin (AAV5-CamKIIa-ArchT-
eYFP; titer 1.9 x 1013 viral particles/mL; Addgene) or a control virus (AAV5-CamKIIa-
eYFP; titer 4.3 x 1012 viral particles/mL; Addgene) bilaterally into the BLA (AP: -2.8 ML: 
±5.1 DV: -8.4) or OFC (AP: +3.5 ML: ±2.6 DV: -5.5). A volume of 500 nL of virus was 
infused per site at a rate of 100 nL/min through a 31-G, gas-tight Hamilton syringe 
controlled by a Micro4 Ultra Microsyringe Pump 3 (World Precision Instruments). The 
needle was left in place for 10 minutes following the infusion to allow for diffusion of the 
virus from the injection site. In the same surgery, rats were bilaterally implanted with 
custom made optic fiber implants (300 µm glass diameter) targeted 200 µM dorsal to 
the infusion site. For electrophysiological recordings, a custom-built microdrive 
containing 16 50 µm tungsten wires soldered to 8-pin Omnetics connectors was lowered 
slowly to the OFC (n=7; AP: +3.5 ML: ±2.6 DV: -4.5) or BLA (n=5; AP: -2.8 ML: ±5.1 DV: 
-7.4) with a silver reference wire wrapped around a screw in contact with the 
cerebellum. Implants were secured to the skull with 4-5 screws placed in the skull and 
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dental acrylic. After surgery, rats received injections of cefazolin (70 mg/kg, 
subcutaneous) to prevent infection and carprofen (5 mg/kg, subcutaneous) to relieve 
pain. Rats were allowed to recover for 10 days prior to the beginning of behavioral 
procedures, with at least 4 weeks passing before any optogenetic manipulations were 
performed.  
Apparatus 
Behavioral testing occurred in Med Associates conditioning chambers (St. 
Albans, VT) housed in sound- and light-attenuating cabinets and controlled by a 
computer running MedPC IV software. In the center of one wall was a fluid receptacle 
that was located in a recessed port. On the opposite wall near the ceiling of the 
chamber was a white houselight (28 V) and to the right of the houselight was a white-
noise generator (10-25 kHz, 20 dB). Outside of the behavioral chamber but within the 
sound- and light-attenuating cabinet was a green houselight (28 V) that provided 
background illumination during each behavioral session. Fluids were delivered to the 
port via tubing attached to a 60 mL syringe placed in a motorized pump located outside 
each cabinet. 
Behavioral Procedures 
Behavioral procedures were generally identical to those we have previously 
published (Fraser and Janak, 2019). Briefly, Training in the occasion setting task took 
place in 3 distinct phases with each session lasting ~2 hours on average with 30 total 
trials and an average inter-trial interval of 3.3 minutes. There was one session a day. In 
the first phase, all trials were reinforced presentations of the following sequence of 
events: occasion setter houselight for 5 s, a 5 s empty period, and 5 s of the conditioned 
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stimulus white noise. Reward consisted of 5 s activation of the syringe pump resulting in 
delivery of ~0.18 mL of 15% sucrose in the reward port occurred immediately upon 
termination of the conditioned stimulus white noise.  Phase one training lasted for 4 
sessions. In phase two, 40% of trials were reinforced as before, but the other 60% of 
trials were conditioned stimulus alone trials consisting of presentation of the white noise 
for 5 s with no reward. Phase two training lasted for 6 sessions. In the final phase of 
training, rats were exposed to the full occasion setting task (Figure 1A) consisting of 10 
reinforced trials, 10 conditioned stimulus alone trials, and 10 occasion setter alone trials 
where the houselight was activated for 5 s with no subsequent stimuli or reward. Note 
that this task is purely Pavlovian; there was never a response requirement. Training in 
the final phase lasted for 8 sessions prior to optogenetic manipulations or 
electrophysiological recordings began. Fiber photometric recordings occurred 
throughout phase 3. 
Optogenetic Manipulations 
 Following training rats were habituated to the procedures necessary for light 
delivery through their surgically implanted optic fibers. Rats were held gently by the 
experiment and connected via a ceramic mating sleeve bilaterally to 200 µm core patch 
cords (Doric), which were connected to a fiber optic rotary join (Doric), connected to a 
separate 200 µm patch cord that interfaced with a 532 nm DPSS laser (Opto-Engine 
LLC). Laser delivery was controlled by transistor-transistor logic pulses from MedPC 
SmartCTRL cards that interfaced with a Master9 Stimulus Controller (AMPI), which 
dictated the duration of stimulation. During tests, constant laser light (15-20 mW) was 
delivered bilaterally for a constant duration of either 15.5s, being presented 0.5s prior to 
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the OS period and lasting until the end of the CS period, or for 5.5s beginning 0.5 s 
before either the houselight or white noise (or the time in which they would be presented 
in CS Alone and OS alone trials). During optogenetic tests the number of trials per 
session was doubled, with 60 total trials (20 of each), during which half of the trials were 
associated with light delivery. Optogenetic testing was done under extinction conditions 
without reward delivery. The order of testing was counterbalanced. 
Electrophysiological Recordings 
Electrical signals and behavioral events were collected from freely behaving 
animals with the OmniPlex (Plexon) recording system as we have previously described 
(Ottenheimer et al., 2018, 2020). Waveforms were sorted into units offline using Offline 
Sorter software (Plexon), and any units that were not recorded throughout a behavioral 
session were discarded. We only included neurons that were identified as single-units 
through careful examination of auto and cross correlations, plotting waveform features 
over time to ensure stability and continuity, and discarded units with more than 0.2% of 
spikes within a 2-ms refractory period. 
Histology 
Following the conclusion of experiments, rats were deeply anesthetized with 
sodium pentobarbital and perfused transcardially with 4% paraformaldehyde. Brains 
were post-fixed for 24 hours in 4% paraformaldehyde, cryoprotected in 25% sucrose in 
0.1 M NaPB, and then sectioned on a freezing cryostat at -20° C in 50 um sections. 
Sections from rats in the optogenetic experiments were processed for detection of GFP 
using fluorescent immunohistochemistry. Sections were first washed in 0.1 M PBS 
containing 0.2% Triton-X (PBST) for 20 minutes and blocked for 30 minutes in 0.1M 
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PBST containing 10% normal donkey serum. Primary antibody incubation (mouse anti-
GFP, 1:1500, Invitrogen A11120, Lot#2180270) occurred overnight at 4C. The following 
day sections were washed in PBST for 15 minutes, blocked in PBS containing 2% 
normal donkey serum for 10 minutes, then secondary antibody incubation (Alexafluor 
488 donkey anti-mouse, 1:200, Invitrogen A21202, Lot# 2229195) occurred at room 
temperature for 2 hours. Following 15 minutes of washing in PBS sections were 
mounted onto Fisher SuperFrost Plus slides and coverslipped with Vectashield 
mounting medium containing DAPI. Brain sections were imaged with a Zeiss Axio 2 
microscope for the reconstruction of final placements of optic fibers and virus 
expression. Final positions of electrodes in the brain were visualized by staining with 
cresyl violet (FD Neurotechnologies). 
Statistics and Analysis 
The primary behavioral metrics of interest for all tests was the time spent in port 
(indicated here as a percentage of the 5s stimulus) during the white noise in the 
occasion setting task or the tones and lights in the probabilistic conditioning tasks. We 
normalized behavioral responding by subtracting average time in port measured in a 
period 10 s prior to the presentation of any stimuli. We also computed differences 
between responding on trials in which the white noise would be reinforced (OSCS 
trials) and trials in which the white noise (CS Alone) was presented alone or the 
houselight presented alone (OS Alone) to allow for an assessment of each individual 
rat’s representative ability to discriminate amongst the trial types. Repeated measure 
ANOVAs were used to compare time in port across trial types or difference scores 
within virus groups by light delivery for each test separately. When applicable, post hoc 
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comparisons were made with Sidak’s correction. Electrophysiological analysis was 
identical to as described in Chapter 4. Statistical comparisons and graphics were made 
with Prism 9 (GraphPad) and MATLAB (Mathworks). For all statistical tests α=0.05. 
RESULTS 
Optogenetic inhibition of the BLA impairs occasion setting 
 We tested the impact of brief inhibitions of the basolateral amygdala (BLA) during 
occasion setting performance. Following exclusions for misplaced virus and cannula the 
final group sizes were BLA ArchT n=8 and BLA GFP n=12 (Figure 1A). We first tested 
the ability of light delivery throughout both the OS and CS on occasion setting 
performance. For rats with ArchT there was no apparent effect of light delivery on 
reward-seeking overall (Figure 1B; effect of laser F(1,7)=1.407, p=0.2742; effect of trial 
type F(1,8)=6.576, p=0.0292; interaction F(1,9)=3.131, p=0.0988) yet when examining the 
average discrimination for each rat there was an overall impact of light delivery reducing 
discrimination amongst to be rewarded OSCS trials and CS alone and OS alone trials 
(Figure 1C; effect of laser F(1,7)=13.93, p=0.0073). There was no impact of this same 
manipulation for rats with GFP in the BLA on either overall reward-seeking (Figure 1D; 
effect of laser F(1,11)=0.4562, p=0.5134; effect of trial type F(1,19)=15.38, p=0.0002; 
interaction F(1,18)=3.131, p=0.4027) or discrimination in the occasion setting task (Figure 
1E; effect of laser F(1,11)=1.312, p=0.2763). We next tested whether light delivery just  
the OS could recapitulate these effects. Surprisingly, there was no significant effect of 
laser delivery during the OS on performance (Figure 1F; effect of laser F(1,7)=2.321, 
p=0.1714; effect of trial type F(1,8)=15.22, p=0.0031; interaction F(1,12)=0.8667, p=0.4293) 
or discrimination for ArchT rats (Figure 1G; effect of laser F(1,7)=0.7851, p=0.4050). 
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Interestingly, GFP rats exhibited higher levels of responding when light delivery was 
presented during the OS (Figure 1H; effect of laser F(1,11)=8.568, p=0.0138; effect of trial 
type F(1,17)=19.08, p<0.0001; interaction F(1,19)=1.7, p=0.2095) but this did not impact 
discrimination for these rats (Figure 1I; effect of laser F(1,11)=2.351, p=0.1535). Finally, 
we tested the impact of light delivery during the CS. For ArchT rats, inhibition of the BLA 
did not have an overall impact on conditioned reward-seeking (Figure 1J; effect of laser 
F(1,7)=1.061, p=0.3372; effect of trial type F(111)=9.982, p=0.0045; interaction 
F(1,9)=2.188, p=0.1684) but planned comparisons revealed an impact of light delivery on 
significantly reducing discrimination achieved (Figure 1K; p<0.05 for both CS and OS 
difference). There was no effect of light delivery during the CS for reward-seeking 
(Figure 1L; effect of laser F(1,11)=0.7690, p=0.3993; effect of trial type F(1,20)=18.31, 
p<0.0001; interaction F(1,19)=1.7, p=0.3938) or discriminations among trials (Figure 1M; 
effect of laser F(1,14)=0.8776, p=0.5218) for GFP rats. Taken together these data 
suggest a role for the BLA in utilizing occasion setters to update conditioned responding 
at the time of an ambiguous conditioned stimulus. 
Neural correlates of occasion setting within BLA 
 To assess potential correlates of occasion within BLA itself, we recorded 115 
neurons from 5 rats during occasion setting performance (Figure 2A). Interestingly 
comparable numbers of neurons in the BLA were significantly modulated by the OS and 
CS (Figure 2B; 34% vs 41%) and cues evoked the most modulation among task events 
within neurons that we recorded. There was no significant difference in the degree of 
excitation (p=0.7039) or inhibition (p=0.1292) between BLA neurons with significant 
responses to the OS or CS. We then sought to determine whether BLA neurons might 
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exhibit variations in responses to the CS depending on the prior presentation of the 
occasion setter. 
 We found that although neurons that were excited (Figure 3A) and inhibited 
(Figure 3B) in their response to the CS by trial type (excited F(2,47340)=1894, p<0.0001; 
inhibited F(2,26826)=459.7, p<0.0001) these were reflective of significant differences in 
activity common to OS+CS and CS alone trials (p<0.0001 against OS alone trials for 
each comparison). We wondered if potentially a subset of neurons may exhibit 
modulation as the BLA and turned to neurons that would exhibit significant modulation 
to both the OS and CS as plasticity of sensory specific modalities into the BLA is a 
hallmark of learning and this nucleus frequently exhibits multisensory responses (Quirk 
et al., 1995; Tye et al., 2008; Morrow et al., 2019). We identified 17 neurons that were 
CS- and OS-excited (54% of CS-excited neurons) and no neurons that were CS- and 
OS-inhibited. When analyzing these neurons in their response to the CS across trials 
we found that these neurons exhibited a greater CS-evoked excitation on OS+CS trials 
relative to CS alone trials (Figure 3C; interaction of time and trial type F(1050,25248)=2.771, 
p<0.0001; p<0.05 from 0.12s to 0.27s post CS onset). These data, coupled with the 
finding that optogenetic inhibition of BLA activity during the CS reduces discrimination in 
this task, suggest that the BLA encodes and resolves the uncertainty of an ambiguous 
CS by exploiting hierarchical stimuli to modulate cue-generated excitations. 
Optogenetic inhibition of the OFC is without effect on occasion setting 
 We previously demonstrated that reversible inactivation of OFC is able to impair 
occasion setting and asked when neural activity in OFC may be critical for occasion 
setting performance. Following exclusions for misplaced cannula or virus infusions final 
165 
 
group sizes were OFC ArchT n=8 and OFC GFP n=12 (Figure 4A). First we tested if 
light delivery throughout both stimuli would replicate the effect of reversible inactivation. 
There was no impact of light delivery on reward-seeking for either rats with ArchT 
(Figure 4B; effect of laser F(1,7)=1.032, p=0.3436; effect of trial type F(1,13)=18.32, 
p=0.0002; interaction F(1,13)=1.532, p=0.2505) or GFP (Figure 4D; effect of laser 
F(1,11)=0.003, p=0.9560; effect of trial type F(1,21)=15.38, p<0.0001; interaction 
F(1,16)=0.2475, p=0.7159). As a result discriminations among trial types were unaffected 
for both ArchT (Figure 4C; effect of laser F(1,7)=1.538, p=0.2548) and GFP (Figure 4E; 
effect of laser F(1,11)=0.3212, p=0.5823) groups. We then tested if light delivery during 
the OS would impair occasion setting but again found a lack of effect on reward-seeking 
for both ArchT (Figure 4F; effect of laser F(1,7)=0.0389, p=0.8492; effect of trial type 
F(2,14)=17.66, p=0.0001; interaction F(2,14)=1.482, p=0.2608) and GFP rats (Figure 4H; 
effect of laser F(1,11)=0.009, p=0.9237; effect of trial type F(2,22)=25.90, p<0.0001; 
interaction F(2,22)=0.7208, p=0.4975). There was no effect of light delivery on 
discrimination for ArchT (Figure 4G; effect of laser F(1,7)=1.356, p=0.2824) or GFP rats 
(Figure 4I; effect of laser F(1,11)=0.8745, p=0.3698). Finally we tested the impact of light 
delivery during the CS on occasion setting, yet observed no impact on reward-seeking 
for ArchT rats (Figure 4J; effect of laser F(1,7)=0.4693, p=0.5153; effect of trial type 
F(2,14)=13.76, p=0.0005; interaction F(2,14)=1.782, p=0.2044) nor GFP rats (Figure 4L; 
effect of laser F(1,11)=0.1322, p=0.7231; effect of trial type F(1,21)=23.05, p<0.0001; 
interaction F(1,19)=2.078, p=0.1555) nor on discriminations for either ArchT (Figure 4K; 
effect of laser F(1,7)=2.462, p=0.1606) or GFP rats (Figure 4M; effect of laser 
F(1,11)=3.285, p=0.0972). These data suggest that if the OFC is critical for occasion 
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setting then its contributions are resistant to transient manipulations of neural activity in 
this region. 
Recordings of OFC neural activity during occasion setting 
We turned to in vivo electrophysiological recordings of individual OFC neurons to 
potentially identify neural correlates that would reveal what the contribution, if any, of 
OFC is to occasion setting (Figure 5A). Surprisingly, the event that evoked the highest 
degree of modulation within OFC neurons was entries to the reward port (Figure 5B; 
52%), with relative degrees of modulation to the OS (15%) and CS (16%) being quite 
low in comparison to what we observed in BLA and also in what we have reported for 
nucleus accumbens. We next analyzed whether the overall strength of response in the 
500 ms post cue-onset differed among the CS and OS (Figure 5D-E; G-H). There were 
no significant differences in the degree of excitation (p=0.7730) or inhibition (p=0.9626) 
between OFC neurons with significant responses to the OS and CS. As an additional 
attempt to observe potential correlates of occasion setting we examined neurons with 
either CS-excitations or CS-inhibitions across trial types. Despite overall modulation of 
CS-excited (Figure 6A) and CS-inhibited (Figure 6B) OFC neurons by trial type (excited 
neurons F(2,20514)=595.3, p<0.0001; inhibited neurons F(2,11046)=94.55, p<0.0001) these 
were reflected by similar changes in activity for OS+CS and CS alone trials relative only 
to OS alone trials (p’s<0.05), which is to expected as there is no CS presented on OS 
alone trials, with no difference between OS+CS and CS alone trials. Given the minimal 
number of CS-modulated neurons and the lack of effect of optogenetic inhibition of OFC 
on occasion setting, the contribution of OFC to the hierarchical control of Pavlovian cue-




 The neural circuits underlying the flexible control of cue-triggered motivation 
remain unclear. Here we made use of optogenetics and in vivo electrophysiology to 
assess the contributions of basolateral amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex to the 
regulation of conditioned reward-seeking by occasion setters. Despite a similar impact 
of reversible inactivation of either structure on performance in this task, we find a 
selective effect of optogenetic inhibition of the BLA on the utilization of occasion setters 
to disambiguate the relationship between a conditioned stimulus and reward. Further, 
we identify correlates of occasion setting in single neurons within the BLA and not OFC. 
Collectively these data suggest that the BLA and its related circuitry, but not OFC, 
provide an essential contribution to the ongoing resolution of cue-generated uncertainty. 
 The essential contribution of the BLA to occasion setting builds on a number of 
studies demonstrating the necessity in a number of behaviors that are considered 
“model-based”. BLA neural activity is necessary for reinforcer devaluation, outcome-
specific Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer, and second-order conditioning as has been 
demonstrated with primarily lesions of the BLA (Gallagher and Holland, 1994; Hatfield et 
al., 1996; Baxter and Murray, 2002; Holland and Gallagher, 2003; Lindgren et al., 2003; 
Sharpe and Schoenbaum, 2016). Despite this, the precise contributions of BLA to these 
processes has remained unclear as lesions interrupt BLA activity permanently. 
Exploiting the temporal precision of optogenetics we reveal a time-limited contribution of 
BLA activity to occasion setting as only inhibitions overlapping with the conditioned 
stimulus impaired performance. This suggests BLA utilizes a previously presented 
occasion setter to resolve uncertainty during a conditioned stimulus. This was 
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accompanied by findings of single neurons in the BLA that strongly encoded these 
occasion setting cues and evidence that BLA neurons show trial-to-trial modulation of 
responses to the conditioned stimulus. These findings suggest a complex contribution of 
BLA to the resolution of uncertainty in potentially disambiguating the current 
motivational significance of Pavlovian cue for downstream circuits. 
 Despite a role for the BLA, we found little evidence of neural encoding nor a time-
limited contribution of activity in the OFC for occasion setting. This was surprising to us 
given a number of demonstrations that interactions between OFC and BLA shape cue 
and outcome related neural activity in each structure and that activity in the OFC is 
necessary for a number of higher-order phenomena in Pavlovian conditioning 
(Schoenbaum et al., 2003; Saddoris et al., 2005; McDannald et al., 2012; Takahashi et 
al., 2013; Lucantonio et al., 2015). However, the contributions of the OFC to occasion 
setting may be resistant to transient manipulations of OFC neural activity, and that 
limited removal of this structure is without effect given that its functions can be 
overtaken by other regions like the BLA (Sharpe and Schoenbaum, 2016). This may 
potentially explain the discrepancy between our prior finding that reversible inactivation 
of the OFC impaired occasion setting, as this manipulation likely was profound enough 
to interrupt not only OFC activity but also that of its downstream structures like the BLA. 
It is possible that optogenetic manipulations of OFC performed during learning, when 
rats are expected to construct a map of possible relations among the stimuli in this task, 
could affect behavior. Interestingly, this hypothesis would support a recent 
demonstration that optogenetic inactivation of the OFC is without effect on value-guided 
choice behavior once it has been established, but can have effects when rats are 
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learning about their relative preferences among options (Gardner et al., 2017, 2019, 
2020; Zhou et al., 2020). Combining manipulations of OFC during learning and 
potentially in combination with circuit-defined optogenetic manipulations will be critical to 
assessing its role in hierarchical reward-seeking. 
 That the BLA encoded occasion setters was suggested by numerous findings 
that this region is essential in utilizing contexts to influence conditioned reward-seeking 
(Chaudhri et al., 2013; Millan et al., 2015; Sciascia et al., 2015). By exploiting the ability 
of occasion setters to have precise and discrete presentations that are non-overlapping 
with their conditioned stimuli we report for the first time the widespread encoding of 
these hierarchical stimuli in the BLA. Interestingly, the BLA also encodes discriminative 
stimuli, which disambiguate when a given action will lead to reward (Ambroggi et al., 
2008; Ishikawa et al., 2008). The manner in which occasion setters and discriminative 
stimuli influence reward-seeking is similar in that they resolve the uncertainty 
surrounding a separate discrete event, although discriminative stimuli themselves are 
essentially always reward-predictive while we made use of occasion setters that on their 
own are not predictive of reward. The BLA is critical for the encoding of discriminative 
stimuli within the nucleus accumbens, where inactivation of the BLA reduces excitations 
in the nucleus accumbens to discriminative stimuli (Ambroggi et al., 2008; Ishikawa et 
al., 2008). We previously reported that a majority of nucleus accumbens neurons are 
significantly modulated by occasion setting stimuli which suggests that input from the 
BLA is additionally necessary for both these neural responses in the nucleus 




 In conclusion, we exploited the ability of occasion setting to reduce a context to a 
brief and phasic event to assess the precise contributions of the BLA and OFC to the 
hierarchical control of reward-seeking. These findings leave open numerous possibilities 
for how the BLA and its related circuitry control the resolution of cue-generated 
uncertainty, potentially by interacting with downstream striatal circuits. Paired recordings 
of neural activity within BLA and OFC during training will be essential for clarifying 
discrepancies among the impacts of reversible inactivation and optogenetic inhibition on 
the contribution of OFC to this dynamic process. Collectively an increased investigation 
into the circuits responsible for the modulation of the motivational value of reward-paired 
cues has the potential to identify novel treatments for substance use disorders and post-








Figure 6.1. Basolateral amygdala neural activity is essential for occasion setters 
to influence conditioned reward-seeking. A, Representative expression of ArchT and 
GFP in the BLA and reconstruction of optic fiber placements and the largest, in light 
green, and smallest, in dark green, degree of expression of ArchT in the BLA. B, Time 
in the reward port during the CS period across trials normalized to a period 10s before a 
trial started for ArchT rats when 532 nm light was delivered throughout the OS and CS 
periods during half of all trials. C, Individual differences in time in port during the 
conditioned stimulus period on reinforced trials minus either conditioned stimulus alone 
or occasion setter alone trials for ArchT rats when light was delivered throughout the OS 
and CS on half of the trials. D-E, same as B-C but for rats with GFP in the BLA. F-I, 
same as B-E but when light was delivered overlapping with half of all OS presentations. 
J-M, same as B-E but when light was delivered overlapping with half of all CS 
presentations. Numbers indicate distance from bregma in millimeters and the coronal 
sections were obtained from (Paxinos and Watson, 2007). Open bars indicate trials 
without laser delivery, closed bars indicate trials with laser delivery. OS, occasion setter. 






Figure 6.2. Basolateral amygdala neurons encode occasion setters. A, 
Reconstruction of electrode tracks throughout the BLA. B, Proportion of neurons that 
are significantly excited (yellow), inhibited (blue), or those with no significant response 
(gray) for the four relevant task-related events. C, Heatmap of individual neuron 
responses to the occasion setting houselight sorted by greatest inhibition at the top to 
greatest inhibition at the bottom. D, Mean ± SEM for neurons with significant inhibitions 
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to the OS cue. E, Mean ± SEM for neurons with significant excitations to the OS cue. F-
H, same as C-E but for the white noise conditioned stimulus. I-K, same as C-E but for 
entries to the reward port. Sorting for heatmaps is independent for each event. Numbers 
indicate distance from bregma in millimeters and the coronal sections were obtained 







Figure 6.3. Responses to conditioned stimuli in the basolateral amygdala are 
influenced by occasion setters. A, Normalized firing rate (z-score) throughout the CS 
of neurons with significant excitations to the CS that are sorted by trial type. B, 
Normalized firing rate (z-score) throughout the CS of neurons with significant inhibitions 
to the CS that are sorted by trial type. C, Normalized firing rate (z-score) throughout the 
CS of neurons that were significantly excited to both the CS and OS sorted by trial type. 
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Figure 6.4. Lack of impact of optogenetic inhibition of orbitofrontal cortex on 
occasion setting. A, Representative expression of ArchT and GFP in the OFC and 
reconstruction of optic fiber placements and the largest, in light green, and smallest, in 
dark green, degree of expression of ArchT in the OFC. B, Time in the reward port 
during the CS period across trials normalized to a period 10s before a trial started for 
ArchT rats when 532 nm light was delivered throughout the OS and CS periods during 
half of all trials. C, Individual differences in time in port during the conditioned stimulus 
period on reinforced trials minus either conditioned stimulus alone or occasion setter 
alone trials for ArchT rats when light was delivered throughout the OS and CS on half of 
the trials. D-E, same as B-C but for rats with GFP in the OFC. F-I, same as B-E but 
when light was delivered overlapping with half of all OS presentations. J-M, same as B-
E but when light was delivered overlapping with half of all CS presentations. Numbers 
indicate distance from bregma in millimeters and the coronal sections were obtained 
from (Paxinos and Watson, 2007). Open bars indicate trials without laser delivery, 









Figure 6.5. Minimal encoding of task-relevant cues in orbitofrontal cortex during 
occasion setting. A, Reconstruction of electrode tracks through the OFC. B, 
Proportion of neurons that are significantly excited (yellow), inhibited (blue), or those 
with no significant response (gray) for the four relevant task-related events. C, Heatmap 
of individual neuron responses to the occasion setting houselight sorted by greatest 
inhibition at the top to greatest inhibition at the bottom. D, Mean ± SEM for neurons with 
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significant inhibitions to the OS cue. E, Mean ± SEM for neurons with significant 
excitations to the OS cue. F-H, same as C-E but for the white noise conditioned 
stimulus. I-K, same as C-E but for entries to the reward port. Sorting for heatmaps is 
independent for each event. Numbers indicate distance from bregma in millimeters and 
the coronal sections were obtained from (Paxinos and Watson, 2007). OS, occasion 






Figure 6.6. Lack of influence of occasion setters on orbitofrontal neural activity 
during an ambiguous conditioned stimulus. . A, Normalized firing rate (z-score) 
throughout the CS of neurons with significant excitations to the CS that are sorted by 
trial type. B, Normalized firing rate (z-score) throughout the CS of neurons with 
significant inhibitions to the CS that are sorted by trial type. For all figures lines indicate 







 In the research described here, I exploited a unique behavioral approach to 
resolve neural and behavioral mechanisms underlying the resolution of uncertainty. This 
work has a number of implications for our understandings of complex interactions 
among stimuli in the world in generating motivation, craving, and approach to reward-
associated stimuli. In particular, I have identified a number of brain regions that are 
essential for this process and described mechanisms within these essential nuclei that 
contribute to this occasion setting process. I will provide first a brief overview of each 
chapter and then turn to a more general implication of the collective findings with 
attention to critical next steps. 
Occasion setters have motivational value 
 In Chapter 2 I developed and characterized a novel behavioral approach to 
capture occasion setting in freely-behaving rodents. These efforts were motivated to 
overcome difficulties in the time required for training, minimal discrimination achieved 
between occasion set and non-occasion set trials, and the reduced trial count in 
previous demonstrations of occasion setting. It is hopefully apparent that the occasion 
setting paradigm I developed captures the notion that in essence the occasion setter is 
akin to acontext, but allows the experimenter to have direct control over the 
presentation and actions of this context. Exploiting this approach, I validated that the 
behavioral performance in this paradigm meets criteria for observing occasion setting as 
extinction of the occasion setting cue was without effect on behavioral discrimination. I 
then asked what are the actions of occasion setters: do they modulate predictive 
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relationships between cues and rewards or do they attain incentive motivational value 
and in turn regulate the motivational value of cues? I demonstrate that the answer to 
both of these questions is yes. Together these resolve a long-standing assumption yet 
difficult to ascertain property of traditional operant-box contexts and that by capturing 
the underlying process suggest that these contexts themselves are desirable, obtain 
motivational value, and in turn act in some way to gate the motivational and predictive 
properties of conditioned stimuli.  
Dopamine neuron activity is essential for occasion setting 
 Dopamine neurons are one of the most intensely investigated neuromodulatory 
systems in the brain yet we continue to lack a detailed understanding of their 
contributions to cue-triggered behavior. In Chapter 3 I made use of optogenetics in 
combination with TH-Cre transgenic rats to allow for the precise inhibition of dopamine 
neuron activity on a timescale relevant to processing reward-associated cues. These 
experiments revealed a surprising and selective effect of dopamine neuron inhibition 
during the presentation of occasion setters as interrupting the ability of rats to use these 
hierarchical stimuli to resolve the ambiguity of a conditioned stimulus. In control 
experiments I attempted to rule out potential explanations concerning the well-
appreciated encoding of expected value, a combination of the probability and magnitude 
of the reward predicted by a conditioned stimulus, by these neurons. In scenarios in 
which expected value was stable and unchanging, there was no apparent impact of 
optogenetic inhibition of dopamine neurons during these probabilistic conditioned 
stimuli. This selective impact on occasion setting is in agreement with a growing body of 
work arguing that dopamine neurons contribute to conditioned behavior by integrating 
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factors beyond simply the value of a conditioned stimulus (Sharpe et al., 2017b; 
Babayan et al., 2018; Langdon et al., 2018; Gershman and Uchida, 2019).  
Nucleus accumbens mechanisms mediating occasion setting 
 That manipulations of dopamine activity impacted occasion setting made 
apparent that investigations into downstream targets of dopamine neurons could reveal 
how such modulation is utilized. In Chapter 4 I found that manipulations of neural 
activity or dopamine release in the nucleus accumbens disrupted occasion setting 
performance. To better understand these pharmacological effects, I first recorded single 
neurons within the nucleus accumbens. I found widespread encoding of occasion 
setters within the nucleus accumbens core which suggests a critical contribution of 
neurons within this specialized subregion is to recognize such hierarchical stimuli. By 
analyzing the activity of neurons on a trial by trial basis I discovered that there existed 
two potential mechanisms for occasion setters to modulate neural activity at the time of 
a conditioned stimulus. One was that the prior presentation of an occasion setter 
generated more intense inhibitions at the time of the conditioned stimulus. The other 
was that there existed a population of about 10% of recorded nucleus accumbens core 
neurons for whom their response flipped from excitation to inhibition to the conditioned 
stimulus if the occasion setter had been previously presented. I collaborated with 
colleagues at the University of Minnesota and we recorded dopamine release in near 
real-time with the biosensor dLight1.3b. We observed a striking gating function of 
occasion setters on dopamine release at the time of the conditioned stimulus such that 
we only observed significant dopamine release to this ambiguous cue if the occasion 
setter had been previously presented. Overall these suggest that both neurons and 
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dopamine release in the nucleus accumbens core are highly dynamic, encode 
hierarchical stimuli, and are necessary for adaptive behavior. 
Basolateral amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex are critical for occasion setting 
 In Chapter 4 I observed an interesting effect of glutamate antagonism within the 
core, but not shell, of the nucleus accumbens in increasing responding following 
presentation of an occasion setter – an effect that I interpret as improper processing of 
this cue as a higher-order stimulus. This finding spurred investigations into potential 
glutamatergic inputs to the nucleus accumbens core that may also be critical for 
occasion setting. On the basis of a large literature investigating the selective 
contribution of activity within the basolateral amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex in 
adjusting responding to cues when their value has changed in Pavlovian conditioning 
these regions were obvious candidates to probe. In Chapter 5 I found that reversible 
inactivation of either basolateral amygdala or orbitofrontal cortex impaired occasion 
setting performance in a manner reminiscent of the same manipulation in the nucleus 
accumbens core. In a series of control experiments, I found that these regions are not 
necessary in the performance of conditioned responding to a conditioned stimulus with 
a fixed and unchanging relationship to reward. I also demonstrate that dorsal 
hippocampus inactivation is without effect on occasion setting performance supporting 
that there is not general state-dependency effects of inactivation in any brain region that 
will affect occasion setting. 
Basolateral amygdala neurons encode and are necessary for occasion setting 
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 In Chapter 6 I sought to explore more precise contributions and mechanisms 
within the basolateral amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex that would underlie their 
essential contribution to occasion setting. In electrophysiological recordings I found that 
basolateral amygdala neurons, and not necessarily orbitofrontal neurons, encoded 
occasion setters. This was commonly observed as a significantly strong and brief 
excitation in basolateral amygdala neurons and I found evidence that for some neurons 
in basolateral amygdala the strength of excitation to the ambiguous conditioned 
stimulus was gated by occasion setters. To test what aspects and, more specifically, 
when neural activity in either structure was necessary I made use of optogenetics to 
precisely inhibit either basolateral amygdala or orbitofrontal cortex. Interestingly, 
optogenetic inhibition of the basolateral amygdala throughout a trial or just during the 
conditioned stimulus decreased discrimination in the occasion setting task. In contrast, 
there was no effect of optogenetic inhibition of the orbitofrontal cortex, despite 
previously demonstrating in Chapter 5 that reversible inactivation of this region impaired 
responding. This discrepancy suggests a complex contribution of orbitofrontal cortex to 
occasion setting that is potentially resistant to brief alterations in orbitofrontal neural 
activity. Overall these data provide strong support for the basolateral amygdala itself as 
critical locus for occasion setting and open up a number of potential future 
investigations into circuit mechanisms underlying its contribution to the hierarchical 
control of cue-motivated behavior. 
Going forward versus holding back with occasion setting 
 In this dissertation I’ve exploited a specific form of occasion setting, positive 
occasion setting, that disambiguates when a conditioned stimulus will predict reward as 
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opposed to negative occasion setting, where the occasion setter acts to inhibit 
responding to a conditioned stimulus that will not lead to reward on the current trial. 
There is an emerging body of work that is concerned with the neural circuits underlying 
this inhibitory process that has focused on the orbitofrontal cortex primarily (Meyer and 
Bucci, 2016b; Shobe et al., 2017). Perhaps the lack of effect of optogenetic inhibition I 
observed is due to a selective contribution of the orbitofrontal cortex to negative 
occasion setting. I opted to pursue positive occasion setting as there are concerns that 
negative occasion setters themselves typically become conditioned inhibitors and act to 
broadly inhibit all conditioned responding in a general manner (see Chapter 1). Despite 
this, it is interesting to note that in most traditional studies of the contextual control of 
behavior that the process at play is thought to be negative occasion setting by the 
extinction context (Grahame et al., 1990; Holland and Bouton, 1999; Bouton, 2004; 
Bouton et al., 2006; Trask et al., 2017). Despite this, in our preparation and 
investigations into positive occasion setting we found overlap in brain regions that have 
previously been implicated in classical contextual control of conditioned responding. 
This suggests there is potential overlap in the neural systems supporting these 
processes – but caution is noted in that physical settings as contexts may not act 
exclusively as occasion setters. In the future it will be critical for better behavioral 
paradigms to be developed for the reliable observation of negative occasion setting and 
work to distinguish the overlap in neural circuits between this form of hierarchical control 
and that of positive occasion setting.  
Dopamine, uncertainty, and nucleus accumbens dynamics 
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 One of the most fascinating aspects of these findings is the precise contribution 
of dopamine neuron activity to occasion setting and in turn the modulation of dopamine 
signaling by occasion setters. This was surprising given the finding that dopamine 
neurons encoding the probability of reward delivery associated with conditioned stimuli 
(Fiorillo et al., 2003; Tobler et al., 2005). In addition, it has been demonstrated that 
dopamine release in the accumbens core is sensitive to probability of reinforcement 
(Hart et al., 2015). Despite this, how such expected value interacted to guide behavior 
was not apparent and required technical and behavioral innovation. The findings in 
Chapters 3 and 4 are in agreement with a developing notion that dopamine functions in 
a manner consistent with “model-based” reinforcement learning algorithms (Dayan and 
Berridge, 2014). That is to say, neither dopamine neurons, nor dopamine release, nor 
activity in their downstream striatal targets are exclusively involved in signaling 
Rescorla-Wagner or temporal difference learning derived prediction errors. What then 
could be the contribution of dopamine neurons to occasion setting? 
 Perhaps occasion setters function to scale the amount of dopamine release in 
response to conditioned stimuli. In a modification of temporal difference reinforcement 
learning put forth by Zhang and colleagues, they propose a scaling factor κ that allows 
for changes in internal state to alter the value of a given conditioned stimulus (Zhang et 
al., 2009; Berridge, 2012; Dayan and Berridge, 2014). An issue arises however in 
imaging how κ could translate to situations of either uncertainty or where a separate 
stimulus like an occasion setter is acting to modify value. The proposal of κ to describe 
occasion setters follows a common theme in this research in the difficult distinction in 
whether alterations in internal state are occasion setters. It is certainly apparent that 
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alterations in homeostasis result in motivated behavior that deviate from traditional 
reinforcement learning algorithms and that κ can indeed capture these given its primary 
assumption that this scaling occurs for all presentations of the stimulus. It is important to 
emphasize, however, that these approaches to manipulate internal states are akin to 
the application of distinct physical contexts to modulate behavior – they make it difficult 
to understand the neural correlates that react to these modulatory states and stimuli. 
The occasion setting approach we have developed has revealed dopaminergic 
correlates that certainly indicate exquisite tuning of this system to hierarchical 
information and then its utilization to gate dopamine release, striatal signaling, and 
behavior at the time of ambiguous conditioned stimuli. As I highlighted in the 
introduction, this presents a conundrum in that no current computational model of 
Pavlovian conditioning appears suited to capture the nuances of occasion setting 
behavior. As we now provide evidence for neural correlates of occasion setting, a 
renewed interest in developing computational models of hierarchical cue control will 
undoubtedly be transformative for our understanding of the function of the mesolimbic 
dopamine system. 
Hierarchical regulation of appetitive versus aversive cues 
 I have focused exclusively on occasion setting for cues that predict appetitive 
stimuli with little to no evidence for occasion setting for aversion-predictive cues. It is 
certainly possible for occasion setters to act on stimuli that predict aversive outcomes. 
Whether the underlying neural substrates are similar or distinct for appetitive versus 
aversive occasion setting is one of the most pressing future directions that is ripe for 
exploration. It is interesting to note that recent evidence has revealed unique 
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dopaminergic contributions to reward and aversion and a segregation of dopamine 
release to rewarding and aversive simple Pavlovian cues in distinct striatal subregions 
(de Jong et al., 2019; Verharen et al., 2020). These findings suggest that there may be 
distinctions in how such release patterns across these striatal subregions are sensitive 
to hierarchical control and if there are any differences in such control for rewarding and 
aversive stimuli. Indeed, this is one direction that I am most excited about and hope to 
explore in the future.  
Apart from dopamine, basolateral amygdala neurons are able to segregate the 
encoding of appetitive and aversive cues that is to some extent captured by their 
projection-target (Paton et al., 2006; Morrison and Salzman, 2009, 2010; Shabel and 
Janak, 2009; Beyeler et al., 2016). These neurons are also able to encode “safety” 
cues, a unique form of conditioned inhibitor for aversion-predictive stimuli, suggesting a 
mechanism within basolateral amygdala for the hierarchical control of aversion (Sangha 
et al., 2013). Translating the model of occasion setting developed here to capture such 
aversive occasion setting and even demonstrating feasibility of such a behavior in mice 
will facilitate the use of novel neuroscientific tools for investigation into flexible cue-
driven behavior.  
Translational implications of occasion setting process in psychiatric illness 
 All of the studies described here made use of traditional sucrose reinforcers to 
first define the neural substrates supporting hierarchical control of reward-seeking. 
These studies were all motivated by a pressing need to better capture in animal models 
the control of cue-elicited motivation that occurs for humans in daily life. It should be 
apparent that our behaviors are highly dynamic and we are not driven to respond to 
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cues solely as a result of learning the precise probability and contingency of their 
relationship to outcomes. It is certainly pressing to develop models in which drug 
associated stimuli are under hierarchical control. An analogue of this process is the use 
of drug availability cues in self-administration paradigms like the intermittent access 
approach (Zimmer et al., 2012; Kawa et al., 2016). Whether these availability cues act 
as occasion setters or are discriminative stimuli is not totally clear, yet evidence 
suggests there are individual differences in the way in which these hierarchical cues 
influence reinstatement either directly or by modulating the motivational value of drug-
paired cues – reminiscent of the findings in Chapter 3 (Collins and Saunders, 2019). In 
line with this, the use of distinct operant boxes to signal extinction or non-extinction is a 
classic model for context-based control (Crombag et al., 2008; Janak and Chaudhri, 
2010; Valyear et al., 2017). As noted previously, this has limited neuroscientific 
investigations into how these higher-order stimuli influence reward-seeking in real-time. 
Adapting operant and Pavlovian occasion setting approaches for drug self-
administration will be essential for identifying novel neural circuits for drug use, 
extinction, and relapse. 
 Apart from modifying the value of drug- and reward-paired cues, occasion setting 
is also applicable to a number of physiological processes resulting from drug use. In 
critical experiments that have largely been overlooked occasion setting processes were 
identified as being essential for the expression of both sensitization and tolerance – two 
of the criteria necessary for a diagnosis of a substance use disorder (Anagnostaras and 
Robinson, 1996; Anagnostaras et al., 2002; Ramos et al., 2002). Despite this, little 
investigation has spurred from these initial findings leaving many open questions 
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pertaining to the neurobiology of sensitization and tolerance that may be essential for 
lessening the harm and concerns of overdosing in human substance users. Moreover, 
interoceptive states evoked by drugs of abuse are able to act as occasion setters and 
investigations into this form of occasion setting will be essential for factors regulating 
continued intake once drug use has been initiated (Randall et al., 2019). Beyond 
addiction, disordered occasion setting has been implicated in schizoaffective disorders 
and in post-traumatic stress disorders (Fraser and Holland, 2019). It is clear that 
embracing a neuroscientific study of occasion setting has pressing implications for our 
approach to the treatment of numerous disorders. 
Conclusion 
 Collectively the work in this dissertation captures a number of initial 
investigations into the hierarchical control of cue-motivated behavior. I provide a 
framework for modeling occasion setting and an optimization of this approach for 
neuroscientific investigation. As a result, I have identified a number of brain regions and 
mechanism within that are essential for flexibility in responding to reward-paired cues. 
Particularly poignant outstanding questions concern the interactions between the neural 
systems explored here, how dopamine release and neural activity interact in the 
resolution of uncertainty, the generality of such findings to outcomes of opposing 
valence, and how experiences such as drug use and stress impede on the neural and 
behavioral mechanisms of hierarchical control. Given the critical influence cues have 
over our behavior and that cues in the real-world are dynamic and have ever varying 
motivational value it is apparent that hierarchical processes regulating cue-driven 
behavior are the norm rather than the exception. Expanding our understanding of how 
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the brain generates and rapidly fine-tunes motivation at an ever more complex and 
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